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SUMMARY 
This thesis investigates the extent to which addiction and its associated 
neurobiological impairment are considered as factors in Magistrates' 
criminal sentencing decisions. Over four empirical studies, Magistrates were 
presented with sentencing scenarios and their decisions analyzed. Study 1 
indicated that addiction can be treated as a disease of the mind, but only in 
the explicit absence of choice in its initiation. Where normative addiction 
narratives were confounded by removing choice, leniency was extended in 
common with similar impairment of alternate origin. This choice 
component was examined in the context of age of first drug use, 
maintenance of addiction, and the extent to which addiction might 
undermine perceptions of intoxication being voluntary. Study 2 found that 
choice was equivalently inculpating whether made as a juvenile or an adult, 
but leniency was observed where addiction was accompanied by an 
acquired (fictional) brain disease, suggesting it was not solely drug-use which 
set it apart. In Study 3, removing choice from addiction promoted leniency, 
but only where drug-use was ongoing and uninterrupted. Where it was not, 
removing choice resulted in harsher sentencing. Study 4 examined addiction 
as it influenced perceptions of choice in intoxication, finding that, in specific 
circumstances, intoxication could serve to mitigate, whilst addiction was 
more commonly seen as aggravating, even in the absence of intoxication. 
Results are discussed in relation to current legal standards which attach 
criminal responsibility to acts on the basis of volitional control over 
behaviour and deny excuse to offenders where they are understood to have 
created the circumstances of their own defence. These findings demonstrate 
impairment mediating leniency on the basis of its aetiology. Addiction is 
understood as a brain disease in theory, but is treated so in practice only 
where conventional aetiological narratives are confounded by varying 
perceptions of voluntariness in drug-use.
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1It is something to show that the consistency of a system requires a 
particular result, but it is not all. The life of the law has not been 
logic: it has been experience. The felt necessities of the time, the 
prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy, 
avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share 
with their fellow-men, have had a good deal more to do than the 
syllogism in determining the rules by which men should be 
governed. 
Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.
The Common Law (1881)
Until comparatively recently, the nature of  the alcohol or drug abuser was 
commonly considered to reside in their bad character. It was the immoral person who 
consumed to excess, just as it was the immoral person who committed crimes. The link 
between drugs and crime was therefore considered to be no mystery; evidence of  
frequent co-occurrence could be attributed to their shared roots. In the latter part of  the 
20th century, advances in imaging technology and neuroscientific techniques provided a 
window into the structure and function of  the brain and began to reveal evidence of  
alterations to both being mediated by drugs of  abuse. Such evidence has contributed in 
large part to the emerging belief  that addiction should be characterized as a brain 
disease. Whilst there is by no means complete agreement on whether addiction merits 
this label or is best understood in these terms, it is a conception which has governed 
research budgets, directed treatment approaches and increasingly entered the public 
understanding.
Yet some have argued that, in giving it this label, we are deriving that addiction 
begins not with choice but with predisposition, that continued drug-use is a compulsion 
which exceeds rational control, and that behavioural impairment resulting from chronic 
2drug-use be considered in common with the manifested symptoms of  other medical 
conditions which impede the full voluntariness of  action. Any condition or circumstance 
which calls into question the volitional nature of  acts inherently speaks to the existence 
and extent of  responsibility for those acts and, in the case of  drug addicts, those acts are 
frequently criminal in nature. Ordinarily, a medical condition which brought into doubt 
the voluntary nature of  an individual's behaviour would be of  significant relevance in a 
criminal justice context. Given the prevalence of  addicted offenders, the question of  
whether addiction is or should be considered in common with these is an increasingly 
pressing one. To what extent does the disease-like conception of  addiction, with its 
implications for the volitional nature of  behaviour and the blame which attaches to it, 
factor into the thinking of  those tasked with the practical application of  criminal law?
Before we return to this question head-on, we will begin by outlining the scale of  the 
problem we are considering, presenting the variety of  ways in which drug use and 
addiction are inextricably linked to criminal behaviour. We will continue by briefly 
outlining developments in the field of  addiction research which have contributed to our 
current understanding and the continuing debate over addiction's status as a disease. We 
will demonstrate that the great majority of  these theories share in common an 
understanding that drugs of  abuse alter brain structure and function resulting in 
impaired behavioural control and that, without exception, all current theories 
incorporate an understanding of  functional impairment in the addict. We will present 
an overview of  the evidence for impulsivity and compulsion in the addict which has led 
some to question the extent to which they bear full responsibility for their actions. 
We will then turn attention to the manner in which the law considers mental faculty 
and behavioural control in determining the existence and extent of  responsibility for 
criminal acts, developing a picture of  the evolved law concerning defendants whose 
volitional capacity is called into question. We will in turn outline how addicted and 
intoxicated offenders fit into this picture, highlighting areas of  uncertainty. We will 
demonstrate that the law sets the threshold for the complete denial of  responsibility 
extremely high, such that only a vanishingly-small number of  cases of  this kind are dealt 
with at the liability stage of  criminal proceedings. We will show that the majority are 
instead passed to sentencing, where factors mitigating or aggravating culpability for 
offending are considered, and explore the status of  addiction as one such factor.
3PREVALENCE
The majority of  offences committed by addicts are low-level acquisitive crimes such 
as mugging and burglary, either with the aim of  acquiring money to buy drugs or to 
supplement an income which is consistently expended on them. Such activity has been 
estimated by police sources to account for in the region of  50% of  all crime (Mills, 
Skodbo, & Blyth, 2013). In 2004, the UK Government estimated that approximately 
280,000 ‘problem drug users’ accounted for more than half  of  all crime (Home Office, 
2004), with a resultant social and economic cost in excess of  £20 billion per year 
(Cabinet Office Strategy Unit, 2003). In the four years to 2008 alone, this estimate rose 
to 332,000 - around 1 in every 150 of  the UK adult population (Home Office, 2008). 
Bennett (2000) explored the relationship between drug-use and the self-reported 
frequency of  acquisitive crime in the 12 months preceding arrest. Arrestees who were 
users of  a single drug reported an average of  26 offences in the past year, users of  two 
drugs 95 offences, and users of  three or more drugs an average of  176.
Once arrested, contact with the criminal justice system shows little tendency towards 
dissuading addicts from further crime. The UK government's Surveying Prisoner Crime 
Reduction Survey records that the rate of  reconviction within a year of  release amongst 
non-drug-using offenders is in the region of  30%, whereas for poly-drug-users the figure 
exceeds 70% (Ministry of  Justice, 2010). Simply put, two out of  every three prison terms 
handed down to substance-abusing offenders are ineffective in preventing those 
offenders from going on to commit further crimes on release from custody. At the same 
time, rates of  drug use amongst prisoners are similar to those amongst arrestees 
(Holloway & Bennett, 2004; Wilson, 2011), indicating an availability of  drugs in prisons 
which at least matches and likely exceeds that on the outside. Of  the 70% of  offenders 
arriving in UK prisons with a record of  prior drug misuse, more than two-thirds report 
drug dependency whilst in custody (House of  Commons Home Affairs Committee, 
2012).
Whilst drug use is clearly a risk factor for imprisonment, there is also evidence to 
suggest that imprisonment is a risk factor for drug use. Almost one in five (19%) of  the 
prisoners sampled in the Surveying Prisoner Crime Reduction study who had ever used 
heroin stated that they had first used it in prison (Edgar, Aresti, &  Cornish, 2012).
 In addition, recent years have seen an increasing number of  dependency and 
addiction issues which begin with the legal and legitimate use of  prescription drugs. 
4Recently released US Government figures indicate a 135% increase in the number of  
heroin users between 2002 and 2016 (SAMHSA, 2017), attributed in large part to the 
link between prescription medication and subsequent illegal drug use (CDC, 2015). It 
has been suggested that 75% of  heroin users in the US first began using prescription 
painkillers (Cicero, Ellis, Surratt, & Kurtz, 2014), of  whom as many as 40% will have 
been legitimately prescribed them by their physician (Lankenau et al., 2012). In a 
disturbing echo of  these trends, the prescription rate in the UK for opioid drugs has 
roughly doubled over a similar time period. As of  2015, 5% of  all patients were 
receiving such prescriptions regularly (Cartagena Farias et al., 2017).
ADDICTION
Neuroscientific advances in recent decades have promoted a fundamental shift in the 
scientific consensus on addiction. The following section will outline the prominent 
theories in the field of  addiction research which emerged over that time and resulted in 
the growing acceptance of  an idea that was once a minority opinion: that addiction, 
rather than being attributable to immoral character, is instead best understood as a 
chronic brain disease rooted in "the neurobiology of  disrupted self-control" (Baler & 
Volkow, 2006, p. 559).
Models of  addiction.
Historic. The seal of  the American Psychiatric Association bears the profile of  Dr 
Benjamin Rush, who, in addition to being a signatory to the US Declaration of  
Independence, is also considered by many to be the father of  American psychiatry. In 
penning his 1785 essay 'An inquiry into the effects of  ardent spirits upon the human 
body and mind', Dr Rush can lay claim to being amongst the earliest advocates of  what 
has come to be termed the disease model of  addiction. Going against the established 
understanding of  the time, he argued that habitual use of  alcohol was not evidence of  
weak will or immoral character, but should be understood as a consequence of  disease 
brought about by such use. In doing so, he was one of  the earliest proponents of  the 
idea that habitual alcohol consumption was driven more by some quality of  the alcohol 
than by the intemperate nature of  the consumer (Lender, 1982). Nevertheless, this 
remained a minority opinion for more than two centuries. 
Journals on the topic of  inebriation and addiction medicine started to appear 
towards the end of  the 1800s, just as advances in chemistry began to add to the array of  
5potent and potentially addictive substances isolated and synthesized (Crocq, 2007). 
Towards the end of  the century, the noted German psychiatrist Emil Kraepelin (1887) 
conducted experiments to examine the impact of  various substances on psychological 
processes and concluded not only that alcohol was a risk factor for mental illness, but 
moreover that alcoholism should be understood as an acquired disease associated with 
damage to the cerebral cortex. However, this gained little traction within the nascent 
study of  the psychological sciences well into the 20th century.
Jumping forward, Dole and Nyswander (1967) termed addiction a ‘metabolic 
disease’, underlining the fact that addiction could readily outlive any physical 
dependence on the drug in question. The suggestion that addiction might be a disorder 
which could continue after drug-use had stopped allowed for two interesting conceptual 
possibilities. Either drug-use induced addiction, causing changes to the brain which 
persisted into abstinence over an unknown timeframe, or drug-use interacted with a pre-
existing susceptibility of  an unclear nature.
Developments in the field of  addiction science over the past half-century have 
arguably been driven in large part by an inability to account for continued, compulsive 
drug-use even as self-reported pleasure wanes and expressions of  a desire for abstinence 
multiply. Whilst there is by no means absolute consensus, these developments have 
converged towards broad agreement that addiction is best characterized as a chronic, 
relapsing disease of  the mind (Leshner, 1997; Robinson & Berridge, 1993; Volkow, 
Koob, & McLellan, 2016).
Opponent processes. Rooted in basic understanding of  homeostatic, negative-
feedback mechanisms that regulate vital physiological functions such as hydration and 
temperature, Solomon and Corbit (1973) derived a model of  addiction which operated 
along similar lines. Theorizing that activation of  brain systems resulting in deviation 
from a regulatory set point (an 'a-process') would automatically trigger the activation of  
a second, opposing process to ameliorate the effect (a 'b-process'), they proposed that 
intense hedonic or emotional states resulting from 'a-processes' would automatically 
trigger opposing 'b-processes' which diminish their intensity, and that the balancing of  
these two opponent processes determines hedonic or dysphoric experience.
The most crucial difference they propose between the a-process and the b-process is 
that, unlike the a-process, the b-process is strengthened by repeated drug experience (see 
Figure 1.1). This has the effect of  magnifying the impact of  the b-process and not that 
6of  the a-process, with this changing balance accounting for the diminishing euphoric 
effect of  drugs (Solomon, 1977). With ongoing drug-use, the b-process continues to 
strengthen, beginning earlier and lasting for longer, with the eventual effect that it masks 
the a-process entirely and presents as tolerance to drug effects (Laulin, Célèrier, Larcher, 
Le Moal, & Simonnet, 1999). At the same time, withdrawal becomes an increasingly 
aversive state and is therefore compulsively avoided by maintaining drug use.
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Figure 1.1 - Opponent Process model of addiction.
Koob and Le Moal (1997) extended the theory and proposed a neural model of  
these opponent processes. They associate the a-process with activation of  the 
mesocorticolimbic dopamine circuit projecting from the ventral tegmental area (VTA) in 
the midbrain to the nucleus accumbens (NAcc) and the amygdala, whilst positing that 
the dysphoria of  the b-process results from the downregulation of  this same circuitry in 
tandem with stress responses in the amygdala associated with activation of  the 
hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis. They suggest that the strengthening of  the 
b-process ultimately leads to the system becoming incapable of  regulating around the 
original set-point. The lowering of  this settling-point, theorized to be due to 
upregulation of  corticotrophin releasing factors (CRF) in the amygdala, results in a 
chronic state of  distress and subjective dysphoria.
In line with Solomon and Corbit's (1973) proposal that relapse in abstinence may be 
the result of  conditioned withdrawal effects, Koob and Le Moal (1997) suggest that 
7upregulation of  the brain systems underlying the b-process persists into abstinence. As 
the b-process is automatically triggered by the a-process, and this in turn may be 
triggered by both drugs and drug-cues, any hedonic response to such cues is 
overwhelmed by the lastingly-strengthened b-process, leading to the subjective state of  
dysphoria associated with withdrawal.
One difficulty presented by this conception is developed from evidence of  drug-
induced neural sensitization in the mesocorticolimbic dopamine circuit which, under 
this interpretation, is associated with the hedonic quality of  drugs. The result of  this 
amplification of  the positive, hedonic a-process should arguably be an initial increase in 
the experience of  drug euphoria with repeated use, which seems to run counter to real-
world experience. As Robinson and Berridge (2003) point out in reviewing the theory, 
there seems little evidence from observation or the self-report of  addicts that they 
experience an increase in the subjective hedonic qualities of  a drug accompanying 
repeat administration.
At the same time, there is substantial evidence to suggest that withdrawal is both 
insufficiently aversive to account for continued drug-use once pleasure in that use has 
waned, subjectively distinct from the experience of  craving reported by addicts, and, 
when contrasted with that craving, commonly offered as the less powerfully motivating 
of  behaviour (Childress, McLellan, Ehrman, & O’Brien, 1988; Potenza, 2010). There is 
also little provision in the theory to account for a propensity towards relapse even long 
after withdrawal. Whilst relapse has been proposed as a conditioned withdrawal 
response to drugs and drug-cues (Siegel & Allan, 1998) and a putative neural 
mechanism underlying this has been offered (Koob & Le Moal, 1997), the scope of  these 
explanations is arguably limited by the minimal power spontaneous withdrawal has in 
the first instance to explain compulsive drug-use (Jaffe, 1992; Shaham, Rajabi, & 
Stewart, 1996; Wise & Bozarth, 1987). Withdrawal correlates poorly with both 
subjective drug-craving and propensity towards relapse (McAuliffe, 1982; Tiffany, 1990). 
Whilst this does not rule it out completely as a motivating factor in drug-taking, it does 
suggest that it is neither a necessary nor a sufficient determinant of  relapse.
One difficulty with attributing drug-use to the avoidance of  withdrawal is that 
physical withdrawal is not a consistent feature across all classes of  addictive drugs. 
Whilst alcohol, opiates and barbiturates can lead to physical withdrawal in abstinence, 
there is little evidence of  the equivalent with drugs of  the psychostimulant class 
8(Robinson & Berridge, 2003). Psychological withdrawal might function in its place, but 
this suggestion is undermined by the observation that cues paired with stimulants do not 
trigger withdrawal, instead producing drug-like effects (Childress, Ehrman, McLellan, & 
O'Brien, 1988; O'Brien, Childress, Ehrman, & Robbins, 1998). It proceeds from this 
that the avoidance of  aversive states is insufficiently explanatory of  either continued 
drug-use or relapse.
Psychomotor stimulant. Wise and Bozarth (1987) argued that the drug class-
dependent nature of  withdrawal effects conflicted with compulsive use as a shared 
component of  addictions to different drugs. They interpret from this the involvement of  
two distinct systems, of  which withdrawal is the less powerful predictor of  both 
compulsive use and relapse in abstinence. Building on understanding of  the 
mesocorticolimbic dopamine circuit as the brain's reward system, taken together with 
the discovery that addictive drugs across different classes all have the effect of  increasing 
extracellular dopamine in that same circuit, Wise and Bozarth developed a hedonic 
model of  drug-use in which users take drugs in order to achieve a rise in dopamine 
levels, leading in turn to the subjective experience of  pleasure. Sensitization of  this 
system through repeated drug administration leads to heightened responding when 
exposed to drugs or drug-cues. Such responding becomes conditioned, potentiating 
relapse in the absence of  withdrawal effects. That craving can remain long after 
withdrawal effects have dwindled is recognized as implying that the two are mediated by 
separate neural mechanisms (Robinson & Berridge, 1993).
In focusing on the hedonic quality of  drug effects as a primary component of  
addiction, Wise and Bozarth (1987) offered a positive reinforcement account of  
addiction in which addicts learned to pursue drugs compulsively in order to re-
experience the pleasure they provided. This view was juxtaposed to the negative 
reinforcement accounts offered by Solomon and Corbit (1973) and Koob and Le Moal 
(1997), in which the rewarding effect of  drugs was derived from their ability to prevent 
or alleviate adverse states (i.e. through a negative reinforcement mechanism). As such, it 
presented a model of  addiction which did not rely on either physical or psychological 
withdrawal as an explanatory factor in continued drug-use or relapse. However, the 
difficulty this model encounters in attempting to present a unifying account of  addiction 
is of  a kind with that encountered by negative reinforcement conceptions. In addition to 
their varied ability to produce withdrawal effects, drugs differ dramatically in the nature 
9and quality of  the subjective pleasure they generate. If  an increase in dopamine in the 
mesocorticolimbic circuit is linked to hedonic response and the shared feature of  
addictive drugs is an increase of  dopamine in exactly that circuit, it would follow that 
the hedonic qualities of  drugs were similar across drug classes. That they are not 
suggested an incomplete understanding of  the link between dopamine and reward.
Incentive Salience. Building on observations of  dopamine's seemingly central role 
in drug abuse and addiction, Berridge, Venier and Robinson (1989) predicted that 
neurochemical lesions to reduce brain dopamine in rats would have the concomitant 
effect of  reducing hedonic reaction elicited by sweet food. This would have accorded 
with mesocorticolimbic dopamine's perceived role in mediating pleasure and support 
Wise and Bozarth’s (1987) conception of  the hedonic addict. In the event, their 
expectations were confounded. Although their subjects exhibited a severe absence of  
motivation, no longer seeking or consuming food (aphagic) or drink (adipsic), taste-
reactivity tests indicated that their hedonic response remained, unaltered. From this, 
they adduced that two separate systems were operating, one associated with hedonic 
reaction, or 'liking', and the second with the motivational state of  'wanting'. Disruption 
of  dopamine levels in the mesocorticolimbic circuit resulted in a reduction in 'wanting', 
but 'liking' remained intact.
Taken in tandem with the discovery that dopamine systems in the brain can become 
enduringly sensitized by drugs of  abuse (Robinson & Becker, 1986), this suggested a 
theoretical approach which could account for drug-craving without appeal to the 
aversive nature of  withdrawal or the hedonic qualities of  drugs. Although 'liking' waned 
with repeated use, drugs of  abuse sensitized brain circuits associated with 'wanting', 
resulting in a heightened degree of  motivational attention to drugs and drug-cues, even 
in the absence of  a subjective liking for them. This provided an account of  drug-craving 
as neurologically and phenomenologically distinct from both withdrawal-aversion and 
pleasure-seeking, rooted instead in the neural sensitization of  systems which operate 
independently of  either.
Repeated drug use and the potential for relapse in abstinence are both therefore 
conceived as examples of  conditioned responding, as drugs and drug-cues activate 
sensitized incentive mechanisms in the brain (McClure, York, & Montague, 2004). This 
is in keeping with the apparent role of  dopaminergic circuitry in the NAcc in the 
motivating effects of  reward-related cues (Balleine & Dickinson, 1998, 2000; Corbit & 
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Balleine, 2011).
Moreover, it has become apparent that the neural sensitization of  these brain 
systems is gated by context, such that drug-cues are more likely to trigger a 'wanting' for 
drugs in drug-related contexts (Crombag, Bossert, Koya, & Shaham, 2008; Leyton & 
Vezina, 2013; Robinson, Browman, Crombag, & Badiani, 1998). Environmentally-cued 
conditioned responding and the neurological model proposed to underlie it accord to a 
far greater degree with the observed and self-reported experiences of  addicts than either 
withdrawal avoidance or hedonic models of  drug use.
Frontostriatal dysfunction. Crucially, the withholding of  conditioned responses 
to motivational cues relies heavily on 'top-down' cognitive control (Aron, Robbins, & 
Poldrack, 2004) mediated by prefrontal cortical areas of  the brain. The appropriate 
functioning of  these areas is essential for the controlling of  strong impulses (Littrell, 
2010) and the inhibition of  cued responding (Chikazoe et al., 2009).
Whilst exaggerated motivation towards drugs or drug-cues may be attributed to 
drug-induced alterations to the NAcc resulting from repeated stimulation of  the 
mesocorticolimbic circuit (Lederle et al., 2011), the same circuit also reaches the 
prefrontal cortex (PFC). The frontostriatal dysfunction model highlights that the types of  
impairment seen in this area of  the brain following repeated drug exposure are 
associated with failed inhibitory control across a variety of  domains (Jentsch & Taylor, 
1999), with addicts exhibiting a paucity of  cognitive function in common with those 
who experience lesions or other physical damage to the region (Robinson & Kolb, 2004).
By various means across different drug classes, repeated exposure causes alterations 
to structure and function in these regions, with the result that the ability to exercise 
cognitive control over responding is impaired. Chronic cocaine administration is 
associated with reduced blood flow and metabolism in the PFC (Volkow et al., 1992; 
Volkow, Mullani, Gould, Adler, & Krajewski, 1992), amphetamines increase the number 
of  synapses (Morshedi, Rademacher, & Meredith, 2009), and the opiate morphine has 
been estimated to reduce the number of  synapses in the region by up to one-third (Kolb, 
Pellis, & Robinson, 2004). In combination with exaggerated motivational responding in 
striatal areas, these neural changes result in an amplified drive towards ill-considered 
behaviour being coupled with the stripping away of  high-order executive function which 
would ordinarily restrain the extent to which impulses were acted upon (Jentsch & 
Taylor, 1999). Addiction is thereby characterized as a disorder of  exaggerated wanting 
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in the absence of  cortical control over behaviour (see Figure 1.2), repeated drug 
exposure having impaired exactly that part of  the brain required to resist enacting a 
conditioned response to drug cues (Volkow, Fowler, & Wang, 2003).
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Figure 1.2 - Proposed network model of addiction.
Rational addiction. The models of  addiction so far discussed all assume some 
type of  pathology – structural and/or functional changes in the brain that extend 
beyond the normal, physiological parameters, and as a result produce aberrant changes 
in function expressed ultimately at the level of  decision making. As an alternative to 
models rooted in neurobiological aberration, there are those who have proposed 
explanations for addiction which do not require physiology to be outside the bounds of  
what might be considered ‘ordinary’. Becker and Murphy (1988) likened drug-users to 
any rational consumers seeking to maximize utility over time and valuing immediate 
rewards over later ones. They point out that people frequently make these kinds of  
calculations and rely on the results to guide their behaviour: the value of  a night out 
drinking is balanced against the following day's hangover; the slice of  cake is balanced 
against the later effort of  dieting. That such calculations frequently result in the 
satisfaction of  immediate desires at the cost of  later discomfort suggests that this is an 
ordinary facet of  human behaviour and requires no explanation rooted in impairment. 
Conceiving drug-taking as resulting from the rational performance of  a delay-
discounting calculation, Becker and Murphy argue that "individuals who discount the 
future heavily are more likely to become addicted" (p. 694).
Elster (2000) argues convincingly that the model of  the rational addict is significantly 
at variance with the beliefs and behaviour of  the addict themselves. Growing 
ambivalence towards the hedonic aspects of  a drug and expressions of  a desire to 
reduce or curtail drug-use are common features of  addiction, yet neither accords well 
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with the discounted utility calculation assumed under the model. As a result, the original 
theory has been extended along several dimensions since its initial derivation, with 
successive authors proposing additions and modifications which might account for this 
misalignment. Orphanides and Zervos (1995) introduced a measure of  uncertainty into 
the discounted utility calculation in an effort to draw the model of  behaviour further 
into line with that observed in addicts. They subsequently derived that inconsistencies in 
this regard might be better explained by individual differences in the performance of  
delay discounting (Orphanides & Zervos, 1998), the starting point of  a rational actor in 
possession of  the appropriate facts having led to the conclusion that some are created 
more rational than others.
Although some subsequent theorists have varied the precepts of  the original model 
(Dockner, Enelberg, & Feichtinger, 1993; Feichtinger, Hommes & Milik, 1997), all 
conceptions share in common a definition of  addiction in non-physiological terms, 
conceiving ongoing drug-taking as repeated instances of  voluntary action; the drug-user 
is a rational actor in possession of  the relevant facts making a calculated choice. Whilst 
the facts may be wrong or the calculation incorrect, the rationality of  the actor is 
prerequisite. It is this presumption of  rationality which is called into question by the 
mounting evidence of  staged neural plasticity in drug-users, married in turn to 
behavioural changes which maintain outside an addiction context.
It is only reasonable to note that the three decades which have passed since the 
rational addiction hypothesis was first proposed have seen the rapid advancement of  
neuroscientific techniques. Today, the picture we have of  the effect of  chronic drug 
administration on the brain is one which includes both neurotoxicity and impaired 
neurogenesis, modified neuronal spine density, altered metabolism, neural sensitization 
and long-term potentiation. That repeated drug use alters the structure and function of  
the brain is a consistent finding across the field of  addiction research (Baler & Volkow, 
2006; Verdejo-García, Bechara, Recknor, & Pérez-García, 2006; Volkow, Fowler, & 
Wang, 2003), and is a commonality across most theories of  addiction discussed above.
To date, no substantive effort to relate the framework of  rational addiction to the 
reported experiences of  actual drug-users has deemed it to hold adequate explanatory 
power over observed behaviour (Baltagi & Geishecker, 2006; Sloan & Wang, 2008; 
Hidayat & Thabrany, 2011). That having been said, at the heart of  rational addiction 
models is the supposition that delay discounting in addicts is not the same as that seen in 
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non-addicts, and in this there is likely some truth. Though at an early stage, there is 
evidence to suggest that differences in delay discounting may serve not only as a 
behavioural marker for addiction, but also as a risk factor for becoming addicted (Bickel, 
Koffarnus, Moody, & Wilson, 2014).
 MacKillop et al. (2011) carried out a meta-analysis of  46 studies and found 
evidence suggesting delayed reward discounting as a common feature of  users of  drugs 
of  different classes. Subsequent work from the lead author suggests that such impulsive 
discounting could be considered an endophenotype of  addictive behaviour and hence 
play an aetiological role in substance use (MacKillop, 2013).
Disease. Evidence of  drug-induced changes to the brain and endophenotypic risk 
factors predating drug-use have guided the suggestion that addiction is best conceived as 
a disease of  the mind. Whilst scarcely universal, the extent to which this conception has 
developed into general understanding is captured by the recent recognition of  Addiction 
Medicine as an official medical sub-specialty by the American Board of  Medical 
Specialities (ABAM). In announcing this development, ABAM President Robert J. Sokol 
offered that "this landmark event, more than any other, recognizes addiction as a 
preventable and treatable disease, helping to shed the stigma that has long plagued 
it” (ABAM, 2016, p. 1).
There are those who argue that the therapeutic practicality of  the disease model 
guiding research and treatment is potentially offset by the degree to which it encourages 
addicts to understand their circumstances as being outside their control, promoting a 
fatalistic acceptance of  a condition which they cannot change (Hall, Carter, & Forlini, 
2015; Lewis, 2015). At the same time there are those who would contend that addiction 
is not a disease, nor even a disorder of  compulsion. Heyman (2013) argues that factors 
associated with abstaining from drugs are most commonly such things as legal concerns 
and economic pressures and, given this, concludes that "the correlates of  quitting are the 
correlates of  choice not compulsion" (p. 31).
Environmentally-dependent drug preferences also add complexity to the question of  
whether drug-use is a choice. Environmental enrichment reduces cocaine-seeking 
behaviour in mice (Chauvet, Lardeux, Goldberg, Jaber, & Solinas, 2009) and can 
eliminate established addiction-related behaviours (Solinas, Chauvet, Thiriet, El Rawas, 
& Jaber, 2008). Conversely, and particularly noteworthy given the prevalence of  drug-
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use in prisons, vulnerability to addiction has been demonstrated to increase on removal 
from a richly stimulating environment and transfer to a poorly stimulating one (Nader et 
al., 2012). The difficulty this presents is that evidence of  context-dependent preference 
for drug-use might also be understood as evidence suggesting a measure of  conscious 
control over that use. If  a drug-addicted mouse is transferred from a poor to an enriched 
environment, they curtail their repeated drug-use. One interpretation of  this is that the 
mouse retains control over their choice to consume drugs; that they choose to consume 
the drugs in a poorly stimulating environment implies that they choose not to take drugs 
in an enriched one.
Impulsivity and control. In their 2003 review paper, Robinson and Berridge 
offer that "drug-induced impairments in frontocortical function may contribute in 
important ways to the suboptimal choices and decisions addicts make concerning drug 
use" (p. 45). Whilst this is a straightforward and likely accurate statement, we might 
reasonably pause to consider whether choices and decisions which do not concern drug-
use are anything other than similarly suboptimal as a result of  that impairment. The 
hijacking of  striatal systems may account for the heightened salience of  drugs and drug 
cues, but we must also consider that this is at the expense of  natural reinforcers. 
Structural alteration of  the prefrontal cortex may go some way towards explaining the 
addict's inability to exert control over their response to drug-related motivational cues, 
but will also translate into impaired behavioural control in other contexts.
When we speak of  drug-induced adaptations to brain structure and function it is 
most commonly in the context of  drug-use itself. That is to say, altered motivational 
perception, attentional bias and impaired behavioural inhibition are proffered as 
potential explanatory factors underlying aspects of  the addictive cycle. Addiction 
research is, unsurprisingly, concerned in large part with linking these changes to aspects 
of  addiction such as the transition from habitual to compulsive drug-use or vulnerability 
to relapse even long into abstinence. Contrastingly little attention is given to the impact 
these alterations have in non-drug-related spheres.
What was clear well in advance of  modern brain imaging techniques was that 
addicts frequently exhibit poor decision-making skills and a tendency towards 
impulsivity. High measures of  impulsivity have been observed in chronic users of  
alcohol, opiates and psychostimulants such as cocaine (Tziortzis, Mahoney, Kalechstein, 
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Newton, & La Garza, 2011; Verdejo-García, Lawrence, & Clark, 2008). This has led 
some to offer that high trait impulsivity is itself  a risk factor for drug-use, suggesting it as 
a "behavioral endophenotype” for dependence (Ersche, Turton, Pradhan, Bullmore, & 
Robbins, 2010, p. 770). There is an appealing simplicity in the causal logic proposed 
here. Impulsivity leads to drug use which leads to addiction, and it follows that addicts 
would therefore exhibit greater than average impulsivity. However, this logic does not 
maintain under scrutiny. Whilst it is true that high impulsivity appears to increase the 
likelihood of  abusing drugs of  some classes, such as alcohol (Lejuez, 2010) and cocaine 
(Belin, Mar, Dalley, Robbins, & Everitt, 2008), the same is not true in the case of  opiates 
(McNamara, Dalley, Robbins, Everitt, & Belin, 2010; Schippers, Binnekade, 
Schoffelmeer, Pattij, & De Vries, 2012). Despite the fact that opiate users exhibit high 
levels of  impulsivity (Kirby, Petry & Bickel, 1999), high impulsivity does not appear to 
predict opiate addiction (McNamara et al., 2010). In this case, it would appear that 
increased impulsivity stems from substance use, rather than preceding it. However, 
evidence from animal studies is contradictory on this front, with some finding a link 
between impulsivity and opiate consumption (García-Lecumberri et al., 2011), and 
others refuting it (Schippers et al., 2012).
Varieties of  impulsivity. Impulsive choice, such as the inability to delay 
gratification, and impulsive action, such as the inability to withhold responding, are 
behaviourally and neurologically distinct (Evenden, 1999; Winstanley, Eagle, & Robbins, 
2006). However, there is overlap in that they both engage broader inhibitory control 
systems in the brain, and it is through alteration of  these systems that addiction can have 
some of  its most pronounced effects on behaviour. In searching for shared characteristics 
between addiction to drugs of  different classes, impaired inhibitory control presents an 
appealing framework for understanding behavioural observations. Indeed, one challenge 
which remains in the study of  addiction is to explain the similarity of  behavioural 
impairments seen in users of  drugs with such different mechanisms of  action. 
In behavioural terms, inhibition functions in several different ways and the effects of  
its impairment are varied. Response inhibition regulates impulsive action in that it 
mediates the postponement, withholding and cancellation of  action (Grant & 
Chamberlain, 2014). Quite straightforwardly, an inability to exert such control over 
behaviour results in actions of  a rash and ill-considered nature. Additionally, inhibitory 
circuits play a related but distinguishable role in delayed gratification, acting to prevent 
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the impulsive selection of  a small, immediate reward in preference over a later, larger 
one (Evenden & Ryan, 1996). Rather than ‘impulsive action’, this is a dissociable aspect 
of  impulsivity more accurately described as ‘impulsive choice’. Crucially, behavioural 
inhibition is also intimately tied to reversal learning, “the ability to actively suppress 
reward-related responding and to disengage from ongoing behaviour” (Izquierdo & 
Jentsch, 2012, p. 607). It has been suggested that deficits in this regard could lie behind 
the behavioural inflexibility of  addicts who continue substance use in apparent disregard 
of  the increasingly negative consequences, and even that it might go some way towards 
explaining the seemingly compulsive nature of  that use (Bari & Robbins, 2013).
Impulsive action. Increases in impulsive action have been observed in acute exposure to 
cocaine (Paine & Olmstead, 2004) and amphetamine (Blackburn & Hevenor, 1996), but 
not when exposure is chronic (Paine, Dringenberg, & Olmstead, 2003; Loos et al., 2010). 
By contrast, opiates such as morphine appear to have little to no effect on a propensity 
towards impulsive action (Pattij, Schetters, Janssen, Wiskerke, & Schoffelmeer, 2009).
Impulsive choice. Increases in impulsive choice, by contrast, have been observed in the 
case of  both acute and chronic exposure to morphine or heroin (Harvey-Lewis, 
Perdrizet, & Franklin, 2012; Kieres, Hausknecht, Farrar, Acheson, de Wit, & Richards, 
2004; Maguire, Li, & France, 2012; Pattij et al., 2009; Schippers et al., 2012). Similar 
results have been demonstrated for chronic cocaine exposure (Anker, Perry, Gliddon, & 
Carroll, 2009; Paine et al., 2003), but not in the case of  other drugs of  the 
psychostimulant class. Some studies have identified an increase in impulsive choice in 
the case of  acute amphetamine exposure (Cardinal, Robbins, & Everitt, 2000; Evenden 
& Ryan, 1996), only for subsequent work to contradict these findings and suggest that 
acute exposure may in fact reduce this aspect of  impulsivity in the short term 
(Baarendse & Vanderschuren, 2012; Bizot, David, & Trovero, 2011). Impulsive choice is 
also a feature of  both acute and chronic alcohol exposure (MacKillop, Amlung, Few, 
Ray, Sweet, & Munafò, 2011; Olmstead, Hellemans, & Paine, 2006), with impulsivity 
seemingly most pronounced in early-onset alcoholics (Dom, D'haene, Hulstijn, & Sabbe, 
2006). 
Reversal learning. Impairment in reversal learning tasks has been observed in chronic 
exposure to alcohol (Badanich, Becker, & Woodward, 2011; Kuzmin, Liljequist, Meis, 
Chefer, Shippenberg, & Bakalkin, 2012), cocaine (Krueger, Howell, Oo, Olausson, 
Taylor, & Nairn, 2009) and methamphetamine (Groman et al., 2012), but not in the 
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case of  heroin, where in fact there is some indication that chronic exposure may serve to 
slightly improve performance (Ranaldi, Egan, Kest, Fein, & Delamater, 2009).
Behavioural inhibition. Clearly not all drugs of  abuse have the same effect, but 
in common across all forms of  addiction we see deficits in one or more aspects of  
behavioural inhibition. If  we are to suggest structural brain damage resulting from 
addiction as the cause of  this, we must first identify the brain structure via which 
inhibition is mediated.
Action inhibition is correlated with activity in the PFC (Brown, Manuck, Flory, & 
Hariri, 2006). Disrupting activity in the PFC by means of  transcranial magnetic 
stimulation has been shown to lead to riskier decision-making (Chambers et al., 2006) 
and a reduced ability to withhold prepotent responses (Knoch et al., 2006). Conversely, 
stimulating activity in the PFC through the application of  direct current leads to the 
suppression of  riskier responses (Fecteau et al., 2007). Numerous studies have 
demonstrated that the PFC is the sine qua non of  behavioural inhibition, playing an 
integral role in both impulse control (Littrell, 2010) and the inhibition of  prepotent 
responses (Chikazoe et al., 2009; Dalley, Everitt, & Robbins, 2011).
Implications. The hijacking of  motivated attention and the process of  neural 
sensitization latterly associated with conditioned responding are clearly vital pieces of  
the addiction puzzle and have been the focus of  much attention. Yet the common thread 
running through all current theories of  addiction, even some variants of  rational 
addiction, is that repeated drug administration has consequences in terms of  the 
structure and function of  the brain, with the result that behavioural output is altered. 
Whether or not one considers addiction a disease of  choice may inform perceptions of  
its moral quality, but it does not alter the neurological findings. There is an abundance 
of  evidence to show that drugs can cause significant changes in brain areas associated 
with motivation and self-control - areas understood as integral to volitional behaviour.
The paucity of  addicts’ ability to inhibit behavioural output is most frequently 
viewed in terms of  their continued substance use despite negative consequences, and 
their tendency to relapse in abstinence. Yet by no means all the maladaptive behaviour 
exhibited by the addict is specifically drug-related. The same circuits that are modified 
by drugs of  abuse underpin behavioural output which has nothing to do with drug-
seeking or drug-taking. The inability to withhold a prepotent response is of  relevance 
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beyond its interpretation as a driving factor in continued drug use. Adaptive learning is 
fundamental to human interaction, whereas the propensity to retain and inappropriately 
repeat an outdated response set even in light of  situational change is clearly inimical to 
it. We can reasonably expect changes to brain circuits responsible for control over 
responding to have wider consequences for behaviour. As Robinson and Berridge offer 
in their 2003 review paper, "a loss of  inhibitory control over behavior and poor 
judgment, combined with sensitization of  addicts' motivational impulses to obtain and 
take drugs, makes for a potentially disastrous combination" (p. 46).
Loeben and Stoehr (2007) argue that moral responsibility is weakened as a result of  
significant impairment of  voluntary control and suggest that our developing 
understanding of  the damage wrought by drugs of  abuse on brain systems integral to 
the regulation of  behaviour “reveals a loss of  control that undermines normative 
judgments of  blame” (p. 28). Yet such judgments are made of  addicts on a regular basis. 
69% of  arrestees test positive for drugs, and 35% report some measure of  dependence 
(Holloway & Bennett, 2004). Between arrest and prison, there is a determination of  
culpability. It seems incumbent, therefore, to consider how the law considers criminal 
responsibility in circumstances where actions have been attributed to aberrant mental 
processes, and in particular those resulting from diseases of  the mind. The following 
section will discuss the genesis and refinement of  the UK law in this regard, and its 
application in some of  the landmark cases which have broadly defined the bounds of  
liability in such contexts.
LAW
An argument to suggest that a crime did not occur, or occurred without the 
defendant’s involvement, is a denial of  offence. No criminal liability can attach because 
no crime has occurred. Where neither the crime nor the defendant’s involvement in it 
can be denied, they may proffer a defence against the charges laid. Though the crime 
occurred, there are potentially excusing factors at play which might lessen its perceived 
severity. In the event that some measure of  responsibility remains, partial defences and 
extraneous factors amongst the wider circumstances of  the crime may be reflected in 
moderated sentencing.
There is little disagreement that repeated drug exposure results in impaired mental 
function. A 2010 study of  polydrug-users found amongst their number a “high 
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prevalence of  executive function impairment” (Fernández-Serrano, Pérez-García, 
Perales, & Verdejo-García, p. 104). Questions over the extent to which drug addicts 
might be considered ‘brain damaged’ in this respect give rise to equally legitimate 
questions over how such damage might impact criminal liability in terms perhaps 
similar to those outlined above. However, there are significant obstacles to addiction 
being understood in this way under the law.
Denials of  offence. In the majority of  common-law criminal justice systems there 
are two elements which must be present in order to produce criminal liability: mens rea 
and an actus reus. The actus reus (guilty act) must be accompanied by mens rea (guilty mind). 
These concepts developed in English law from the principle outlined by jurist and Chief  
Justice Edward Coke in 1644: actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea (an act does not make a 
person guilty unless the mind is also guilty). This encapsulates a general test of  guilt, in 
that an act committed without fault or blameworthiness cannot be considered a crime.
Involuntary behaviour does not attract criminal liability, and this accords with 
common sensibilities regarding the degree to which individuals are responsible for their 
actions in general terms. We do not need a moral philosopher to develop for us the 
notion that proscribed conduct is meaningless in the absence of  free agency. In 
preferring charges against an individual suspected of  criminal misconduct, the law 
ascribes them wilful authorship of  the act. To bring this into question is to challenge the 
existence of  criminal liability entirely. An individual not possessed of  mental faculty, or 
who finds such faculty indisposed for a period of  time, with the result that their 
behaviour may be understood as not of  their own choosing, presents to the Court as 
having committed no crime (Bratty v. A-G for NI, 1963). Clearly, the law must provide for 
claims of  this kind.
Alongside claims of  involuntariness, a person may also deny an offence on the basis 
of  a simple lack of  mens rea. For example, where a person damages another’s property 
under the mistaken belief  that it is their own, their lack of  knowledge as to ownership 
undermines potential liability for criminal damage, as they lack mens rea for one part of  
the offence. Cases involving involuntary conduct will standardly include a lack of  
associated mens rea, but a denial of  offending on the basis of  a lack of  mens rea need not 
include a claim of  involuntary conduct.
Arguments of  this kind are not defences against allegations of  criminal acts, but 
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rather challenge the existence of  criminal liability altogether, and are therefore more 
accurately considered denials of  offence. In theory then, considerations of  this kind 
should be addressed before a case reaches trial. However, the caselaw which guides 
precedent has developed in the main from occasions on which it is brought into 
question. In other words, determining the boundaries of  these arguments under the law 
has been a process of  considering those instances when the argument has been 
advanced at the trial stage. Perhaps in light of  this, when speaking of  denials of  offence 
it is not uncommon for them to be referred to as ‘defences’ by those who practice 
criminal law (Law Commission, 2012). They do not, strictly speaking, fall into this 
category, but that is the language commonly employed.
Automatism. In denying conscious control of  behaviour, an individual makes a 
claim of  ‘automatism’. This is the term the law applies to the absence of  voluntary 
control over the body’s actions, such that one’s behaviour might be interpreted as that of  
an automaton lacking consciousness. Lack of  consciousness rules out possession of  a 
guilty mind and, in the absence of  that mental element, an act cannot be considered 
criminal. All claims that acts took place outside the voluntary control of  the conscious 
mind are appeals to automatism. It is therefore a broad church which incorporates not 
only those persons who might be colloquially termed ‘mad’, but examples as disparate 
as the person who attacks their wife while sleepwalking (R. v. Burgess, 1991), the epileptic 
who injures a bystander whilst in the throes of  a seizure (R. v. Sullivan, 1984) or the truck 
driver whose sneezing fit results in a multi-car pile-up (R. v. Whoolley, 1997). All may lay 
claim to automatism in denying criminal liability for the consequences of  their actions.
Insane and non-insane automatism. Within the category of  automatism, there are two 
sub-divisions with respect to the nature of  causal factors. Where automatism occurs, 
actions taken in that state do not attract criminal liability, but this does not alter the fact 
that acts have been committed which would under any other circumstances be 
considered crimes. In the absence of  external causal factors, such a state can only have 
arisen as a consequence of  internal factors, and this creates a difficulty. Although the 
individual in this case cannot be found criminally liable, because no criminal offence has 
actually taken place, they are unlikely to be allowed to resume their former position in 
society given their demonstrated propensity for involuntary 'criminal' behaviour. By 
contrast, if  automatism can be attributed to an external causal factor (e.g. a blow to the 
head, or the involuntary ingestion of  a mind-altering substance), then it may be taken 
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that recurrence is unlikely so long as that factor is avoided in future.
For this reason, the law distinguishes between insane automatism and non-insane 
automatism. Insane automatism1 is the determination which arises in the event that 
causal factors are considered to be exclusively internal. Non-insane automatism, more 
commonly (and confusingly) referred to as simply ‘automatism’, is the finding which 
results when external factors are established to which the mental state which arose can 
be attributed.
It is the individual whose causal factors are internal, and from which they therefore 
cannot be separated, from whom it is incumbent upon the Court to protect society. For 
this reason, a finding of  insane automatism results in a special verdict allowing for 
several disposal options, including compulsory detention or supervision (Criminal 
Procedure Act 1991, s5). Their counterpart whose causal factors are deemed external, 
and who is thereby determined to have been acting in a state of  non-insane automatism, 
will in consequence be acquitted of  all charges. The only exception to this is cases where 
the external factor arose as a result of  the person’s own fault, for example, where they 
negligently failed to eat after taking insulin (cf. R v. Bailey, 1983).
There is no statute in UK law which seeks to define automatism. Rather, such 
definition has emerged through judgments in common law which have served to 
establish precedents. The legal standard for both automatic behaviour and insanity has 
been largely unchanged since its fundamentals were established in 1834 when Daniel 
M’Naghten, supposedly acting under the influence of  paranoid delusions, shot and 
killed Edward Drummond, personal secretary to the British Prime Minister. The 
subsequent trial hinged on the legal definition of  insanity, and the jury’s verdict of  ‘not 
guilty on the ground of  insanity’ only served to highlight the lack of  a consistent 
standard to which claims of  this nature could be held. In the wake of  the verdict, the 
House of  Lords empanelled a group of  leading Judges and put to them a series of  
hypothetical questions regarding insanity and criminal liability. The answers stimulated 
by those questions formed the basis of  the M’Naghten rules, a set of  principles by which 
it might be determined if  criminal liability rested with a mentally-afflicted offender 
(West & Walk, 1977). Through subsequent usage in the common law, these principles 
became the standard test which a claim of  insanity must pass:
1 Insane automatism should not be confused with Cognitive Insanity (see page 23), despite the fact that 
they are both frequently abbreviated to ‘insanity’ in general discussion.
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 …to establish a defence on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly 
proved that, at the time of the committing of the act, the party 
accused was labouring under such a defect of reason, from 
disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the 
act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he did not know he 
was doing what was wrong.
Lord Tindal CJ in M'Naghten 
(1843)
Clearly this test addresses some forms of  involuntary behaviour and not others. 
Specifically, one might anticipate an instance in which actions are performed in the 
absence of  voluntary control where no such ‘disease of  the mind’ is in evidence.
Criteria. Crucially, non-insane automatism is only available as a denial of  offending if  
three conditions are satisfied. Firstly, the action taken must be deemed to have been 
completely involuntary. Any measure of  control retained over action undermines the 
notion that the act was truly involuntary, as in Broome v. Perkins (1987), where an appeal 
against a conviction of  driving without due care and attention was denied despite the 
erratic nature of  the driving having arisen at least in part through the defendant 
suffering a bout of  hypoglycaemia resulting from his diabetes. The actions he had taken 
in avoiding collision with other road users and in slowing the car using the brake were 
both considered to suggest that the appellant had retained some measure of  voluntary 
control, and hence the actions amounting to the offence for which he had been 
convicted could not be held to be entirely involuntary.
The necessity of  complete involuntariness is rendered explicit in Lord Taylor CJ’s 
statement in A-G Ref (No 2 of  1992) that “the defence of  automatism requires that there 
was a total destruction of  voluntary control on the defendant's part. Impaired, reduced 
or partial control is not enough” (at 994). In making this judgment Lord Taylor CJ drew 
upon earlier decisions in Watmore v. Jenkins (1962), where the Court referred to the 
necessity of  demonstrating “such a complete destruction of  voluntary control as could 
constitute in law automatism” (at 874), and Roberts v. Ramsbottom (1980), where the Court 
offered that “one cannot accept as exculpation anything less than the total loss of  
consciousness” (at 832). The very narrow definition of  automatism is made clear in R v. 
Coley (2013), in which the Court of  Appeal addressed the defendant’s claim to have been 
suffering a psychotic episode at the time of  the offence by concluding that it was “a 
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description of  irrational behaviour, with a deluded or disordered mind, but it is not a 
description of  wholly involuntary action” (at 23).
The second criterion which must be satisfied for a finding of  non-insane automatism 
is that the involuntary action must arise as a result of  either external factors or reflex. In 
R v. Kemp (1957) the defendant sought to raise a defence of  automatism against a charge 
of  grievous bodily harm, arguing that he suffered a disease which caused hardening of  
the arteries which in turn led to the congestion of  blood in the brain. His actions had 
taken place during the period of  lost consciousness which had resulted from this 
affliction. However, it was held by the Court that a hardening of  the arteries with direct 
and obvious impact on the brain constituted a ‘disease of  the mind’ and, under the 
M'Naghten Rules, would fall outside the scope of  a defence of  non-insane automatism. 
That being the case, the only defence open to him was one of  insanity.
The third and final criterion which must be met for a defence of  non-insane 
automatism is that the automatism may not be self-induced. The most frequently cited 
case in this respect is R v. Bailey (1983), in which a diabetic defendant was deemed by the 
Court to have induced his own hypoglycaemic state through failure to eat, and hence 
could not rely on a defence of  non-insane automatism. The conviction was upheld on 
appeal, but in making its judgment the Court of  Appeal clarified the extent to which 
such a defence was reasonable in the eyes of  the law. Griffith LJ offered that “self-
induced automatism, other than that due to intoxication from alcohol or drugs, may 
provide a defence to crimes of  basic intent” (at 507), adding moreover that, additionally 
in crimes of  specific intent2, self-induced automatism might be relied upon as evidence 
of  the absence of  mens rea.
Cognitive insanity. Establishing insane automatism relies on the existence of  a 
defect of  reason, however transient, so as to constitute a disease of  the mind. Not all 
diseases of  the mind, however, impact reasoning or behaviour to the extent that they 
result in “complete destruction of  voluntary control” (Roberts v. Ramsbottom, 1980, at 574), 
such that they would satisfy the criteria for automatism. In circumstances where an 
2 The distinction made in many jurisdictions between crimes of  specific and basic (or general) intent is 
beyond the scope of  this discussion. The US Model Penal Code (American Law Institute, 1985) describes 
it as “an abiding source of  confusion and ambiguity in the penal law’ (§ 2.02 cmt. at 231 n.3) and its 
continued application in English law is perhaps best summed up by Lord Salmon in DPP v. Majewski 
(1977): “The answer is that in strict logic this view cannot be justified. But this is the view that has been 
adopted by the common law of  England, which is founded on common sense and experience rather than 
strict logic.” (at 482E). For the interested reader, Johnson (2016) provides a somewhat more involved 
account, with an equivalent conclusion.
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individual’s actions can be deemed to have exhibited even some small measure of  
volition, the test is failed. Yet the M’Naghten rules provide scope for insanity which does 
not manifest in automatic behaviour. An act may be consciously and intentionally 
performed and yet not attract criminal liability. It is sufficient that the individual who 
performed the act ‘was labouring under such a defect of  reason, from disease of  the 
mind, as not to know the nature and quality of  the act he was doing’. In such example 
the behaviour in question would not constitute automatism, but may nevertheless fall 
within the definition of  insanity laid out within the M’Naghten rules and result in a 
finding of  Cognitive Insanity.
Rather than volition, it is rationality which must be absent. Here, too, the law sets a 
very high threshold for challenging liability. It is not sufficient to suggest that rationality 
was impaired. The complete absence of  rationality is required, such that the defendant 
was incapable of  understanding their actions or that they were legally wrong.
Intoxication. One of  the most common external causes for a lack of  mens rea is 
self-induced intoxication, which in extreme cases may be of  such degree that 
voluntariness in action is entirely lacking. Indeed, intoxicated offending is so common 
that the law has developed particular rules to set it apart from insanity and automatism. 
These rules permit the creation of  liability where otherwise a lack of  mens rea would 
speak against it, and at their heart is the logic of  'prior fault'. Only occasionally relevant 
to automatism cases, prior fault takes a central role in the case of  intoxicated offending. 
Where an offender lacks mens rea and/or voluntariness in offending, liability cannot 
ordinarily be attached to actions. In the case of  the intoxicated offender, their earlier 
decision to become intoxicated is effectively substituted for any missing offence elements, 
resulting in liability for all but the most serious criminal offences.
Addiction and denial of  offence. In R v. Roach (2001) it was held that the 
interaction of  external factors with a pre-existing internal condition may provide 
grounds for a defence of  automatism. This thinking is reflected in R v. Burns (1973), 
where the pre-existing internal condition was brain damage due to alcohol abuse and 
the external factors were alcohol and prescription medication. This provides an insight 
into the somewhat counterintuitive nature of  parsing internal and external cause. 
Theoretically, an individual, suffering from brain damage resulting from alcoholism, 
who had taken prescription medications prior to the offence, may raise a defence of  
automatism, providing that the aberrant behaviour which arose could not reasonably 
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have been foreseen (cf. R v. Coley, 2013). In contrast, a defendant who attributes their 
behaviour to brain damage induced by alcoholism but who remained sober at the time 
of  the offence may not, in the absence of  an external causal factor, and would have only 
the defence of  insanity open to them. Moreover, if  the internal factor was identical but 
the external factor was alcohol, rather than prescription medication, then neither 
defence could be raised. Automatism would be ruled out because the state of  
drunkenness would have been foreseeable, whereas insanity could not be invoked 
because, as the House of  Lords clarified in A-G for N. Ireland v. Gallagher (1963), if  the 
internal disease of  the mind did not bring an individual within the M’Naghten rules, 
this fact could not be altered by the external factor of  exacerbating alcohol.
Insane automatism, by definition, may not be induced by an external factor of  any 
kind. We might argue that long-term neurological effects of  repeated exposure to 
intoxicants represented a ‘disease of  the mind’, but even leaving aside the arguments 
against addiction being so classified, we have seen that the test for the denial of  mens rea 
is set strictly at the complete loss of  self-control. Cognitive insanity, similarly, may not be 
self-induced and must pass a similarly stringent test: the complete absence of  rationality.
Non-insane automatism may include a drug component as the external agentic 
factor, but even if  the resulting state of  consciousness passed the stringent test of  complete 
loss of  control over behaviour, the caveat that such state may not be self-induced places 
a requirement on the individual to advance that such consequence could not reasonably 
have been foreseen. The naive admixture of  alcohol and prescription medications may 
pass this test (R v. Burns, 1973), but can the addicted drug-user reasonably argue their 
ignorance of  the potential such use has for negative consequences?
The conclusion here is that, even were addiction to result in such complete loss of  
rationality or control over behaviour so as to constitute the basis of  a denial of  offence, 
rooted in the absence of  mens rea, culpability can be restored in the event that the 
individual concerned is deemed to bear some measure of  responsibility for having 
placed themselves in that state. Denial of  offence in the case of  addiction is thereby 
twice-hampered. Even were one to meet the challenging threshold for the denial of  mens 
rea, criminal liability can still be attached to actions on the basis of  prior fault in having 
voluntarily consumed the drug at an earlier point in time.
In searching for addiction's place in the law, we can rule out its operation as a denial 
of  offence. The requirement that volition or rationality be completely absent places too 
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stringent a test for addiction as we currently understand it to pass. If  faculty is impaired, 
rather than destroyed, criminal liability cannot be denied outright on one of  the severely 
limited number of  grounds for doing so. We might instead look to analogy with 
defences, which do not seek to deny liability, but to justify or excuse offending.
Doli incapax. Virtually every legal system in the world determines an age under 
which children cannot be considered blameworthy for acts which would otherwise be 
criminal. In England, Wales and Northern Ireland that age is 10.
Being a binary construct, the existence of  criminal liability does not readily lend 
itself  to attenuation. Given the a priori position that infants lack sufficient mental faculty 
to form criminal intent, we are forced to ponder the appropriate stage during their 
maturation into adulthood at which such faculty might be deemed sufficient. In this we 
can see rendered a well-recognized fallacy: that there is an identifiable threshold which, 
when crossed, somehow ‘activates’ criminal responsibility. A child of  9 is no more 
completely irrational than a child of  11 may be described as completely rational, yet the 
determining of  criminal liability in such fashion is necessitated by the logical 
impossibility of  having partial mens rea.
At the same time, neither rationality nor conscious control over action are binary 
constructs in this same vein. On the spectrum between complete rationality and 
complete irrationality, there are a multitude of  dispositions in between, and the same 
may equally be said of  control. Does it follow from this that partial rationality should 
result in only partial liability? Plainly, it cannot. Liability either exists or it does not. Yet 
there are conditions which impair, rather than obliterate, either rationality or control 
over action. In such circumstances, where mens rea cannot be denied, the law must yet 
account for gradations of  this kind.
Defences. Where liability cannot be denied, there is still scope for offending to be 
excused. On a limited number of  grounds, a defendant may offer that they are less than 
fully culpable for their actions. As with the grounds on which denials of  offence are 
based, defences are largely concerned with the degree to which offenders may argue that 
their actions were not fully within their control. An individual may retain control over 
their movements and full understanding of  the wrongness of  their actions, but, where 
pressured to act through threat or circumstance, may argue for reduced or absent blame 
in respect of  those actions.
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Where such an excuse serves to exculpate entirely, it is referred to as a ‘complete’ 
defence. A successful argument in these terms would result in acquittal. ‘Partial’ 
defences, on the other hand, reduce culpability rather than removing it, with the result 
that the impact of  such findings is reflected in sentencing. As we shall see, in common 
with denials of  offence, these liability stage rules are rarely open to addicted offenders.
Complete defences.
Duress. In order to be judged wholly responsible for one’s actions they must be 
actions taken of  free will. To attribute responsibility is to attribute authorship. Hence the 
individual who commits a crime under duress placed upon them by a third party 
through threat of  violence may argue that the crime was not one for which they bear 
culpability. Whilst such circumstances would not justify, they might instead excuse 
criminal acts. 
The circumstances governing when and to what extent an individual may claim to 
have been acting under such duress are generally taken to have been established in their 
modern form by Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, whose Digest of  the Criminal Law of  
England (1887) outlined the doctrine in these terms:
An act which would otherwise be a crime may in some cases be 
excused if the person accused can show that it was done only in 
order to avoid consequences which could not otherwise be 
avoided, and which, if they had followed, would have inflicted 
upon him or upon others whom he was bound to protect 
inevitable and irreparable evil, that no more was done than was 
reasonably necessary for that purpose, and that the evil inflicted 
by it was not disproportionate to the evil avoided (pp. 24-5).
For over a century, these broad terms have been regarded as providing the clearest 
direction for probing a defence of  duress. It has guided decisions in defining cases such 
as R v. Martin (1989), in which Simon Brown J acknowledged the existence, in extreme 
circumstances, of  a defence of  necessity which he termed “duress of  circumstances” (at 
653), and R v. Abdul-Hussein (1999), wherein the Court of  Appeal established that the 
threat of  death or serious injury had only to be ‘imminent’ and not ‘immediate’. These 
principles, as restated by Simon Brown J in R v. Martin (1989), were described by Rose 
VP in R v. Abdul-Hussein (1999) as "the clearest and most authoritative guide to the 
relevant principles and appropriate discretion in relation to both forms of  duress” (p. 
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12).
Duress requires that the threat made “must be so great as to overbear the ordinary 
powers of  human resistance” (A-G v. Whelan, 1933, at 526). To be included within this 
category requires passing the Graham test, so named for the case in which the three 
criteria were clearly laid out (R v. Graham, 1982). Firstly, the defendant must have a 
reasonable belief  that the threat is real. Secondly, that belief  must have led to their 
having good cause to fear death or serious injury in the event of  their failure to comply. 
Thirdly, it must be conceivable that, if  they shared the characteristics of  the defendant, 
a sober person of  reasonable firmness would have acted similarly.
Necessity. Unlike duress, the defence of  necessity is not defined in law. Rather, its 
existence represents an acknowledgement that neither statute nor precedent can 
anticipate all possible circumstances. The defence of  necessity has broadly been 
interpreted as applying where a crime has been committed in attempt to prevent a 
greater wrong. Given the potentially broad scope of  such a defence, courts have 
demonstrated reluctance to entertain it outside the most extreme cases, and even greater 
reluctance to define it in real terms. Child and Ormerod (2017) suggest that it is “best 
understood as an imperfect safety net, a complete and general defence of  last resort 
where no other defence is available but it is clear that liability would be 
inappropriate” (p. 591).
The greatest clarity on the necessity defence is arguably that provided in Re A (2000), 
where Brooke LJ laid out the necessary requirements: (i) the act in question was needed 
to avoid inevitable and irreparable evil; (ii) no more should have been done than was 
reasonably necessary for the purpose to have been achieved; (iii) the evil inflicted must 
not have been disproportionate to the evil avoided. However, it was made clear in this 
judgment that these requirements did not in themselves form the basis of  a necessity 
defence. They were, rather, points of  reference for guiding consideration of  the 
particular facts of  a given case. A necessity defence is only likely to succeed where it is 
believed that a particular, unique set of  circumstances exist which are not catered for in 
the existing law.
Addiction and complete defence. There may at first appear to be scope here for 
addiction to inform judgment along lines akin to those which excuse offending. We 
could propose withdrawal as a form of  duress, for instance, or argue that craving is a 
type of  necessity. However, we quickly run into some familiar issues with respect to 
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volition and foresight.
Where defendants seek to raise a defence of  duress, such state of  duress as is claimed 
cannot have been entered into by choice. As Lowry LCJ made clear in R v. Fitzpatrick 
(1977), “if  a person voluntarily exposes and submits himself…to illegal compulsion, he 
cannot rely on the duress to which he has voluntarily exposed himself  as an excuse” (p. 
33). This logic was clarified in R v. Shepherd (1987): “it is a matter of  joining in a criminal 
enterprise of  such a nature that the defendant appreciated the nature of  the enterprise 
itself… so that when he was in fact subjected to compulsion he could fairly be said by a 
jury to have voluntarily exposed himself  and submitted himself  to such compulsion” (p. 
51). Here we can see the logic of  prior fault directing the course of  assigning 
responsibility for criminal action. Reasonable foresight and voluntary behaviour 
inculpate where otherwise there would be questions over liability.
If  anything, a defence of  necessity provides even less scope for excusing the 
behaviour of  addicted offenders. Where it has been successful, this has been in cases 
involving a unique set of  circumstances not catered for in statute or precedent. There is 
a substantial amount of  caselaw concerning addicted offenders, in part because their 
crimes are anything but unique.
One central difficulty is that a state of  addiction is not the same as a state of  
intoxication. One can be a sober addict. So we instantly have two categories: the sober 
addict and the intoxicated addict. The intoxicated addict might suggest that the state of  
intoxication in which they committed offences was such that their rationality was 
impaired. The complete loss of  rationality would by definition negate mens rea. Where 
such a state was voluntarily entered into, mens rea can be constructed through the 
doctrine of  prior fault. This only requires that the intoxicating substance in question was 
first taken voluntarily, and with reasonable anticipation of  its potential for inducing 
deleterious behavioural results. An addict is a more than infrequent user, so cannot 
reasonably argue that the potential for such results was unforeseen.
On the matter of  voluntariness, there is a prima facie argument that, as an addict, 
drug use is not voluntary. Indeed, compulsive drug-taking is a pillar of  drug addiction. 
Yet, even if  we were to accept the addicted state as confirmation that any individual 
episode of  intoxication was not, in the strictest sense, voluntary, the logic of  prior fault 
extends over time. There is certainly a stage on the path toward addiction at which 
frequent use transmutes into compulsive use, which logically develops the notion of  a 
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period of  drug-taking which preceded compulsion. Such voluntariness as might be 
deemed absent from the intoxicated state in which a crime was committed can be found 
in the acquisition of  the addicted state on which blame for the intoxication is placed.
On the other hand, what of  the sober addict? That is, the individual who has, 
through drug exposure, induced brain changes which result in altered behavioural 
output, yet was not intoxicated at the time of  the offence. If  there is a credible argument 
to be made that the criminal behaviour in question was stimulated, guided or permitted 
as a direct result of  the long-term effects of  addiction, this presents a quandary. To what 
extent is behaviour under those terms volitional? Ordinarily, brain dysfunction of  
similar quality would be highly relevant in apportioning criminal responsibility. Yet the 
addict can ascribe such aberrant mental processes only to their compulsive drug-taking 
behaviour, blame for which can be placed on their earlier, voluntary drug-taking. In this 
way, the same logic which underpins prior fault thinking can be stretched across years, 
and even decades.
Clearly voluntariness is not a binary construct. It exists on a spectrum. At one 
extreme is genuinely volitional action and, at the other, the complete absence of  
voluntariness: action without choice, action without awareness. Where these 
circumstances are demonstrated to exist, criminal liability cannot be attached to 
behaviour. Where some fractional measure of  control over and understanding of  
behaviour is present, the question becomes one not of  the existence of  liability, but over 
the extent of  responsibility borne. Compulsion or constraint of  behaviour may result in 
the rational commission of  knowingly criminal acts whose performance nevertheless 
cannot be considered entirely voluntary. Certainly there is a distinction when contrasted 
with an individual who commits identical acts in the absence of  such influence. The 
extent to which behaviour is voluntary has direct relevance to its perceived criminality.
Partial defences. Partial defences are only available to a charge of  murder, but are 
included here as illustrative examples of  the way in which the law regards claims that 
aberrant mental function should translate into reduced culpability for offending. Murder 
is the only crime for which the law obliges a mandatory life sentence, which has the 
effect of  limiting judicial discretion with respect to the sentencing options available. 
Partial defences therefore exist to allow a charge of  murder to be reduced to one of  
voluntary manslaughter, removing the obligation of  handing down a life sentence and 
opening up sentencing options which would not otherwise be available. The successful 
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advancement of  a partial defence does not challenge the existence of  criminal liability, 
but rather permits sentencing to be moderated in respect of  mental factors which may 
speak to reduced culpability for the offending.
Diminished responsibility. In order to present a defence of  diminished responsibility, it 
must be established that the defendant was “suffering from an abnormality of  mental 
functioning” arising from a recognised medical condition which was causal to the crime 
(Homicide Act 1957, s2). This abnormality must substantially impair either the 
defendant’s ability to understand the nature of  their conduct, their ability to form a 
rational judgment, or their ability to exercise self-control.
Loss of  control. The Coroners and Justice Act 2009 abolished the somewhat 
incoherent common-law defence of  ‘provocation’ as a partial defence to a charge of  
murder and replaced it with ‘loss of  control’. The three criteria which need to be 
satisfied in order for a defendant to raise this defence are that the loss of  control was 
causal to the offence in question, that it had a qualifying trigger, and that “a person of  
[their] sex and age, with a normal degree of  tolerance and self-restraint and in the 
[same] circumstances…might have reacted in the same or in a similar way” (s 54(1)).
Addiction and partial defence. Given our understanding of  addiction as a 
condition rooted in compulsion and disrupted self-control, it may at first appear that a 
‘loss of  control’ defence is a natural fit. However, a loss of  control argument is difficult to 
form in the case of  addiction, as one prerequisite is “a normal degree of…self-
restraint” (Coroners and Justice Act 2009, s 54(1)(c)). Suggestion that the loss of  control 
in question was rooted in neurobiological disruption which undermined normal 
restraint clearly fails this test.
It is, rather, in the realm of  diminished responsibility that some account has been 
taken of  addiction in determining culpability for offending. Whilst attempts to propose 
acute intoxication as a “recognised medical condition” (Homicide Act 1957, s (2)(a)) 
have failed (R v. Dowds, 2012), there have been instances in which account has been 
taken of  addiction in tandem with intoxication. As we have seen, intoxication cannot be 
offered as a complete denial of  criminal offending where it is understood to have been 
voluntary. However, an addict might advance that their intoxication is not voluntary, but 
rather a compelled act over which they are incapable of  exerting control. In R v. Tandy 
(1989), Watkins LJ outlined the operation of  such an argument in terms of  rationality 
and voluntariness:
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If the alcoholism has reached the level at which her brain had been 
injured by the repeated insult from intoxicants so that there was 
gross impairment of her judgment and emotional responses, then 
the defence of diminished responsibility was available to her ... if 
her drinking was involuntary, then her abnormality of the mind 
at the time of the act of strangulation was induced by her 
condition of alcoholism.
Here we can see scope for addiction to be offered as a partial defence, if  only to the 
crime of  murder, by underpinning an argument for diminished responsibility. As 
outlined above, such a finding would open up more lenient sentencing options, obviating 
the requirement of  a life sentence. In fact, there are two different approaches offered 
here: one by which addiction can challenge the voluntariness of  intoxication, and 
another by which addiction itself  may be considered a brain injury sufficient to 
challenge rationality. In the former case, diminished responsibility is developed from 
acute, intoxicated brain state, which addiction may explain as involuntary. In the latter, 
however, it is developed from chronic, addicted brain state, which in itself  may 
undermine the notion of  behaviour being fully rational. This is an important distinction. 
Where addiction is proposed to explain intoxication as involuntary, this can only ever 
apply in the case of  crimes committed whilst intoxicated. Suggestion that addicted brain 
state speaks directly to behaviour is, by contrast, a claim about global impairment with 
much broader application. How these two conceptions operate to inform judicial 
decision-making at sentencing is a question we will be considering in the coming 
chapters.
Developmental. Although not a defence to criminal liability, the law does take 
account of  immaturity in assessing blameworthiness for acts. As already outlined, the 
age of  criminal majority in England and Wales is 10. Once this age has been reached, 
liability can only be determined in common with adult offenders. However, 
accommodation is made for juvenile offenders (under 18 years of  age) with altered 
procedures and different sentencing options, both of  which are intended to reflect the 
general understanding of  children lacking the control and rational judgment they will 
develop into adulthood. 
33
Neuroimaging techniques have revealed the developmental course of  the brain and 
given us insight into the structural and functional changes which take place from infancy 
into adulthood (Durston et al., 2001; Gogtay et al., 2004). The picture we now have of  
the brain as it matures is one which accords with folk-psychological understanding of  
children’s faculty for moral reasoning and behavioural restraint: they are far from fully 
developed (Selemon, 2013; Spear, 2013). 
High-order neurological function is an emergent property of  neural connectivity, 
and as such is developed not only through the extent of  synaptic proliferation but also its 
refinement; an overabundance of  connectivity can impede function just as readily as its 
absence (Craik & Bialystok, 2006). Neural development is characterized by the 
production of  a super-abundance of  neurons during childhood, followed by a pruning 
process which shapes functional connectivity (Petanjek et al., 2011). Now that we can 
observe this process through the use of  advanced neuroimaging techniques, we can see 
that it does not take place in all areas of  the brain simultaneously. 
Brain areas such as those responsible for sensory and motor function develop and 
mature first, whilst areas associated with integrative, high-order functions, such as the 
prefrontal and lateral temporal cortices, are amongst the last to develop (Sowell, 
Thompson, & Toga, 2004). The systems which facilitate reward-seeking behaviour are 
amongst those which develop early. These are the mechanisms by which we are driven 
to action to satisfy our needs. In adulthood, these systems are regulated through top-
down processes which, as we have seen, are believed to rely on the normal functioning 
of  prefrontal cortical areas. Yet these are amongst the last areas to reach maturation in 
the human brain. The synaptic pruning process which mediates functionality does not 
begin in the prefrontal cortex until late adolescence and continues into an individual’s 
early twenties (Gogtay et al., 2004). The young brain, then, exhibits a paucity of  
function in precisely that area which has been demonstrated to be essential for resisting 
impulses.
There is an increasingly sound scientific basis on which to argue for reduced 
criminal responsibility in the case of  juvenile offenders (Steinberg & Scott, 2003). 
Developmental fMRI studies have repeatedly demonstrated the differential recruitment 
of  prefrontal and subcortical regions in adolescent brains (Monk et al., 2003; Thomas et 
al., 2004), consistent with findings which have demonstrated that such elevated 
subcortical activity is associated with decision-making which shows bias towards 
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immediate over long-term rewards (McClure, Laibson, Loewenstein, & Cohen, 2004) 
and is correlated with risky choices (Kuhnen & Knutson, 2005).
We can therefore observe in children an example of  unchecked motivational 
processes. Goal-oriented, novelty- or pleasure-seeking systems are developed and 
functioning, but operating with a lack of  restraint. The underdevelopment of  prefrontal 
areas results in a paucity of  function in terms of  both moral reasoning and self-control 
(Anderson, Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 1999; Greene, Nystrom, Engell, 
Darley, & Cohen, 2004 ; Romer, 2010). As children mature into adolescence these areas 
develop very little, and their limited capacity for restraint is tested by a significant 
increase of  activity in subcortical areas associated with motivation and drive. The 
increasingly impaired behavioural control exhibited by children as they become 
adolescents reflects the temporarily exaggerated responding of  sub-cortical limbic 
regions associated with reward and the anticipation of  reward (Ernst et al., 2005), 
coupled with the ongoing underdevelopment of  prefrontal regions (Casey, Jones, & 
Hare, 2008).
There are many similarities, then, between the adolescent brain and that of  the 
addict. Exaggerated responding of  the subcortical limbic system driving impulsive 
action and riskier choices, twinned with limited functionality in prefrontal areas 
impairing behavioural control. Yet any argument for reduced responsibility on the 
grounds of  functional impairment encounters an insurmountable difficulty: liability is a 
binary construct which cannot be attenuated. In the case of  juvenile offenders, 
mitigation of  criminal responsibility on account of  age can only be addressed in 
sentencing outcome.
Another commonality between addiction and adolescence is that there is no scope 
for denying liability for criminal acts on the basis of  addiction. Nor, for that matter, can 
addiction be likened under current legislation to excuses for offending such as duress or 
necessity. There is no route to exoneration for the addicted offender. However, where 
addiction may have an impact at the liability stage is as a factor influencing sentencing. 
The partial defences available to a charge of  murder cannot remove culpability, but they 
may reduce it, and such reduction can only be reflected in moderated sentencing. It is 
only at sentencing that criminal responsibility can be assessed by degrees, so it is only 
there that suggestion of  partially impaired control or rationality can be accommodated.
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SENTENCING
Sentencing, to the outside observer, may represent the limited set of  prescribed 
outcomes made necessary by the liability stage of  criminal proceedings. The main 
purpose of  a trial, after all, is the establishment of  guilt or innocence. Yet it is sentencing 
upon which the substantive burden of  attenuating responsibility is placed. As we have 
seen, the range of  options for the denial or mitigation of  responsibility at the liability 
stage of  criminal proceedings is severely limited. If  a defendant can be demonstrated to 
have been in even some small measure of  control over their actions at the time of  the 
offence, and acting with the required state of  mind, liability attaches. Once liability has 
been established, sentencing is the stage to which questions over the extent of  culpability 
are referred. The binary nature of  the liability stage does not lend itself  to 
incrementation. Rather, such considerations must be carried over and their validity and 
relevance accounted for through the range of  sentencing options available.
The requirement of  allowance for the individual facts and circumstances of  the 
offence in question beyond that made in determining liability is clear, for example, in the 
way Courts treat juvenile offenders. The nature of  a crime does not change in relation 
to the comparative youth of  its perpetrator. If  the actor in question is over the age of  
criminal majority, liability cannot be denied other than by those limited avenues 
available to their adult counterparts. Yet some account must be taken of  age. If  a 
country sets, as England does, the age above which criminal liability may be attached to 
actions at 9, it proceeds logically that a 10-year-old accused of  a crime should receive 
identical treatment to that which would be extended to a 30-year-old facing identical 
charges. Yet this is plainly unsatisfactory. Account must be taken of  a juvenile offender’s 
developmental stage on the trajectory of  maturation, and such nuance cannot be 
applied in the determination of  liability. It can only be addressed in the application of  
procedural changes or, more commonly, through differential sentencing options. 
This same is true of  offenders who present some measure of  mental impairment in 
defence of  their actions. The liability stage removes the most severely afflicted offenders, 
but, as we have seen, the stringent requirements imposed for this to occur are rarely met. 
By far the majority of  offenders who can genuinely lay claim to some measure of  
mental impairment do not pass these tests. Instead, what reduced culpability they might 
be apportioned can only be resolved in the moderation of  sentencing.
In England and Wales, virtually all criminal cases start in Magistrates’ Court. 
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Offences for which the maximum custodial sentence is greater than 6 months are 
referred to higher (Crown) Court, whilst the less severe offences - which constitute in the 
region of  95% of  all cases - are retained and disposed of  in Magistrates’ Court. 
Magistrates are lay-judges drawn from the local community who volunteer their 
services. They do not require formal legal qualifications, but will have undertaken 
training, including Court and prison visits, to develop the necessary skills to perform 
their duties. In Court, Magistrates are assisted and provided legal and procedural advice 
by qualified clerks.
In deciding the appropriate sentence for a given offence, Magistrates and Judges use 
sentencing guidelines from the Court of  Appeal and the Sentencing Council for 
England and Wales. The guidelines set out different levels of  sentence based on the 
harm caused and how culpable the offender is. This provides an offence-based starting 
or ‘anchor’ point. Once this anchor point has been established, credit for a guilty plea is 
considered, usually amounting to a one-third reduction in the length of  sentence. 
Following this, the guidelines provide general direction on the consideration of  offender 
or offence characteristics which may serve to aggravate or mitigate offending, the length 
of  sentence being adjusted accordingly.
The balance between judicial discretion and consistency in sentencing can be a 
difficult one to strike. With the aim of  ensuring consistency, the Criminal Justice Act 
2003 stated that the judiciary “must have regard to” guidelines in sentencing. The 
Coroners and Justice Act 2009 subsequently changed this language to the somewhat 
firmer “must follow”, which led to suggestion that the new language represented a 
narrowing of  discretionary sentencing powers (Magistrates’ Association, 2009). Though 
the language was retained, an additional amendment was added to offset any concerns 
raised. Where before an explanation would be required if  a sentence was given which 
fell outside the narrower category range, it would now only be required if  it fell outside 
the overall offence range. As a result, whilst the language suggests a duty to comply with 
the guidelines, the result was in reality a widening of  the discretionary sentencing 
powers Magistrates and Judges could bring to bear, particularly in deciding whether and 
to what extent mitigating or aggravating factors may reduce or increase sentences 
(Roberts, 2011).
The sentencing guidelines do not provide direction on the matter of  addiction. 
Whilst they do lay out a range of  potentially aggravating or mitigating factors, it is 
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underlined that these lists are not intended to be exhaustive, and nowhere is it stated that 
addiction is excluded from operation as one such factor. The guidelines include “mental 
illness or disability” (Sentencing Council, 2017, p. 20) as a potentially mitigating factor 
indicating significantly lower culpability for offending, and the neurobiological disease 
model of  addiction would arguably bring it within this category. However, “commission 
of  an offence while under the influence of  alcohol or drugs” (p. 20) is given as an 
aggravating factor indicating higher culpability. Whether the phrasing “under the 
influence” refers specifically to behavioural impairment resulting from acute intoxication 
or may be interpreted more broadly as the longer-term impact of  repeated consumption 
is left unaddressed.
Section 142 (1) of  the Criminal Justice Act 2003 lays out the five purposes of  
sentencing to which courts must have regard: (i) the punishment of  offenders; (ii) the 
reduction of  crime (including its reduction by deterrence); (iii) the reform and 
rehabilitation of  offenders; (iv) the protection of  the public; (v) the making of  reparation 
by offenders to persons affected by their offences. In the absence of  specific guidance or 
directive, it is from the weighing of  these principles that appropriate sentencing is 
drawn. No suggestion is made that any one principle is more important than any other, 
nor is it given that they are to be held equal regard. It is for sentencers to determine the 
relevance of  each principle and the weight they accord them in deciding the appropriate 
sentence.
As we have seen over the preceding sections, issues surrounding the rationality of  
offenders or the volitional nature of  their offending rarely meet the criteria for the 
complete denial of  responsibility. As a result, such factors are invariably addressed at 
sentencing. The discretion extended to sentencers here, both in determining the 
appropriate sentence and over which factors may be incorporated into that 
determination, acknowledges that “the purposes of  punishment are manifold and each 
element will assume a different significance not only in different crimes but in the 
individual commission of  each crime… ultimately every sentence imposed represents a 
sentencing judge’s instinctive synthesis of  all the various aspects involved in the punitive 
process” (R v. Williscroft, 1975, pp. 299-300). Given this, the manner in which drug-use 
and addiction are regarded by the judiciary is given clearest expression in sentencing 
practice, and it is therefore here that we shall focus our attention over the coming 
chapters.
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THESIS STRUCTURE
The following four chapters comprise a series of  studies designed to probe the 
impact of  addiction and intoxication on Magistrates' sentencing decisions. All of  our 
participants were English and Welsh Magistrates.
In Chapter 2 we examine the extent to which neurobiological deficits associated with 
addiction serve to mitigate criminal responsibility when attributed to alternate aetiology. 
We also investigate the role of  choice across different aetiologies, determining that 
perceived choice in the initiation of  a condition to which deficits are attributed plays a 
pivotal role in subsequent determinations of  criminal responsibility.
In Chapter 3, we develop mixed aetiologies in which addiction is either followed or 
preceded by a co-morbid brain disease and contrast impressions of  culpability in these 
instances with those formed of  addiction or disease in isolation. We also further 
investigate the role of  choice in extended aetiology by examining the extent to which the 
addict being either juvenile or adult when first drug-use occurred informs sentencing 
decisions.
The study presented in Chapter 4 examines the function of  choice in continued 
drug-use, contrasting addiction maintenance narratives which include some measure of  
abstinence. We also re-examine the impact of  choice in drug-use initiation, replicating 
the finding that choice in the genesis of  addiction can direct impressions of  its 
aggravating or mitigating nature.
The final study, presented in Chapter 5, considers addiction and intoxication as they 
relate to one another in criminal sentencing by presenting them separately or in 
combination. We demonstrate circumstances under which intoxication can serve to 
mitigate criminal responsibility, together with the tendency of  alcoholism to aggravate it.
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Chapter 2. Addiction and choice:
The role of  perceived choice in the sentencing of  addicted offenders.
Abstract
Whether the prevailing neuroscientific model of  addiction as a brain disease 
informs questions around moral and criminal responsibility continues to fuel 
debate, but empirical evidence is lacking. The greater part of  the existing 
literature is concerned with the liability stage of  criminal proceedings, and 
experimental work is most commonly conducted using mock jurors or members 
of  the public. Whereas liability is binary, responsibility is commonly placed on a 
spectrum when Judges are deciding the appropriate criminal sentence for an 
offender. We wanted to investigate the factors which informed such judgments in 
practical application. We therefore asked 108 Magistrates to consider criminal 
sentencing scenarios which included evidence of  a defendant’s brain damage and 
impaired impulse control resulting from either a (fictional) disease or from 
addiction to and use of  heroin. Custodial sentences were significantly reduced 
when the identical neuropsychiatric profile resulted from a disease, but not when 
caused by heroin use and addiction. The pivotal factor denying addiction the 
mitigating power of  disease was perceived choice in the initial acquisition; 
removing choice from addiction dramatically increased the odds of  leniency, while 
attaching choice to disease tended to aggravate or reverse earlier leniency. Our 
results indicate a dramatic effect of  impairment aetiology on judgments of  
criminal responsibility and suggest that addiction is not considered in common 
with diseases of  the mind in determinations of  culpability for wrongdoing.
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If a madman commit a felony he shall not lose his life for it, because 
his infirmity came by the Act of God; but if a drunken man 
commit a felony, he shall not be excused, because his 
imperfection came by his own default.
Lord Bacon
Elements of the Common Lawes of England (1630)
If  criminal success is measured by avoiding punishment, then addicted criminals 
rank somewhere near the bottom. Even when controlling for the fact that substance-
abusers are more than three times as likely to commit crimes than their sober 
counterparts, they are more likely to be arrested (Stevens, 2008) and much more likely to 
commit further detected crimes upon release (UK Drug Policy Commission, 2008). 
While some of  these offences relate directly to the possession and/or supply of  illicit 
substances, the majority are accounted for by acquisitive crimes (e.g. shoplifting, 
mugging or burglary) or, in the case of  cocaine or alcohol, offences of  a violent or sexual 
nature. The net result is that, among arrestees, 50% abuse and/or are dependent on 
drugs, more than half  of  whom regularly take Heroin (Wilson, 2011). Once imprisoned, 
the opportunity for drug use only increases, with in the region of  40% of  heroin- and 
cocaine-using prisoners reporting first using them in prison (Boys et al., 2002; Light, 
Grant, & Hopkins, 2013), contributing to a drug trade in UK prisons with an estimated 
value in excess of  £100 million per annum (Centre for Social Justice, 2010).
The inextricable link between addiction and crime is reinforced by the cultural 
understanding of  addiction as a state tied to moral failing, with the result that any 
negative consequences are undeserving of  sympathy on the part of  the ordinary (non-
addicted) citizen. Moreover, high recidivism rates suggest that such failing is not 
momentary, but rather a persistent and potentially immutable characteristic of  the 
addict. A heightened tendency towards criminality and an apparent intractability of  bad 
character perhaps go some way towards explaining why a majority of  the public admit 
to having a general ‘dislike’ of  addicts, together with a willingness to accept 
discriminatory practices against them and a general skepticism of  policies aimed at 
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helping them (Barry, McGinty, Pescosolido, & Goldman, 2014).
Conversely, an increasing number of  academic scientists, health professionals and 
influential media figures cite evidence of  drug-related brain changes and resultant 
deficits in mental function as reason to raise legitimate questions about whether or to 
what extent we should be holding addicts responsible for their addiction and associated 
behaviour. Where that behaviour is criminal, questions surrounding the existence and 
extent of  responsibility, and hence blameworthiness, are paramount.
Contemporary neuroscience offers us unprecedented insights into the addict’s brain 
and how drugs hijack or usurp normal structure and function in brain areas like the 
prefrontal cortex (PFC), a region implicated in ‘normal’ executive function, rational 
decision-making and impulse control (Alexander, Stuss, Picton, Shallice, & Gillingham, 
2007; Aron & Poldrack, 2005; Bari & Robbins, 2013). Some have even pointed to this 
region as the neural substrate underlying moral reasoning (Loeben & Stoehr, 2007). To 
many, such findings raise legitimate questions over the extent to which addicted criminal 
offenders possess the requisite cognitive and volitional capacities to be held morally or 
criminally responsible for their actions in the same way as non-addicts (Leshner, 1997). 
As succinctly captured by criminal law theorist H. L. A. Hart, it is a prerequisite of  
justice that “those whom we punish should have had, when they acted, the normal 
capacities, physical and mental, for doing what the law requires and abstaining from 
what it forbids” (1968, p. 152)3. This notion is clearly reflected in how Courts consider 
minors, moderating criminal responsibility by virtue of  the extent to which juveniles 
may be less capable of  considering their actions or controlling their impulses. In recent 
years, Courts have increasingly cited neuroscientific evidence of  prefrontal cortical 
immaturity to support the idea that juvenile offenders lack the ‘normal mental 
capacities’ which form part of  the standard for responsibility under the law (Steinberg, 
2013). Yet brain imaging studies in a similar vein have developed a wealth of  evidence 
suggesting structural and functional changes in the brains of  substance-abusers, 
including in the PFC. Should similar account not be taken of  the addict’s different brain 
state in holding them accountable for resulting behaviour? Or does the fact that 
addiction implies an initially voluntary choice to use drugs, and thus that addicts can be 
3 See also the US Model Penal Code (4.01, 1985) in the context of  insanity defences, noting that “a 
person is not responsible for criminal conduct if  at the time of  such conduct as a result of  mental disease 
or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality (wrongfulness) of  his conduct or 
to conform his conduct to the requirements of  the law" (p. 61).
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seen as having themselves brought about the conditions which speak to mitigation, block 
considerations of  this kind? Given that drug-using offenders make up the majority of  
the prison population (HMIP, 2015a), are significantly more likely to re-offend following 
release, and are estimated to be responsible for anywhere from 60% to 90% of  all 
acquisitive crime (Birt, 2003), the importance of  these questions goes beyond the 
theoretical.
An examination of  recent case-law offers contradictory views. While some Courts 
have considered evidence of  drug-use and addiction as aggravating, even when 
introduced as a mitigating factor (Bjerregaard, Smith, Fogel, & Palacios, 2010; Blume, 
Johnson, & Sundby, 2008), others explicitly cite neurocognitive deficits associated with 
drug use and addiction as grounds for extending leniency. In a recent sentencing opinion 
in US v. Hendrickson (2014), for instance, the Judge noted “because addiction is a serious 
brain disease that diminishes one’s capacity to evaluate decisions and regulate behavior, 
I consider addiction to be a generally and substantially mitigating factor” (at 1176)4. 
The apparent incoherence in the use of  addiction-related evidence by criminal 
courts risks inequity in sentencing and begs empirical study into sentencers’ reasoning in 
cases involving addiction. However, studies even tangentially touching on these issues 
tend to do so in the context of  the most serious and hence rarest of  offences 
(Bjerregaard et al., 2010), rather than the ‘run-of-the-mill’ offences which comprise the 
overwhelming majority of  cases seen by Courts and constitute the greatest economic 
and social burden of  crime. Moreover, to our knowledge, no studies in this context have 
queried those actually tasked with sentencing criminal offenders.
Given that in the region of  95% of  all crime in England and Wales is dealt with in 
Magistrates' Court, it is Magistrates who are most frequently called upon in such 
instances to gauge criminal responsibility by degrees. In asking how Courts regard 
addicted offenders, it is to Magistrates we must turn in seeking to bridge our 
understanding of  theory and practice. Though they have sentencing guidelines to assist 
them, it is in their individual considerations which are weighed the many factors 
potentially serving to aggravate or mitigate offending. Which of  these factors hold 
weight in such a balancing is a question of  more than academic interest - it is current 
4 See also the more recent case of  FBI agent Matthew Lowry (US v. Lowry, 2015) in which the presiding 
Judge Thomas F. Hogan explicitly cited US v. Hendrickson as providing the basis for considering addiction a 
generally mitigating factor (pp. 99-100).
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legal thinking in its practical application, moreover in the context where it is most 
commonly applied.
We hypothesized that identical impairment would result in different sentencing 
depending on its aetiology. We anticipated that a description of  structural and functional 
brain changes associated with altered behavioural output would lead to leniency in 
sentencing if  attributed to a fictional brain disease, and not when described as the 
consequence of  addiction. Theorizing that the impression of  initial choice in drug-use 
would be the primary distinguishing factor here, we anticipated that subsequent explicit 
evidence of  our defendant’s initial drug use having been outside his control would 
inspire leniency previously withheld while, conversely, suggestion that their past 
decisions contributed to their developing our fictional disease would establish a 
blameworthy choice sufficient to block mitigation and even aggravate. We also predicted 
that additional testimony indicating that our defendant had committed the crime with 
the intention of  self-medicating his neuropsychological symptoms (Stage 4) would 
further undermine impressions of  blameworthiness in the case of  the addict (by virtue 
of  their attempting to ‘kick’ their addiction to heroin), while reinforcing the view of  the 
disease sufferer being culpable in their condition by virtue of  their continuing choice to 
avoid treatment by self-medicating.
Method
Participants. A total of  110 active and retired Magistrates were recruited by 
invitation and directed to a survey link made available through the member’s internal 
webpage of  the England and Wales Magistrates’ Association. Additionally, cards inviting 
individual Magistrates to participate by visiting the website were distributed at London’s 
Westminster, Hammersmith and Richmond Courts. Of  the 110 respondents, one was 
excluded for cause (see Measures on page 48), leaving 109 surveys to be included in the 
initial data analysis. Five respondents did not complete the full survey. Of  the remaining 
104 completed responses, 11 were excluded from portions of  the analysis for the reasons 
given below.
As agreed in advance with the Magistrates’ Association and explained to 
respondents at the start of  the survey, all responses were recorded anonymously and no 
personal details, including age or sex, were collected.
This study was conducted in accordance with the British Psychological Society’s 
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Code of  Ethics and Conduct. Informed consent was collected in advance and all 
respondents were debriefed and given the opportunity to withdraw their responses 
following participation. The study protocol was approved by the Research Ethics 
Committee of  the University of  Sussex.
Design. A within-between-subjects design was used, with each participant being 
consecutively presented with new trial evidence across four stages and, depending on 
two independent variables, randomly assigned to one of  four experimental conditions 
(see Figure 2.1). At Stage 1, all participants were presented with the facts of  a 
hypothetical case and recorded an initial sentence in light of  these. The independent 
variables were the potentially mitigating factors introduced at the different stages. At 
Stage 2, this was the distinction between the aetiology of  the neuropsychiatric profile as 
either a fictional disease or addiction to and use of  heroin. At Stage 3, a second 
independent variable was introduced by providing new evidence of  the defendant’s past 
choices contributing to the aetiology. At Stage 4, evidence of  a self-medication motive 
for the crime was presented. The dependent variable remained identical across all stages 
and measured the length of  custodial sentence selected by respondents.
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Figure 2.1 - Group schematic of conditions.
Procedure. Survey materials were developed and administered using the Qualtrics 
software platform and were hosted through their server (Qualtrics, Provo, UT). After 
clicking the link provided through the Magistrates’ Association’s webpage, respondents 
were presented with an introductory page which provided them with a brief  outline of  
what was to follow, together with information on their ability to withdraw at any time 
during the survey. Once respondents clicked the ‘continue’ button, they were instructed 
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that they would be presented with the details of  a crime, and that it was their task to 
assign an appropriate sentence after considering the facts of  the case. It was explained 
that, subsequent to the presentation of  these primary facts of  the case and their initial 
sentencing decision, additional evidence would be introduced in a staged manner and 
they would have the option of  modifying their initial sentence in light of  this new 
information. To indicate their sentence decisions, respondents were provided with a 26-
point sliding scale that was reset to the minimum value (1 week) at each subsequent stage 
to reduce the likelihood of  respondents ‘clicking through’ with the same value, and to 
ensure that each new answer had to be considered before being selected. The reading on 
the scale was recorded once the ‘continue’ button was clicked.
At Stage 1, all respondents received an identical scenario outlining a crime 
committed by the defendant. Respondents were presented with the following facts of  the 
case:
John is 27 years old and unemployed. He has never been convicted of a 
crime. In January of this year he broke into a pharmacy. Having previously 
worked in the pharmacy as a cleaner, he knew that the staﬀ sometimes left 
the side door open for the cleaner when they left in the evening. Having 
waited for the staﬀ to leave, he tried the door and it opened. He entered, 
went behind the counter and took £100 worth of Vicodin, a prescription 
semi-synthetic opioid painkiller. John was identified by two eye-witnesses 
leaving the premises and arrested later that evening. Faced with an 
overwhelming case for the prosecution, he has entered a plea of guilty to the 
charge of non-domestic burglary.
Immediately after reading these facts of  the case, respondents were instructed that:
Guidelines suggest that John be sentenced to serve between 10 and 26 weeks. 
Optionally, his sentence may be reduced in light of John having entered a 
guilty plea. Your task is to decide the appropriate sentence. For how many 
weeks should John go to prison?
Magistrates were able to indicate their sentence decision on the sliding scale located 
underneath the question and to consider their decision without time constraint until 
clicking the ‘continue’ button. At subsequent stages participants were provided with the 
same 1-26 week sliding scale on which to enter their sentencing decisions.
At Stage 2, respondents were informed that John wished to introduce new 
information concerning a neuropsychiatric condition to be taken into consideration in 
deciding whether and to what extent they wished to alter their initial sentence. All 
respondents were informed that John’s condition included the following neurobiological 
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and behavioural symptoms:
... reduced grey matter volume in the prefrontal cortex, an area of the brain 
associated with action inhibition. Damage to this area has been 
demonstrated to result in impulsive behaviour and a lack of self-control.
Magistrates were randomly assigned to one of  two independent conditions 
depending on the aetiology of  John’s neuropsychological symptoms. Respondents 
assigned to the Disease condition learnt that John’s neuropsychological profile had 
resulted from him suffering from a (fictional) disease called 'Woznicki’s'. By contrast, 
respondents assigned to the Addiction condition learnt that his symptoms had resulted 
from his addiction to and use of  Heroin. The symptoms being described in identical 
terms, the respondent conditions differed only in the outlined aetiology of  John’s 
condition. Respondents were then asked to once again indicate on a sliding scale the 
sentence they felt was appropriate for the crime, given the new information with which 
they had been presented.
At Stage 3, respondents within the Disease and Addiction conditions were again 
randomly assigned to one of  two independent groups, offering further details of  John’s 
culpability in the development of  his condition, being either self-induced by past choices 
(autogenic) or resulting from a physician’s error and having thus been outside his control 
(iatrogenic).
Respondents in the Iatrogenic (no choice) conditions were informed either that the 
early stages of  John’s disease had gone undiagnosed due to an oversight on the part of  
his doctor (Iatrogenic Disease), or that John’s addiction had resulted from his doctor’s 
mismanagement of  his legitimate pain medication (Iatrogenic Addiction). In both 
groups it was offered that the physician responsible was later disciplined for the error, 
lending credence to the notion that the fault for the initial steps towards John’s current 
condition lay with someone other than himself. Conversely, respondents in the Disease 
or Addiction groups assigned to an Autogenic condition learnt that the origins of  John’s 
current state lay in part with his past decisions, either to refuse medical treatment 
(Autogenic Disease), or to self-medicate symptoms of  depression (Autogenic Addiction) 
(see Table 2.1).
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Table 2.1 - Aggravating or mitigating circumstances presented across Aetiology 
and Choice conditions.
Condition
Choice Aetiology Additional information
Autogenic
Addiction
John was in his late teens when he became addicted. Six months 
earlier, his doctor had diagnosed him as suﬀering from 
depression. John says that he began taking heroin because of the 
depression that he was suﬀering at the time. 
Disease
John was in his late teens when his disease manifested. 
Treatment at this early stage would have prevented the later 
onset of symptoms such as impulsivity and anti-social behaviour. 
However, although the early signs of the disease were noticed by 
his doctor, John chose not to receive treatment and his 
condition grew more severe. Six months earlier, his doctor had 
diagnosed him as suﬀering from depression, and John says that 
he refused to receive treatment because of the depression that 
he was suﬀering at the time.
Iatrogenic
Addiction
John was in his late teens when he became addicted. He was hit 
by a car and spent several weeks in hospital, during which time 
he was regularly receiving morphine, an opioid painkiller. His 
regimen of painkillers was mismanaged and, although he 
recovered from his physical injuries, John had developed an 
addiction to morphine by the time he left the hospital. He says 
this led to him becoming a heroin user. The doctor in charge of 
John’s care later faced disciplinary charges for this and several 
other instances of professional misconduct. 
Disease
John was in his late teens when his disease manifested. 
Treatment at this early stage would have prevented the later 
onset of symptoms such as impulsivity and anti-social behaviour. 
However, the early signs of the disease went unnoticed by his 
doctor and his condition grew more severe. The doctor in 
charge of John’s care later faced disciplinary charges for this and 
several other instances of professional misconduct. 
 4
At Stage 4, participants were informed that John had stolen the drugs for the 
purposes of  self-medicating his ongoing symptoms (Disease condition) or his planned 
withdrawal from Heroin (Addiction condition). The option was provided for sentences 
to be altered in light of  this new information.
Finally, all respondents were instructed that John would like to receive treatment for 
his condition in the form of  a 12-week residential program. Participants were informed 
that in order for John to receive such treatment, he would require a community order 
instead of  a custodial sentence. Respondents were then asked if  they would be willing to 
see John sentenced to a community order and, if  so, for how many months it should 
run. Those unwilling to offer diversion to treatment were instead asked to make one 
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final indication as to how long John’s custodial sentence should be.
After completing all stages of  the survey, a final page was presented containing a 
debriefing statement outlining the purpose of  the study and the fictional nature of  
Woznicki’s disease, clarifying that the neurological impairment outlined was that 
associated with Heroin use. It further reminded all respondents that they were free to 
withdraw from the study and have their answers removed at any time. An e-mail link 
was included and all participants were advised to use this link should they wish to have 
their responses withdrawn. Questions or comments regarding the study were also invited 
and, finally, participants were thanked for their time.
Measures and analyses. Length of  sentence in weeks at each of  the adjustment 
stages was transformed into percentage change from the initial anchor sentence 
indicated at Stage 1. Apart from controlling for absolute differences in the initial anchor 
sentences, the use of  percentage change (rather than absolute change) more accurately 
reflected the fact that a week removed from a two week sentence (50% reduction) is a 
relatively greater expression of  leniency than a week removed from a 20 week sentence 
(5% reduction).
We determined in advance that any response set which began at Stage 1 and ended 
at Stage 4 with a value above the scale midpoint (13 weeks) but fell to 1 week at either 
Stage 2 or Stage 3 would be considered an error arising from the default return to 
minimum and that those results would be omitted. A single participant met this criterion 
and was excluded from the analysis. Where results were analyzed in terms of  percentage 
change in sentence, the greatest possible decrease in sentence was necessarily less than 
100%. Given this, allowing the greatest increase in sentence to exceed 300% was 
regarded as having the potential to bias the results in favour of  a perceived overall 
increase. A single respondent met this criterion and was temporarily excluded from 
analysis conducted in percentage terms at the stage were the increase was made.
The likelihood of  sentence reduction by Magistrates at the different stages was 
quantified by calculating odds ratios. In this context, the odds ratios represent the 
likelihood that a Magistrate would change their sentence after exposure to a particular 
set of  information, compared to the odds of  sentence reduction occurring in the 
absence of  such information, or in the presence of  different information. Eight 
respondents selected an initial anchor sentence of  one week, leaving no possibility of  
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reducing their sentence at subsequent stages, and were therefore excluded from odds 
ratio analyses. Three additional respondents reduced their sentence to one week at later 
stages and were consequently excluded from subsequent odds ratio analyses. For these 
reasons, the number of  participants in each condition varied across stages and in line 
with analytical approach. Full details of  odds ratio calculations are shown in Appendix 
C on page 177.
Bayes Factor calculations were also conducted to augment odds ratio analyses at 
Stages 2, 3 and 4, deriving prior probability distributions from the observed effect at 
preceding stages. Bayes Factor calculation parameters for the tests conducted in this 
study are outlined in Appendix G on page 182. Full details of  the Bayesian approach 
adopted and a guide to Bayes Factor interpretation are provided in Appendix F on page 
180. 
Power and effect-size calculations were performed using G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, 
Lang, & Buchner, 2007).
Results
Magistrates’ initial anchor-sentences varied along the full range available to them 
(1-26 weeks), but skewed towards the lower two-thirds to distribute around an average 
sentence of  9.1 weeks (SEM ± 0.5) imprisonment.
Addiction v. Disease. The distributions of  results in the Woznicki’s and Heroin 
conditions were significantly non-normal [Woznicki’s D(52)=0.30, p<.001; Heroin 
D(56)=0.44, p<.001] and exhibited inequality of  variance [F(1,106)=8.1, p=.005]. 
Therefore, a non-parametric statistical approach was employed for comparisons of  
percentage reduction in sentence.
Despite identical neuropsychiatric profiles, the different aetiologies had a dramatic 
effect on sentencing judgments; in the Disease aetiology condition (n=52), Magistrates 
reduced their initial anchor sentence by an average of  17.1% (or 1.6 weeks) compared 
with only 7.1% (or 0.5 weeks) on the part of  those in the Addiction aetiology condition 
(n=56) [U=1075.5, z=-2.79, p=.005 (two-tailed test), r=0.48, power=0.68] (see Figure 
2.2).
50
Woznicki's Heroin
-25%
-20%
-15%
-10%
-5%
0%
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 re
du
ct
io
n
**
Figure 2.2 - Mean percentage reduction of initial sentence at Stage 2 in 
Woznicki’s and Heroin conditions (N=107; error bars +/-1 SEM; ** p<.01).
 Importantly, this difference was driven by whether Magistrates chose to reduce their 
initial sentence (Figure 2.3a), rather than the extent by which they reduced it when they 
chose to (see Figure 2.3b); with 49% of  Magistrates (n=24) reducing their initial sentence 
in the Disease aetiology and only 23% (n=12) in the Addiction aetiology condition, 
John’s odds of  receiving a reduced sentence dropped by more than 3 times if  his 
testimony mentioned Heroin addiction as the cause of  his neuropsychological deficits 
[OR=3.2, 95%CI=1.4-7.5, X2=7.4, p=.007] (see Figure 2.5).
51
Disease Addiction Disease Addiction
0
20
40
60
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y 
of
 re
du
ct
io
n
Reduction
 
** ns
A B
Figure 2.3 - (A) Relative frequency of sentence reduction at Stage 2 in the 
Disease and Addiction Aetiologies (N=101); (B) Mean percentage change from 
initial sentence excluding null respondents (n=36; error bars +/- 1 SEM; ** p<.
01). 
Autogenic v. Iatrogenic. Introducing information regarding the Autogenic 
(choice) or Iatrogenic (no choice) origin of  impairment had a powerful effect on leniency 
in sentencing. Iatrogenic origin of  Woznicki’s was associated with a greater likelihood of  
receiving a reduction in the length of  sentence [OR=3.4, 95% CI=0.8-14.9, X2=2.8, 
p=.10, BH(0, 1.16)=2.5], whilst iatrogenic origin of  addiction dramatically increased the 
chance or receiving a reduced sentence [OR=12.0, 95% CI=1.4-105.4, X2=7.0, p=.008, 
BH(0, 1.16)=5.0]. A Cochran-Mantel-Haenszel estimate of  the pooled odds ratio 
demonstrated that the likelihood of  sentence reduction was significantly greater in the 
event that impairment aetiology had iatrogenic origins [ORpooled=5.4, 95% CI=1.6-18.6, 
X2=7.5, p=.006, BH(0, 1.16)=17.4] (see Figure 2.5).
Once the additional information regarding a self-medication motive for the crime 
was introduced at Stage 4, Magistrates in the Iatrogenic Disease condition (n=26) were 
four times as likely to reduce John’s sentence as those in the Autogenic Disease condition 
(n=22) [OR=4.0, 95% CI=1.03-15.53, X2=4.2, p=.04, BH(0, 1.16)=4.4] (see Figures 2.4 
and 2.5). In parallel, participants in the Iatrogenic Addiction condition (n=27) were 
more than 20 times as likely to reduce John’s sentence than those in the Autogenic 
Addiction condition (n=29) [OR=20.3, 95% CI=2.4-175.3, X2=11.6, p=.001, BH(0, 
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1.16)=9.7].
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Figure 2.4 - Relative frequency of sentence reduction across Stages 3 and 4 in 
Iatrogenic (no choice) and Autogenic (choice) conditions across both Disease 
and Addiction Aetiology conditions (* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001).
Across both Disease and Addiction aetiologies, a Cochran-Mantel-Haenszel estimate 
of  the pooled odds ratio demonstrated a sevenfold greater likelihood of  sentence 
reduction in the Iatrogenic, ‘no choice’ groups when contrasted with the Autogenic, 
‘choice’ groups [ORpooled=7.2, 95% CI=2.28-22.67, X2=12.7, p<.001, BH(0, 1.16)=87.0].
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Figure 2.5 - Calculated Odds Ratios and associated Bayes Factors for sentence 
reductions by Magistrates at different stages of Anchor-and-Adjust sentencing 
(* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001; Open circle = Disease vs. Addiction; Open squares 
= Iatrogenic/no-choice vs. Autogenic/choice origin of Disease; Closed squares = 
Iatrogenic/no-choice vs. Autogenic/choice origin of Addiction; Closed circles = 
Pooled odds ratio Iatrogenic/no-choice vs. Autogenic/choice).
Total reduction and final sentence. The distributions of  results in the 
Woznicki’s and Heroin conditions exhibited equality of  variance [F(1,101)=3.1, p=.08], 
but were significantly non-normal [Woznicki’s D(48)=0.28, p<.001; Heroin D(55)=0.38, 
p<.001]. Therefore, a non-parametric approach was taken to analysis of  percentage 
reduction. Mean percentage reduction in sentence length across all stages was greater in 
the Disease conditions (n=48, M=-21.9%, SD=30.6) than in the Addiction conditions 
(n=55, M=-13.4%, SD=24.9) [U=1090.5, z=-1.72, p=.04, r=0.30, power=.44] (see 
Figure 2.6). In the Disease condition, sentence reduction was significantly greater 
[U=170, z=-2.59, p=.004, r=0.65, power=.57] in the Iatrogenic group (n=26, 
M=-31.0%, SD=33.1) than in the Autogenic group (n=22, M=-11.1%, SD=23.8). 
Similarly, in the Addiction condition, mean sentence reduction in the Iatrogenic group 
(n=27, M=-20.5%, SD=28.3) was significantly greater [U=256, z=-2.46, p=.007, 
r=0.56, power=.70] than in the Autogenic group (n=28, M=-6.5%, SD=19.2).
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Figure 2.6 - Mean percentage sentence reduction over all stages in Iatrogenic 
(no choice) and Autogenic (choice) conditions across both Disease and 
Addiction aetiologies (error bars +/-1 SEM; * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001).
In real terms, the distinction between choice in addiction and no choice in disease 
was the difference between 5.5 and 9.1 weeks imprisonment (see Figure 2.7).
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Figure 2.7 - Mean final sentence in weeks in Iatrogenic (no choice) and 
Autogenic (choice) conditions across both Disease and Addiction aetiologies 
(error bars +/-1 SEM).
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Discussion
John’s prima facie case for reduced culpability rests with his neuropsychological profile 
and how his diminished impulse-control may have contributed to the crime. That the 
odds of  leniency vary dramatically with the aetiology of  these symptoms indicates that 
leniency in sentencing was moderated by considerations beyond the immediate and 
wider circumstances of  the crime. One such consideration is rooted in what some legal 
philosophers have termed ‘diachronous responsibility’ (Khoury, 2013; Vincent, 2013); 
even if  his symptoms present a legitimate claim for reduced culpability (as evidenced in 
the Disease condition), John the heroin addict is deemed responsible for having chosen 
to use the drugs to which he subsequently became addicted, thereby restoring 
culpability. Both his initial use, and his subsequent failures to avoid further use, 
contravene the mitigating relevance of  his neurobiological deficits. As outlined in the 
Introduction, in law diachronous responsibility is addressed at the liability stage of  
proceedings by means of  ‘prior fault’ (see page 24). Yet we observed leniency in respect 
of  neurological deficits being blocked where those deficits were attributed to addiction, 
suggesting the operation of  a similar logic in sentencing decisions.
John’s odds of  sentence reduction were improved by testimony that he was seeking 
to control his addiction to heroin by self-medicating his withdrawal. This additional 
leniency was in keeping with the view of  culpability being derived not only from the 
choice to become addicted, but also from repeated failure to curtail use. Conversely, 
similar evidence of  self-medication in the Disease aetiology was equally as likely to lead 
to increases in sentence as it was to reductions.. In fact, Magistrates observed to increase 
their sentence were those that had earlier reduced it, suggesting a reversal or retraction 
of  leniency they had previously extended. Although this reversal was in line with our 
prediction, we cannot rule out additional factors driving this effect. The self-medication 
evidence may have suggested planning and intent (rather than impulsivity) and/or a 
perception of  future dangerousness resulting from the implied need for John to commit 
further crimes to ensure ongoing supply of  drugs.
There is a sense in which it is less than noteworthy to detect the pivotal role of  
choice in the determination of  blameworthiness. The law is not normally concerned 
with punishing involuntary behaviour. However, we must consider that the putative basis 
upon which leniency was advocated in this instance was the neurobiological picture of  
disrupted self-control. This was a picture which, in the context of  an acquired disease, 
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demonstrably served to mitigate criminal responsibility. Mitigation in the context of  
addiction was not similarly forthcoming until choice in the initiation of  drug-use was 
explicitly contradicted.
It would appear that perceived initial choice in the acquisition of  drug-using habits 
is a pivotal factor distinguishing addiction from other diseases of  the mind/brain in the 
consideration of  Magistrates; ‘adding’ choice to a disease made it analogous to 
addiction, while ‘removing’ choice from the addiction narrative increased the 
probability of  leniency to 60%, in line with that of  a disease (70%) and, critically, well 
beyond that afforded to a ‘typical’ addict (16%). 
It might follow from this that Magistrates do not consider addiction to be a disease, 
but for the fact that, when sampled elsewhere, over three-quarters of  them express 
agreement with the statement 'addiction is a disease' (see Appendix B on page 171). We 
could perhaps surmise that those tasked with addressing the material consequences of  
immorality consider drug-abuse revealing of  criminal character, but for the fact that 
four-fifths of  those sampled disagree with the statement 'drug addiction is evidence of  a 
lack of  moral character' (p. 171). It is difficult to reconcile these seemingly conflicting 
impressions.
To be clear, our findings do not serve to identify any bias in sentencers, but rather 
highlight an area of  criminal law and moral philosophy that is fundamentally 
problematic: prior fault. This is the term applied in law to the doctrine by which 
diachronous responsibility denies the excusing power of  circumstances which defendants 
have, either through negligence or intentional action, themselves created (Robinson, 
1985). Establishing prior fault rests on determining whether such actions were 
voluntarily undertaken and this can present a challenging task in its own right. In the 
case of  addiction, the Court shoulders the additional burden of  acting as both 
neuroscientist and moral philosopher in judging the ‘voluntariness’ of  drug use. In the 
absence of  clear guidance, such judgments are inescapably ad hoc and likely to vary in 
line with prevailing folk-psychological beliefs.
Advocates of  reform frequently cite new neuroscientific understanding of  addiction-
related molecular, cellular and synaptic changes in the brain as their rationale. As one 
Director of  the National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA) famously noted, “even if  
[addiction] initially comes about because of  a voluntary behavior (drug use), an addict’s 
brain is different from a non-addict’s brain, and the addicted individual must be dealt 
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with as if  he or she is in a different brain state” (Leshner, 1997, p. 46). Our findings 
indicate that whether addicts are likely to be held morally or criminally responsible for 
their actions depends not on the scientific and legal credibility of  their current state of  
addiction, or its pathological ‘disease-like’ nature, but rather on what might be described 
as the understanding that addiction “initially comes about because of  a voluntary 
behavior”. In prefacing his thought with such a caveat, Leshner identifies a principal 
obstacle in advancing the understanding of  addiction as a disease in criminal Court 
judgments concerning addicted offenders.
Whilst we might propose that the drug-taking behaviour of  the addict is to a degree 
beyond their control, such that current drug-taking might be conceived as less than 
completely voluntary, it is difficult to construct a similar argument with regard to first 
drug-use. Our increasingly detailed picture of  the brain following repeated drug 
exposure is one which includes progressive structural and functional alterations to areas 
associated with the ability to exert control over behaviour. Whilst this need not 
undermine the notion of  voluntariness in action, it certainly puts it to question. The 
logic which follows is deceptively simple: if  self-control has been impaired by repeated 
drug exposure, then there was a time before first drug use when it was unimpaired. An 
individual can thereby be held accountable for an unimpaired, voluntary choice to first 
use drugs, irrespective of  how compulsive or uncontrollable subsequent drug-taking 
behaviour might be argued or judged.
Yet this, in turn, raises interesting but difficult questions about the voluntary nature 
of  first drug use when such use takes place (as it most frequently does) during 
adolescence (SAMHSA, 2014a; Home Office, 2014). The immaturity of  the PFC 
during adolescent neurodevelopment is increasingly recognized by academics and 
Courts alike as diminishing criminal responsibility in the case of  juvenile offenders, with 
the associated impulsivity and lack of  the ‘normal’ restraining powers of  adulthood 
being commonly understood as strong bases on which to withhold prosecution or 
moderate sentencing (Steinberg, 2013). If  the legal view of  adolescent choices is one 
that suggests reduced culpability for their consequences, should not similar reasoning 
maintain in the event of  addiction as one such consequence? We more explicitly 
examine these issues in the next chapter.
However, context is important in criminal judgment. One limitation of  the present 
study is that addiction to Heroin involves drug use, for which reason merely adding a 
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choice component to Woznicki’s does not bring it into equivalency. We might speculate 
as to the effect Woznicki’s and Heroin-use in combination might have on sentencing. 
Would mitigation fall part-way between the two extremes, or would the impact of  one 
outweigh that of  the other?
By varying not only the results of  substance use, but also the circumstances 
preceding its first occurrence, we can begin to unpick the impact of  perceived choice on 
determinations of  blameworthiness in the case of  addicted offenders by manipulating 
the context in which that choice was taken. In the following chapter, we will explore the 
effect of  that context when it involves both addiction and mental illness by replicating 
and extending the present study paradigm, introducing additional aetiologies in which 
they are co-morbid. We will also examine in closer detail the importance of  the timing 
of  first drug-use using paired narratives in which first use occurred at either 15 or 20 
years of  age.
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Chapter 3. Addiction and mixed aetiology:
How the sentencing of  addicted offenders is affected by
the age of  first drug use and disease co-morbidity.
Abstract
Our previous study illustrated the pivotal role of  choice in addiction aetiology 
when determining criminal responsibility at sentencing. We wanted to explore the 
degree to which perceptions were altered by the age at which such choices were 
made, whilst also examining the impact of  addiction and mental illness when 
presented in tandem. We therefore asked 277 Magistrates to consider a criminal 
sentencing scenario in which the defendant exhibited neurological impairment 
attributed to one of  four origins: (i) disease; (ii) addiction; (iii) disease which led to 
addiction; (iv) addiction which led to disease. These four aetiologies were 
additionally varied with the information that they first manifested at either 15 or 
20 years of  age. Our findings indicate that, where drug use leads to addiction, 
leniency in respect of  associated impairment is withheld. In contrast, identical 
impairment is a cue to leniency where the same drug use led to the development 
of  a (fictional) disease. Unlike aetiological considerations, the age of  initial drug-
use (or disease) had minimal impact on sentencing decisions. Our results confirm 
the dramatic effect which the aetiology of  impairment can have on judgments of  
criminal responsibility, whilst indicating areas in which this effect is less obviously 
in operation. Qualitative responses indicating the basis of  sentencing decisions 
suggest that drug-use tips the balance in favour of  punitive, rather than 
rehabilitative, principles.
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That although the simple phrenzy occasioned immediately by 
drunkenness excuse not in criminals, yet if by one or more such 
practices an habitual or fixed phrenzy be caused though this 
madness was contracted by the vice and will of the party, yet this 
habitual and fixed phrenzy thereby caused puts the man into the 
same condition in relation to crimes, as if the same were contracted 
involuntarily at first.
Sir Matthew Hale
The History of the Pleas of the Crown (1678)
In the previous chapter we explored the effects of  brain impairment on perceptions 
of  criminal responsibility. We found, in the first instance, that identical impairment 
could attract different sentencing depending on its origin. Where brain damage was 
attributed to a fictional disease, the likelihood of  receiving a reduction in the length of  
custodial sentence was significantly increased. In developing on this finding, we 
subsequently sought to isolate the distinction between addiction and our fictional disease 
by examining the impact of  impairment origin, thereby demonstrating the pivotal role 
perceived choice played in determining the likelihood of  mitigation.
Adding a voluntary initiation component to a non-drug-related disease model 
resulted in leniency being withheld, and we drew from this that reduced criminal 
responsibility in respect of  altered brain-state is contradicted by perceptions of  such a 
state having been voluntarily self-induced. Similarly, removing the voluntary initiation 
component from an addiction narrative resulted in greater leniency, even where that 
addiction was described as having been maintained for years since that time through the 
repeated self-administration of  drugs. It was developed from this that personal 
responsibility for the choice to begin using drugs was of  paramount significance in 
determining moral accountability for subsequent actions linked to further drug use. This 
broadly accords with the thinking outlined in the extensive legal literature on the matter 
of  creating the circumstances of  one’s own defence (cf. Child, 2014; Robinson, 1985). In 
its simplest terms, an appeal to circumstance is a claim of  misfortune, easily 
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contradicted by suggestion of  contrivance in its construction. To claim some measure of  
diminished responsibility by virtue of  impaired brain-state begs the question of  its origin 
and the extent to which responsibility can be equivalently denied for its inception. In the 
case of  the addicted offender, our findings to this point have suggested that perceptions 
of  reduced criminal responsibility on account of  brain impairment show potential to be 
blocked by understanding of  a choice having been made in its acquisition.
The difficulty which presents itself  in the example of  the addicted offender, however, 
is that the initial choice to use drugs most frequently takes place in advance of  
adulthood. The majority of  addicts in both the UK and the US report first using drugs 
below the age of  18 (Home Office, 2015; SAMHSA, 2014b). From this we may 
reasonably be led to consider what accommodation the law conventionally makes on 
account of  youth. In the UK, the age of  criminal responsibility is 10. Below this age, 
criminal liability cannot be attached to actions, whereas a 10-year-old offender may be 
held criminally responsible for their behaviour in common with adults.
Many commentators have queried the significant disparity between the age of  
criminal responsibility and the various markers of  physical and mental maturity which 
are judged according to age (cf. Keating, 2007), and there is acknowledgement within 
the law of  the need to accommodate the immaturity of  younger offenders through 
differential procedures and sentencing practice. As Lord Diplock offered in DPP v. 
Camplin (1978): “to require old heads on young shoulders is inconsistent with the law's 
compassion of  human infirmity” (at 717).
Juvenile offenders therefore occupy what might be termed a 'grey area' in terms of  
criminal responsibility. Whilst liable under the law, there is plainly an argument for 
comparatively lesser responsibility for action on the basis of  their developmental 
immaturity. Impulsivity and a lack of  self-control were understood as inherent 
characteristics of  childhood long before brain-imaging techniques permitted 
examination of  their associated neurodevelopmental trajectories. There is an extent to 
which such advances have merely lent credence to existing understanding of  the often 
ill-considered and impetuous nature of  youthful action through demonstration of  its 
neural basis.  Sentencing practice therefore conventionally strives to accommodate some 
measure of  reduced blameworthiness for crimes committed in adolescence, but in the 
example of  the addicted offender this is complicated by notions of  diachronous 
responsibility. Where leniency in respect of  impairment is denied on the basis of  the 
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impairment having its origins in a temporally-distal rational choice, it is the 
blameworthiness for that earlier act which is ‘imported’ into consideration of  the present 
offence. To ignore the timing of  that act in relation to the developmental phase of  the 
actor is to reject the idea of  juvenile capacity for rational decision-making being only 
fractionally that of  an adult.
Drawing on the impression that the initial choice to take drugs is a pivotal factor in 
determining the extent of  criminal mitigation, it would follow that the circumstances of  
that choice would be influential in judgment. Making explicit the potentially mitigating 
nature of  those circumstances should result in leniency being extended on their account. 
On this basis, the present study had two aims.
 Firstly, if, as with the majority of  addicts, first drug use occurs while still a juvenile 
(Home Office, 2015), then the choice which underlies it is made during a developmental 
phase on which account justice systems conventionally adopt more lenient sentencing 
practices. Whether viewed through the eyes of  legal philosophy as a question of  moral 
development, or from a psychological perspective as an absence of  those 
neurodevelopmental factors associated with exercise of  impulse control and behavioural 
regulation, account must be taken of  developmental phase in determining the 
wrongness of  action. There is no widely accepted theoretical framework in any 
academic field which deems acceptable that the consequences of  choices made by 
children be held to the same account as those stemming from the choices made by 
mature adults (Keating, 2007; McDiarmid, 2013).
Secondly, we can explore the extent to which the perception of  voluntariness in 
initial drug use can genuinely be the necessary and sufficient determinant of  mitigation. 
We saw in the preceding chapter that Woznicki's disease could be rendered analogous to 
Heroin addiction through the introduction of  a choice element in its initiation. Yet for 
choice in initiation to be the only factor differentiating addiction in that case makes little 
sense from either a psychological or a legal perspective. To suggest that drug-use 
subsequent to that initial choice is of  no account would be to discount responsibility for 
it entirely, as one would if  it were understood to be wholly involuntary.
From a neuroscientific perspective, this would mean suggesting that the kind of  
changes we see to brain structure and function in long-term drug users are manifested 
substantively in the earlier stages of  use - a picture contradicted by evidence of  staged 
plasticity resulting from repeated drug administration (Kalivas & O'Brien, 2008). From a 
63
legal standpoint, denying the relevance of  continued drug-use in maintenance of  a habit 
is tantamount to a similar belief  in the 'immediate' nature of  the changes wrought by 
initial drug-use. For blame to be mediated solely by the actions of  the rational actor who 
first chose to use drugs is to imply the subsequent irrationality of  that actor.  The only 
logic which allows for blame to attract to first drug-use whilst entirely precluding it for 
subsequent use is one which considers subsequent use to be entirely outside voluntary 
control.
By employing our fictional disease in combination with addiction, we can attenuate 
our initial narratives. In the previous chapter, when we confounded expectations 
surrounding either addiction or our analogous fictional disease, it was possible to modify 
judgments of  blameworthiness and demonstrate that leniency in respect of  mental 
impairment was reduced when the source of  that impairment was offered as addiction. 
Here, we can bring into question the volitional nature of  initial drug-use by suggesting 
that it was preceded by Woznicki’s. Offering one symptom of  our fictional disease as 
progressively impaired behavioural control poses questions about the volitional nature 
of  the drug-use which followed. The capacity to withhold action and to suppress strong 
desires are intrinsic characteristics of  the rational actor who bears culpability for their 
actions. In their absence, there may still be a choice made, but it is more difficult to 
conceive of  it as an entirely free one. By offering the possibility of  a hitherto 
unconsidered causal factor in heroin-use we can refocus attention to the context of  that 
perceived choice as one in which behavioural control was already impaired.
Additionally, a fourth narrative offering that Woznicki’s had developed as a result of  
habitual Heroin-use provides an extremely close analogy to a normative understanding 
of  addiction; a brain disease, characterized by behavioural impairment, cultivated 
through repeated drug use. These two additional narratives were included alongside two 
conditions replicating our original paradigm: an unconfounded Heroin addiction 
narrative and one in which Woznicki’s was presented in the absence of  any drug history 
or involvement (see Figure 3.1 on page 65).
Each of  these four groups was mirrored, such that the age at which first drug use or 
disease occurred was presented as either 15 or 20 years of  age. If  choice in the matter of  
initial drug-use plays a pivotal role in sentencing decisions, and on legal grounds choice 
is viewed as compromised during earlier developmental stages, then choice in drug-use 
initiation having been at such an earlier stage should be seen as grounds for leniency.
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We therefore hypothesized that greater leniency would be expressed in sentencing 
where the initial choice to use drugs was made at 15 years of  age, rather than 20. We 
also anticipated that, as in the previous study, leniency would be forthcoming for the 
Woznicki’s sufferer and blocked in the case of  the addict with identical impairment, 
whilst the mixed aetiologies, in which disease only partially replaced potentially 
blameworthy aspects of  the addiction cycle, would attract leniency part-way between 
these two extremes.
Method
Participants. A total of  277 active and retired Magistrates took part in this survey, 
which was accessible via a link on the Magistrates’ Association members’ website and 
distributed through their members’ bulletin. One survey was incomplete, leaving 276 
submitted responses which were eligible for inclusion in the analysis (131 Male, 137 
Female, 8 withheld)5. Broadly in line with national figures, the majority (60.2%) of  
Magistrates participating in this study were between 61 and 70 years of  age6. Some 
participants were excluded from portions of  the analysis for reasons given below.
This study was conducted in accordance with the British Psychological Society’s 
Code of  Ethics and Conduct. Informed consent was collected in advance and all 
respondents were debriefed and given the opportunity to withdraw their responses 
following participation. The study protocol was approved by the Research Ethics 
Committee of  the University of  Sussex.
Design. This was a mixed 2 (Age) by 4 (Aetiology) design. The Age conditions 
varied the age at which first drug-use or initial disease acquisition was given as having 
taken place (15 or 20 years old). The Aetiology conditions mirrored those of  our initial 
Woznicki’s/Heroin paradigm alongside two additional aetiology narratives: one in 
which Heroin-use had resulted in Woznicki’s disease and another in which Woznicki’s 
disease had been followed by Heroin-use. In both instances, the mental impairment 
upon which mitigation was predicated was attributed to the most recent factor in the 
chronology. This gave four Aetiology conditions:
5 Following the study presented in Chapter 2, the Magistrates’ Association extended the opportunity to 
collect limited demographic information from those members who chose to participate in subsequent 
studies.
6 70 is the mandatory retirement age for Magistrates sitting in England and Wales.
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Figure 3.1 - Staged replacement of addiction cycle components across four 
Aetiology conditions.
Procedure. The survey was hosted on the Qualtrics platform (Qualtrics, Provo, 
UT) and accessible via url. All participants were informed that they would initially be 
presented with details of  a fictional offence and asked to decide on an appropriate 
sentence for the offender. The scenario was as follows:
David is a young man with no previous convictions. He was waiting for a 
train at his local station when he noticed an elderly woman who had a 
significant amount of money in her purse, which she had placed beside her 
on a bench. David snatched the purse and ran.
Transport police located him on CCTV and apprehended him shortly 
afterwards. He was no longer in possession of the purse, but did have a 
substantial sum of money in his possession. David pleaded 'not guilty' to the 
charge of Theft (Theft Act 1968, s. 1).
David has now been found guilty at trial, with the following factors 
contributing to the seriousness:
 
-vulnerable victim;
-large sum of money (approximately £1000);
-victim suﬀered emotional shock and distress;
-victim now too afraid to travel independently.
Respondents were instructed that current sentencing guidelines would suggest a 
custodial sentence of  between 12 and 26 weeks. All participants were then asked to 
indicate, on a sliding scale of  1 to 26 weeks, how many weeks’ custody they would 
consider appropriate, given the facts of  the case. Having decided on this initial ‘anchor’ 
sentence, they were subsequently presented with additional information on potentially 
mitigating or aggravating features. The first section of  this additional information was 
identical for all participants:
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From the evidence you heard at trial, you are satisfied that the following is 
true:
David suﬀers from damage to his prefrontal cortex, an area of the brain 
involved in action inhibition. Damage to this area has been demonstrated to 
result in impulsive behaviour and a lack of self-control.
David’s neurological condition was directly causal to his commission of the 
crime. David has a history of increasingly impulsive behaviour, although this 
is the first occasion on which it has resulted in the involvement of the 
criminal justice system.
Those in each of  the eight conditions then received variations on the origin of  the 
defendant’s pathophysiological profile, dependent on the aetiology of  the outlined 
impairment and the age at which it first occurred (see Table 3.1).
Table 3.1 - Aggravating or mitigating circumstances presented across Age and 
Aetiology conditions.
Aetiology Additional information
Woznicki's
Six years ago, when David was [15/20] years old, he developed a 
rare neurological disease called Woznicki’s syndrome, a 
degenerative disorder associated with progressively impaired 
behavioural control. The damage to his prefrontal cortex has 
resulted from Woznicki’s syndrome.
Woznicki’s-Heroin
Six years ago, when David was [15/20] years old, he developed a 
rare neurological disease called Woznicki’s syndrome, a 
degenerative disorder associated with progressively impaired 
behavioural control. In the wake of this diagnosis, David began 
taking Heroin. The damage to his prefrontal cortex has resulted 
from addiction to Heroin.
Heroin
Six years ago, when David was [15/20] years old, he began taking 
Heroin. The damage to his prefrontal cortex has resulted from 
addiction to Heroin.
Heroin-Woznicki's
Six years ago, when David was [15/20] years old, he began taking 
Heroin. As a result of this, he developed a rare neurological 
disease called Woznicki’s syndrome, a degenerative disorder 
associated with progressively impaired behavioural control. The 
damage to his prefrontal cortex has resulted from Woznicki’s 
syndrome.
Genesis Additional information
Autogenic
About ten years ago, when Edward was in his late teens, he became 
addicted to Heroin. Six months earlier, his doctor had diagnosed him 
as suﬀering from depression. Edward says that the depression he was 
suﬀering from at the time led to him becoming a Heroin user.
Iatrogenic
About ten years ago, when Edward was in his late teens, he became 
addicted to Heroin. Whilst abroad, he was hit by a car and spent 
several weeks in a local hospital, during which time he was regularly 
receiving morphine, an opioid painkiller. His regimen of painkillers 
was mismanaged and, although he recovered from his physical injuries, 
Edward had developed an addiction to morphine by the time he left 
the hospital and was able to return home. He says this led to him 
becoming a Heroin user.
 7
Participants were then invited to adjust their original sentence, within the same 
bounds of  1 to 26 weeks’ custody, in light of  this additional information. Once 
participants had chosen to increase, decrease or leave unchanged their original sentence, 
several follow-up questions were presented in order to probe the underlying rationale for 
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the decision. Firstly, respondents were explicitly requested to provide the reasoning 
behind their decision in the form of  a free-text response. Secondly, they were presented 
with the five principles of  justice as laid out in the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (see 
Appendix A on page 167) and asked to select those which were at the forefront of  their 
consideration in making their determination. If  more than one principle was selected, 
participants were then asked to rank them in order of  relevance to their deliberation. 
Thirdly, all respondents were asked to indicate on a sliding scale how likely they thought 
it was that David would go on to commit further crimes in future.
Finally, all respondents were given the option of  suspending David’s custodial 
sentence in favour of  a community order, with a view to facilitating his attending a 
residential treatment facility. Those who chose to suspend David’s sentence were asked 
to indicate for how long they felt his suspended sentence should last, on a sliding scale 
between 1 and 24 months.
Measures and analyses. One participant submitted an incomplete response and 
this was omitted from the analysis. As the maximum possible reduction in sentence was 
96%,7 whereas the maximum possible increase in sentence was 2500%8, a decision-rule 
was implemented to ensure that no undue weighting occurred when analyzing results in 
percentages terms. In common with the study presented in Chapter 2, it was determined 
in advance that any respondents increasing their initial sentence by more than 300% at 
the adjustment stage would be excluded from such analysis. Six participants met this 
criterion (n=6, M=1600%, SD=874%) and these responses were therefore excluded from 
analysis in percentage terms. Seven respondents opted for the minimum possible (one 
week) sentence at the initial sentencing phase, precluding the possibility of  reducing 
their sentence on subsequent presentation of  additional factors. These response sets 
were therefore excluded from odds ratio analyses of  sentence reduction. For these 
reasons the number of  participants in each condition varied in line with analytical 
approach.
The study presented in the preceding chapter gave strong suggestion that differences 
in mean percentage change in sentence between groups could be driven almost entirely 
by the frequency of  reduction, rather than its extent. For this reason, results were 
7 25 weeks off  an initial 26-week sentence.
8 1 week increasing to 26 weeks.
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analyzed both in terms of  percentage change in initial sentence and as the odds of  
receiving a changed sentence. Both of  these approaches were augmented with the 
calculation of  Bayes Factors, employing prior probability distributions derived from the 
results of  the previous study. Details of  the distributions employed can be found in 
Appendix H on page 183.
Following the adjustment phase of  custodial sentencing, participants were 
additionally asked to provide the reasons for their final decision in the form of  free-text 
responses. These responses were coded for statistical and thematic analysis. Statistical 
measures were not calculated where, due to small sample sizes, power analyses indicated 
only a marginal possibility of  detecting even a large effect.
Results
We were interested in examining how the aetiology of  a potentially mitigating factor 
(disease, addiction, or a combination of  the two) affected sentencing decisions. To this 
end, we asked Magistrates to consider a criminal sentencing scenario. Using a 2 (Age) x 
4 (Aetiology) design, Magistrates were provided with additional information which 
varied the aetiology of  impairment and the age at which it began.
At the initial sentencing phase, Magistrates used the full range of  sentences available 
to them. Mean initial sentence was 18.1 weeks (SD=6.6, N=276).
We sought to determine the impact of  Age and Aetiology on percentage change in 
sentence, and moreover the extent to which these independent variables might interact 
in mediating leniency. In the Age conditions, the data were not normally distributed 
[Age 15 D(135)=0.23, p<.001; Age 20 D(135)=0.29, p<.001] and exhibited 
heterogeneity of  variance [F(1,268)=2.9, p<.001]. Similarly, in the Aetiology conditions 
the data were not normally distributed [Heroin D(69)=0.40, p<.001; Heroin-Woznicki’s 
D(67)=0.24, p<.001; Woznicki’s D(67)=0.13, p<.001; Woznicki’s-Heroin D(67)=0.26, p<.
001] and exhibited heterogeneity of  variance [F(3,266)=5.4, p=.001]. However, there 
are no robust non-parametric tests for interaction effects and parametric tests will 
nonetheless yield robust results when, as in the present study, sample sizes exceed 30 
participants per condition (Glass, Peckham, & Sanders, 1972 ; Lumley, Diehr, Emerson, 
& Chen, 2002). For these reasons, a parametric approach was adopted in the first 
instance, after which non-parametric methods were employed to test for specific group 
contrasts.
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A 2-way independent ANOVA indicated a significant main effect of  Aetiology on 
percentage sentence reduction outcome [F(3,262)=11.9, p<.001] and a non-significant 
main effect of  Age [F(1,262)=0.02, p=.90]. Additionally, there was a non-significant 
interaction effect between Age and Aetiology [F(3,262)=0.82, p=.49] (see Figure 3.2).
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Figure 3.2 - Mean percentage sentence reduction by Aetiology and Age (N=270; 
error bars +/-1 SEM).
Age of  initiation. In order to determine the impact of  age of  initiation of  drug 
use on leniency in sentencing, both the extent and frequency of  sentence alteration were 
compared across Age conditions. Results were calculated in terms of  the odds of  
receiving a change in sentence, percentage change in sentence and length of  final 
sentence.
The was no significant effect of  Age on mean percentage sentence reduction in any 
of  the four Aetiology conditions (see Table 3.2).
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Table 3.2 - Mean percentage sentence reduction across Age and Aetiology 
conditions (N=270).
Woznicki’s-Heroin 67 3.5 (4.7) 14.8 (6.6)
Age 15 Age 20
Aetiology % SD % SD U z p
Heroin 6.7 (17.4) 7.2 (14.1) 579.5 -0.23 ns
Heroin-Woznicki's 21.3 (20.5) 19.5 (26.2) 496.5 -0.84 ns
Woznicki's 27.2 (21.8) 33.2 (30.3) 503.5 -0.73 ns
Woznicki’s-Heroin 22.1 (25.2) 15.9 (23.2) 471.0 -1.2 ns
Age 15 Age 20
n Estimate (%) SD n
Estimate 
(%) SD
Heroin 35 65.1 (18.5) 35 66.4 (17.1)
Heroin-
Woznicki's 35 65.6 (17.8) 34 68.2 (20.1)
Woznicki's 35 65.1 (16.5) 34 63.2 (21.6)
Woznicki’s-
Heroin 34 61.4 (19.0) 34 64.9 (22.1)
Age n Reoffending estimate (%) SD
15 139 64.3 (17.8)
20 137 65.7 (20.2)
Age 15 Age 20
n Final sentence SD n
Final 
sentence SD U z p
Heroin 35 17.4 (6.4) 35 18.2 (6.7) 563.0 -0.59 ns
Heroin-
Woznicki's 35 14.3 (5.5) 34 14.1 (6.5) 558.5 -0.44 ns
Woznicki's 35 13.8 (6.7) 34 11.7 (6.7) 493.5 -1.23 ns
Woznicki’s-
Heroin 1.4 0.53 ns 0.72
Pooled 1.5 2.20 ns 1.39
 2
In order to assess the impact of  Age on the likelihood of  receiving a reduction in 
sentence, odds ratios of  frequency of  reduction as a function of  Age were calculated in 
each of  the four Aetiology conditions. Although it was possible to discern a slight 
tendency towards more frequent reduction in the Age 15 variants of  each Aetiology 
condition, in no instance did this effect achieve statistical significance. There was no 
indication that the likelihood of  receiving a reduction in sentence varied significantly as 
a function of  age of  initial drug use (see Figure 3.3).
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Figure 3.3 - Relative frequency of sentence reduction across Age and Aetiology 
conditions.
Across all four Aetiology conditions, Bayes Factors fell within the range of  0.5 to 1.5, 
indicating that the data were insensitive and no conclusions could be drawn regarding 
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the impact, if  any, of  Age on the likelihood of  receiving a reduction in custodial 
sentence (see Table 3.3).
Table 3.3 - Odds ratio comparisons of Age across Aetiology conditions.
Age 15
Heroin Heroin-Woznicki's Woznicki's
Woznicki’s-
Heroin
Age 
20
Heroin 1.2 - - -
Heroin- 
Woznicki's - 1.9 - -
Woznicki's - - 0.6 -
Woznicki’s-
Heroin - - - 1.4
Heroin Heroin-Woznicki's Woznicki's
Woznicki’s-
Heroin
Heroin - 0.3*** 0.1*** 0.4**
Heroin-
Woznicki's 3.3*** - 0.5* 1.2
Woznicki's 7.1*** 2.1* - 2.5*
Woznicki’s-
Heroin 2.8** 0.9 0.4* -
Principle X 2 p
Reparation 3.94 .27
Rehabilitation 10.79 .01*
Reduction 6.18 .10
Protection 0.72 .87
Punishment 10.34 .02*
Odds 
Ratio X
2 p Bayes Factor
Heroin 1.2 0.07 ns 0.51
Heroin- 
Woznicki's 1.9 1.74 ns 1.43
Woznicki's 1.6 0.78 ns 0.92
Woznicki’s-
Heroin 1.4 0.53 ns 0.72
 1
Likewise, there was no indication that age of  initiation played a role in determining 
the length of  custodial sentence imposed in the final instance, with no significant 
difference emerging along this dimension in any of  the four Aetiology conditions (see 
Table 3.4).
Table 3.4 - Effect of Age of initiation on mean final sentence in weeks by Age 
and Aetiology.
Woznicki’s-Heroin 67 3.5 (4.7) 14.8 (6.6)
Age 15 Age 20
Aetiology % SD % SD U z p
Heroin 6.7 (17.4) 7.2 (14.1) 579.5 -0.23 ns
Heroin-Woznicki's 21.3 (20.5) 19.5 (26.2) 496.5 -0.84 ns
Woznicki's 27.2 (21.8) 33.2 (30.3) 503.5 -0.73 ns
Woznicki’s-Heroin 22.1 (25.2) 15.9 (23.2) 471.0 -1.2 ns
Age 15 Age 20
n Estimate (%) SD n
Estimate 
(%) SD
Heroin 35 65.1 (18.5) 35 66.4 (17.1)
Heroin-
Woznicki's 35 65.6 (17.8) 34 68.2 (20.1)
Woznicki's 35 65.1 (16.5) 34 63.2 (21.6)
Woznicki’s-
Heroin 34 61.4 (19.0) 34 64.9 (22.1)
Age n Reoffending estimate (%) SD
15 139 64.3 (17.8)
20 137 65.7 (20.2)
Age 15 Age 20
n Final sentence SD n
Final 
sentence SD U z p
Heroin 35 17.4 (6.4) 35 18.2 (6.7) 563.0 -0.59 ns
Heroin-
Woznicki's 35 14.3 (5.5) 34 14.1 (6.5) 558.5 -0.44 ns
Woznicki's 35 13.8 (6.7) 34 11.7 (6.7) 493.5 -1.23 ns
Woznicki’s-
Heroin 34 14.5 (6.9) 34 15.5 (6.6) 533.5 -0.55 ns
Woznicki’s-
Heroin 1.4 0.53 ns 0.72
Pooled 1.5 2.20 ns 1.39
 2
Aetiology. In the absence of  suggestion that age of  initiation impacted sentencing 
decisions, analyses were collapsed across this variable where appropriate. Results across 
Aetiology conditions were not normally distributed and exhibited inequality of  variance, 
so non-parametric methods were employed for subsequent analyses. A Kruskal-Wallis 
test indicated a significant effect of  Aetiology on mean percentage sentence reduction 
[H(3)=34.6, p<.001] (see Figure 3.4). Mann-Whitney tests were used to follow up this 
finding, employing the Holm-Bonferroni method to control for multiple comparisons.
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Figure 3.4 - Mean reduction in sentence across 4 aetiology conditions (N=270; 
error bars +/-1 SEM; *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001).
Heroin contrasts.
Heroin v. Woznicki’s. Mean percentage sentence reduction was significantly greater 
[U=1055, z=-5.80, p<.001 (two-tailed test), r=1.14, power=1.0, BN(10.28, 5.14)=1.8× 107] 
in the Woznicki’s condition [n=67, M=30.2, Mdn=28.6] than in the Heroin condition 
[n=69, M=7.0, Mdn=0].
Heroin v. Heroin-Woznicki’s. Mean percentage sentence reduction was significantly 
greater [U=1547, z=-3.68, p<.001 (two-tailed test), r=0.68, power=.97, BN(11.6, 5.8)=1.1 ×
103]  in the Heroin-Woznicki’s condition [n=67, M=20.4, Mdn=14.3] than in the 
Heroin condition [n=69, M=7.0, Mdn=0].
Heroin v. Woznicki’s-Heroin. Mean percentage sentence reduction was significantly 
greater [U=1689, z=-3.02, p=.003 (two-tailed test), r=0.59, power=0.91, BN(11.6, 5.8)=1.8
× 102] in the Woznicki’s-Heroin condition [n=67, M=19.0, Mdn=16.7] than in the 
Heroin condition [n=69, M=7.0, Mdn=0].
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Woznicki's contrasts. 
Woznicki’s v. Heroin-Woznicki’s. Mean percentage sentence reduction was significantly 
greater [U=1745, z=-2.27, p=.02 (two-tailed test), r=0.39, power=.60, BN(11.6, 5.8)=7.7] in 
the Woznicki’s condition [n=67, M=30.2, Mdn=28.6] than in the Heroin-Woznicki’s 
condition [n=67, M=20.4, Mdn=14.3].
Woznicki’s v. Woznicki’s-Heroin. Mean percentage sentence reduction was significantly 
greater [U=1604, z=-2.92, p=.004 (two-tailed test), r=0.44, power=0.70, BN(11.6, 
5.8)=16.0] in the Woznicki’s condition [n=67, M=30.2, Mdn=28.6] than in the 
Woznicki’s-Heroin condition [n=67, M=19.0, Mdn=16.7].
Mixed contrast.
Woznicki's-Heroin v. Heroin-Woznicki's. There was a nonsignificant difference [U=2108, 
z=-0.64, p=.52 (two-tailed test), r=0.06, power=.06, BN(11.6, 5.8)=0.2] in mean percentage 
sentence reduction between the Woznicki’s-Heroin condition [n=67, M=19.0, 
Mdn=16.7] and the Heroin-Woznicki’s condition [n=67, M=20.4, Mdn=14.3].
Odds of  sentence reduction. In a direct replication of  the Heroin vs. Woznicki’s 
contrast in the previous chapter, differences in the leniency extended by Magistrates in 
the form of  sentence reduction derived almost entirely from differences in the likelihood 
of  sentence reduction, rather than variation in its extent. Magistrates informed that 
David’s neurological impairment stemmed from Woznicki’s were more than seven times 
as likely to reduce the custodial sentence given than they were when informed that those 
identical impairments had result from the use of  and addiction to Heroin [OR=7.7, 
X2=30.2, 95%CI=3.6-16.6, p<.001, BH(0, 1.16)=1.6× 105] (see Figure 3.5).
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Figure 3.5 - Relative frequency of sentence reduction in Heroin and Woznicki’s 
aetiologies (***p<.001).
Participants in the Woznicki’s-Heroin condition (n=67) were almost three times as 
likely to reduce their original sentence [OR=2.9, X2=8.7, 95%CI=1.4-6.0, p=.003, BH(0, 
1.16)=21.3] than those in the Heroin condition (n=69). Similarly, the odds of  the sentence 
being reduced in the Heroin-Woznicki’s condition (n=66) were over three times greater 
[OR=3.6, X2=12.5, 95%CI=1.7-7.6, p<.001, BH(0, 1.16)=83.1] than in the Heroin 
condition (n=69).
At the same time, odds of  receiving a reduction in sentence in the Woznicki’s 
condition (n=67) were more than double [OR=2.2, X2=4.3, 95%CI=1.0-4.5, p=.04, 
BH(0, 1.16)=4.1] those in the Heroin-Woznicki’s condition (n=66), and two-and-a-half  
times higher [OR=2.7, X2=7.2, 95%CI=1.3-5.6, p=.007, BH(0, 1.16)=15.0] than in the 
Woznicki’s-Heroin condition (n=67).
The odds of  receiving a reduction in sentence in the Woznicki’s-Heroin condition 
(n=67) and the Heroin-Woznicki’s condition (n=66) were broadly equivalent [OR=0.8, 
X2=0.4, 95%CI=0.4-1.6, p=.54, BH(0, 1.16)=0.19], whilst the calculated Bayes Factor of  
0.19 provides substantial evidence against the suggestion of  dissimilarity. These findings 
are presented in Table 3.5.
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Table 3.5 - Odds ratio matrix of likelihood of sentence reduction across 4 
Aetiology conditions (*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001).
Heroin Heroin-Woznicki's Woznicki's
Woznicki’s-
Heroin
Heroin - 0.3*** 0.1*** 0.3**
Heroin-
Woznicki's 3.6*** - 0.5* 1.2
Woznicki's 7.7*** 2.2* - 2.7**
Woznicki’s-
Heroin 2.9** 0.8 0.4** -
 12
However, it is not true to say that those who opted to reduce their sentence did so in 
equal terms across all conditions. Isolating just those participants who chose to reduce 
the sentence they had given revealed some variation in the degree to which their 
leniency extended (see Figure 3.6).
The data in the Heroin group were normally distributed [D(19)=0.17, ns], but the 
data in the Woznicki’s condition were not [D(50)=0.18, p<.05]. A Levene’s test 
confirmed inhomogeneity of  variance across the two groups [F(1,67)=6.97, p<.05]. A 
direct contrast between the Heroin and Woznicki’s conditions showed a statistically 
significant difference in the extent of  reduction in sentence. Mean percentage sentence 
reduction in the Woznicki’s condition [n=50, M=40.4, Mdn=33.3] was greater [U=324, 
z=-2.03, p=.04 (two-tailed test), r=0.68, power=.68] than that in the Heroin condition 
[n=19, M=28.6, Mdn=25.0].
This deviates slightly from earlier impressions indicating frequency as the sole driver 
of  the difference and presents a somewhat muted (though still apparent) echo of  the 
pattern seen in relative frequency of  change. In simple terms, the greater the likelihood 
of  sentence reduction, seemingly the greater the extent of  that leniency should it be 
forthcoming.
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Figure 3.6 - Mean percentage sentence reduction (reducers only; n=142) across 
Aetiology conditions (error bars +/-1 SEM; *p<.05).
In considering the likelihood of  receiving a reduction in sentence, leniency extended 
in the Heroin-Woznicki’s and the Woznicki’s-Heroin conditions appears to occupy a 
‘middle-ground’ between the two extremes of  the Woznicki’s and Heroin conditions. 
This is true both in terms of  the likelihood of  receiving a reduction in sentence and also, 
to a lesser extent, the proportion by which the sentence is reduced should that occur. In 
tandem, these two factors contributed to significant variation in the length of  the 
custodial sentence decided upon in the final instance in respect of  identical crimes (see 
Figure 3.7). Defendants in the Heroin condition received the highest mean final 
sentence (M=17.7 weeks, SD=6.5) and those in the Woznicki's condition the lowest 
(M=12.9 weeks, SD=6.8). Mean final sentence in the two mixed aetiologies fell roughly 
midway between these two extremes, with defendants in the Woznicki's-Heroin 
condition receiving slightly longer sentences (M=14.8 weeks, SD=6.6) than those in the 
Heroin-Woznicki's condition (M=14.2 weeks, SD=5.9)
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Figure 3.7 - Mean final sentence by Age and Aetiology (error bars +/-1 SEM).
Principles. The principle of  justice cited most frequently as having been at the 
forefront of  consideration in deciding the appropriate sentence was Protection of  the 
Public (see Table 3.6). This was in keeping with findings on the general ranked 
importance of  the five principles presented in Appendix A (see page 167).
Table 3.6 - Frequency with which the five principles were cited as at the 
forefront of consideration in sentencing decisions (N=276).
Age 15
Heroin Heroin-Woznicki's Woznicki's
Woznicki’s-
Heroin
Age 
20
Heroin 1.2 - - -
Heroin- 
Woznicki's - 1.9 - -
Woznicki's - - 0.6 -
Woznicki’s-
Heroin - - - 1.4
Heroin Heroin-Woznicki's Woznicki's
Woznicki’s-
Heroin
Heroin - 0.3*** 0.1*** 0.4**
Heroin-
Woznicki's 3.3*** - 0.5* 1.2
Woznicki's 7.1*** 2.1* - 2.5*
Woznicki’s-
Heroin 2.8** 0.9 0.4* -
Principle X 2 p
Reparation 3.94 .27
Rehabilitation 10.79 .01*
Reduction 6.18 .10
Protection 0.72 .87
Punishment 10.34 .02*
Odds 
Ratio X
2 p Bayes Factor
Heroin 1.2 0.07 ns 0.51
Heroin- 
Woznicki's 1.9 1.74 ns 1.43
Woznicki's 1.6 0.78 ns 0.92
Woznicki’s-
Heroin 1.4 0.53 ns 0.72
Group n Reduction SD Final sentence SD
Heroin 69 1.3 (2.7) 17.7 (6.5)
Heroin-Woznicki's 67 3.9 (4.6) 14.2 (5.9)
Woznicki's 67 5.6 (5.4) 12.9 (6.8)
Odds 
Ratio X
2 p Bayes Factor
Heroin 1.2 0.07 ns 0.51
Heroin- 
Woznicki's 1.9 1.74 ns 1.43
Woznicki's 1.6 0.78 ns 0.92
Principle n %
Protection 246 89.1
Punishment 236 85.5
Reduction 178 64.5
Rehabilitation 141 51.1
Reparation 98 35.5
 1
Only 4% of  respondents (n=12) stated that only one of  the five principles was at the 
forefront of  their consideration when making their decision (6 Punishment, 4 Protection, 
2 Rehabilitation). The remaining 96% of  respondents (n=264) offered two or more 
principles and were subsequently asked to rank them in order of  relevance. If  fewer 
than four principles were selected, those omitted were imputed through equiprobability 
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coding (see Appendix D on page 178 for full details of  this procedure). Rankings were 
then converted into weighted scores following the same procedure as outlined in 
Appendix A (see page 167) for direct comparison with the scores calculated there.
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Figure 3.8 - Frequency with which the five principles of justice are cited as 
significant factors in sentencing decisions across Aetiology conditions (*p<.05).
There was some variability in the frequency with which the principles were cited 
across Aetiology conditions (see Figure 3.8). Specifically, participants in the Heroin 
Aetiology condition offered Rehabilitation as having been a factor at the forefront of  
their consideration significantly less frequently than participants in the other three 
conditions [X2=10.8, p=.01] (see Figure 3.9).
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Figure 3.9 - Relative frequency of Rehabilitation being cited as a factor in 
sentencing decisions across four Aetiology conditions.
The frequency with which rehabilitation was cited as factor in sentencing was 
significantly lower in the Heroin Aetiology condition. In the other three conditions, 
Rehabilitation is cited more frequently (56.8%) than Reparation (33.5%). Yet, in the 
Heroin condition, Rehabilitation is cited in only 34.3% of  instances, versus 41% citing 
Reparation (see Figure 3.8). This seemingly altered perception of  the relevance of  
rehabilitation as a factor in sentencing decisions cannot be attributed to the presence of  
drug involvement in the narrative, as similar involvement is outlined in three of  the four 
conditions. It would appear, rather, to be a function of  the absence of  Woznicki's.
At the same time, the absence of  drug-use in the impairment narrative presented in 
the Woznicki’s condition was associated with a lower frequency of  Punishment being 
cited as a factor [X2=10.3, p=.02] (see Figure 3.10).
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Figure 3.10 - Relative frequency of Punishment being cited as a factor in 
sentencing decisions across four Aetiology conditions.
Rank scores were calculated for the relative importance of  the five principles, 
allowing the relative weight attributed to each to be contrasted both between conditions 
and with the scores derived in Appendix A in relation to general sentencing practice (see 
page 167). The sharpest deviations from the importance of  the principles as expressed in 
general sentencing practice were in Punishment and Rehabilitation. Rehabilitation was 
ranked comparatively lower in importance, whilst Punishment was a full point higher, 
placing it second only to Protection in relative importance when considering sentencing 
decisions (see Table 3.7).
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Table 3.7 - Difference in relative importance of the five principles in the present 
scenario and general sentencing. 
Protection Punishment
4.0 3.6
3.6 2.6
3.6 2.6
0.4 0.9
0.4 0.9
3.54 2.74
Protection Punishment
3.96 3.92
4.03 3.66
4.13 3.00
3.90 3.64
p
HerWoz Deviation Woz Deviation WozHer Deviation F
4.0 0.4 4.1 0.5 3.9 0.3
3.7 1.0 3.0 0.4 3.6 1.0
2.5 -0.5 2.8 -0.3 2.8 -0.2
2.7 -0.5 2.7 -0.5 2.8 -0.5
Principle General Sentencing
Present 
Study Difference
Protection 3.6 4.0 + 0.4
Rehabilitation 3.2 2.6 - 0.6
Reduction 3.0 2.7 - 0.3
Punishment 2.6 3.6 + 1.0
Reparation 2.5 2.2 - 0.3
 6
Reoffending estimate. In order to examine the extent to which perceptions of  
future dangerousness impacted sentencing decisions, comparisons were conducted of  
the estimated probability that David would reoffend upon release. Estimated probability 
of  future reoffending did not vary significantly by Aetiology, with respondents across all 
conditions offering an average estimate of  the likelihood that David would commit 
further crimes in future in the region of  60-70% (see Table 3.8).
Table 3.8 - Estimated probability of future reoffending across Age and 
Aetiology conditions.
Woznicki’s-Heroin 67 3.5 (4.7) 14.8 (6.6)
Age 15 Age 20
Group % SD % SD U z p
Heroin 6.7 (17.4) 7.2 (14.1) 579.5 -0.23 ns
Heroin-Woznicki's 21.3 (20.5) 19.5 (26.2) 496.5 -0.84 ns
Woznicki's 27.2 (21.8) 33.2 (30.3) 503.5 -0.73 ns
Woznicki’s-Heroin 22.1 (25.2) 15.9 (23.2) 471.0 -1.2 ns
Age 15 Age 20
n Estimate (%) SD n
Estimate 
(%) SD
Heroin 35 65.1 (18.5) 35 66.4 (17.1)
Heroin-
Woznicki's 35 65.6 (17.8) 34 68.2 (20.1)
Woznicki's 35 65.1 (16.5) 34 63.2 (21.6)
Woznicki’s-
Heroin 34 61.4 (19.0) 34 64.9 (22.1)
Age n Reoffending estimate (%) SD
15 139 64.3 (17.8)
20 137 65.7 (20.2)
Age 15 Age 20
n Final sentence SD n
Final 
sentence SD U z p
Heroin 35 17.4 (6.4) 35 18.2 (6.7) 563.0 -0.59 ns
Heroin-
Woznicki's 35 14.3 (5.5) 34 14.1 (6.5) 558.5 -0.44 ns
Woznicki's 35 13.8 (6.7) 34 11.7 (6.7) 493.5 -1.23 ns
Woznicki’s-
Heroin 1 4 0.53 ns 0.72
Pooled 1.5 2.20 ns 1.39
 2
There was similarly little to indicate that estimated probability of  reoffending varied 
according to age of  initiation (see Table 3.9). 
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Table 3.9 - Estimated probability of future reoffending by Age.
Woznicki’s-Heroin 67 3.5 (4.7) 14.8 (6.6)
Age 15 Age 20
Group % SD % SD U z p
Heroin 6.7 (17.4) 7.2 (14.1) 579.5 -0.23 ns
Heroin-Woznicki's 21.3 (20.5) 19.5 (26.2) 496.5 -0.84 ns
Woznicki's 27.2 (21.8) 33.2 (30.3) 503.5 -0.73 ns
Woznicki’s-Heroin 22.1 (25.2) 15.9 (23.2) 471.0 -1.2 ns
Age 15 Age 20
n Estimate (%) SD n
Estimate 
(%) SD
Heroin 35 65.1 (18.5) 35 66.4 (17.1)
Heroin-
Woznicki's 35 65.6 (17.8) 34 68.2 (20.1)
Woznicki's 35 65.1 (16.5) 34 63.2 (21.6)
Woznicki’s-
Heroin 34 61.4 (19.0) 34 64.9 (22.1)
Age n Reoffending estimate (%) SD
15 139 64.3 (17.8)
20 137 65.7 (20.2)
Age 15 Age 20
n Final sentence SD n
Final 
sentence SD U z p
Heroin 35 17.4 (6.4) 35 18.2 (6.7) 563.0 -0.59 ns
Heroin-
Woznicki's 35 14.3 (5.5) 34 14.1 (6.5) 558.5 -0.44 ns
Woznicki's 35 13.8 (6.7) 34 11.7 (6.7) 493.5 -1.23 ns
Woznicki’s-
Heroin 1.4 0.53 ns 0.72
Pooled 1.5 2.20 ns 1.39
 2
Those respondents who had opted to reduce the length of  David’s custodial sentence 
on learning of  his impairment offered slightly more optimistic opinions on the likelihood 
of  his reoffending [M=61.4%, SD=19.9, n=142] than those who did not feel that a 
reduction in sentence was merited [M=68.8%, SD=17.3, n=134]. A similarly minimal 
difference was observable in the estimates offered by participants who were subsequently 
willing to suspend David’s custodial sentence in favour of  a community order 
[M=64.1%, SD=18.2, n=232] and those who preferred to leave the custodial sentence in 
place [M=70.8%, SD=21.3, n=43].
Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients were computed to assess the 
relationship between estimated probability of  future re-offending and length of  either 
custodial sentence or community order. Length of  final sentence was positively 
correlated with estimated probability of  reoffending [N=276; r=0.354, p<.001]. 
Amongst those participants willing to see the custodial sentence suspended in favour of  
a community order (n=232), there was a weak but significant positive correlation 
between the length of  that community order and estimated probability of  reoffending 
[r=0.189, p=.004]. Amongst those who chose not to suspend the custodial sentence 
(n=43), a greater positive correlation was observed between the length of  final sentence 
and estimated probability of  reoffending [r=0.534, p<.001]. 
Thematic analysis. In order to investigate the decision-making process 
Magistrates followed in our hypothetical case, all respondents were asked to add a brief  
rationale for their sentencing decision. Selected examples of  themes emerging from 
these responses are presented in Table 3.10 on page 83. Responses were coded for 
statistical and thematic analysis, revealing the factors which most frequently emerged as 
having underpinned sentencing decisions and their mitigating or aggravating nature.
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Table 3.10 - Selected examples of factors offered by Magistrates as 
considerations in sentencing decisions.
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Medical condition. Specific reference to the medical nature of  David’s condition 
was significantly more frequent in those conditions which included Woznicki’s 
[X2=22.57, p<.001]. The Heroin condition saw least reference made to the nature of  
the impairment being medical in nature, with only 16% of  respondents characterizing it 
in these terms. In contrast, an average of  43% of  respondents across the other three 
conditions offered a similar medical characterization (see Table 3.11)
Table 3.11 - Frequency with which impairment was described in terms of being 
a medical condition.
Woznicki’s-
Heroin 34 14.5 (6.9) 34 15.5 (6.6) 533.5 -0.55 ns
n Frequency %
Heroin 70 1 1.4
Heroin-Woznicki's 69 7 10.1
Woznicki's 69 3 4.3
Woznicki’s-Heroin 68 9 13.2
n Frequency %
Heroin 70 11 15.7
Heroin-Woznicki's 69 24 34.8
Woznicki's 69 37 53.6
Woznicki’s-Heroin 68 28 41.2
n Frequency %
Heroin 70 22 31.4
Heroin-Woznicki's 69 10 14.5
Woznicki's 69 10 14.5
Woznicki’s-Heroin 68 9 13.2
n Frequency %
Heroin 70 14 20.0
Heroin-Woznicki's 69 3 4.3
Woznicki's 69 0 0.0
Woznicki’s-Heroin 68 14 20.6
n Frequency % Reducers
Heroin 70 6 8.6 6
Heroin-Woznicki's 69 2 2.9 2
Woznicki's 69 3 4.3 3
Woznicki’s-Heroin 68 3 4.4 3
 3
Vulnerable Victim. A reverse of  this pattern was discernible in the frequency with 
which the vulnerable nature of  the victim was offered as a consideration in sentencing 
decisions [X2=10.49, p=.02] (see Table 3.12). Comparison across conditions indicated 
that participants in the Heroin condition were almost three times more likely to 
reference the victim in their deliberations than in any of  the other three conditions 
[ORpooled=2.8, X2=16.7, 95%CI=1.7-4.6, p<.001]
Table 3.12 - Frequency with which the vulnerability of the victim was referred 
to as a factor in sentencing decisions.
Woznicki’s-
Heroin 34 14.5 (6.9) 34 15.5 (6.6) 533.5 -0.55 ns
n Frequency %
Heroin 70 1 1.4
Heroin-Woznicki's 69 7 10.1
Woznicki's 69 3 4.3
Woznicki’s-Heroin 68 9 13.2
n Frequency %
Heroin 70 11 15.7
Heroin-Woznicki's 69 24 34.8
Woznicki's 69 37 53.6
Woznicki’s-Heroin 68 28 41.2
n Frequency %
Heroin 70 22 31.4
Heroin-Woznicki's 69 10 14.5
Woznicki's 69 10 14.5
Woznicki’s-Heroin 68 9 13.2
n Frequency %
Heroin 70 14 20.0
Heroin-Woznicki's 69 3 4.3
Woznicki's 69 0 0.0
Woznicki’s-Heroin 68 14 20.6
n Frequency % Reducers
Heroin 70 6 8.6 6
Heroin-Woznicki's 69 2 2.9 2
Woznicki's 69 3 4.3 3
Woznicki’s-Heroin 68 3 4.4 3
 3
Mental illness. The frequency with which David’s condition was specifically 
referred to in terms of  its being a mental illness varied significantly across conditions 
[X2=8.88, p=.03]. In line with expectation, Heroin-use and its associated impairment 
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was significantly more likely to be characterized as a form of  mental illness if  it was 
either followed by [OR=7.8, X2=4.87, 95%CI=0.93-65.11, p=.03] or preceded by 
[OR=10.5, X2=7.15, 95%CI=1.30-85.53, p=.007] Woznicki’s disease.
Curiously, however, there was suggestion of  a similar effect in evidence with regard 
to Woznicki’s disease. Offering that Woznicki’s was preceded by Heroin-use appeared to 
make it more likely for David to be described as having a mental illness [OR=2.5, 
X2=1.73, 95%CI=0.61-10.03, p=.19], as did the knowledge that it had been followed by 
a period of  Heroin-use [OR=3.6, X2=3.38, 95%CI=0.87-12.68, p=.07] (see Table 
3.13). Although neither of  these results achieved statistical significance, the pattern is 
noteworthy given the high frequency of  sentence reduction in the Woznicki's condition. 
In light of  the legitimately mitigating fact of  mental illness, it seems remarkable that the 
extension of  leniency is so infrequently explained in these terms.
Table 3.13 - Frequency with which the condition described was characterized 
as a mental illness.
Woznicki’s-
Heroin 34 14.5 (6.9) 34 15.5 (6.6) 533.5 -0.55 ns
n Frequency %
Heroin 70 1 1.4
Heroin-Woznicki's 69 7 10.1
Woznicki's 69 3 4.3
Woznicki’s-Heroin 68 9 13.2
n Frequency %
Heroin 70 11 15.7
Heroin-Woznicki's 69 24 34.8
Woznicki's 69 37 53.6
Woznicki’s-Heroin 68 28 41.2
n Frequency %
Heroin 70 22 31.4
Heroin-Woznicki's 69 10 14.5
Woznicki's 69 10 14.5
Woznicki’s-Heroin 68 9 13.2
n Frequency %
Heroin 70 14 20.0
Heroin-Woznicki's 69 3 4.3
Woznicki's 69 0 0.0
Woznicki’s-Heroin 68 14 20.6
n Frequency % Reducers
Heroin 70 6 8.6 6
Heroin-Woznicki's 69 2 2.9 2
Woznicki's 69 3 4.3 3
Woznicki’s-Heroin 68 3 4.4 3
 3
Drug use. There was significant variation in the frequency with which drug-use or 
dependency were highlighted as prominent factors in sentencing considerations 
[X2=23.38, p<.001]. The frequency with which drug use or dependency was referenced 
as a factor in deliberation was roughly equivalent in the Heroin and the Woznicki’s-
Her i  onditions (20% and 21% of  cases respectively), whilst, quite understandably, 
the Woznicki’s condition sees no mention of  it. In the Heroin-Woznicki’s condition, 
however, drug-use is mentioned by only 4% of  respondents as a component in their 
consideration (see Table 3.14). The impairment described here was attributed to 
Woznicki’s, rather than the heroin-use which precipitated it, but no suggestion was made 
that drug-use had been curtailed. Despite this, it would appear that drug-use as a 
precipitating factor is of  less relevance in sentencing considerations if  the brain disease 
which developed from it is named as something other than addiction.
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Table 3.14 - Frequency with which addiction/dependency was cited as a factor 
in sentencing decisions.
Woznicki’s-
Heroin 34 14.5 (6.9) 34 15.5 (6.6) 533.5 -0.55 ns
n Frequency %
Heroin 70 1 1.4
Heroin-Woznicki's 69 7 10.1
Woznicki's 69 3 4.3
Woznicki’s-Heroin 68 9 13.2
n Frequency %
Heroin 70 11 15.7
Heroin-Woznicki's 69 24 34.8
Woznicki's 69 37 53.6
Woznicki’s-Heroin 68 28 41.2
n Frequency %
Heroin 70 22 31.4
Heroin-Woznicki's 69 10 14.5
Woznicki's 69 10 14.5
Woznicki’s-Heroin 68 9 13.2
n Frequency %
Heroin 70 14 20.0
Heroin-Woznicki's 69 3 4.3
Woznicki's 69 0 0.0
Woznicki’s-Heroin 68 14 20.6
n Frequency % Reducers
Heroin 70 6 8.6 6
Heroin-Woznicki's 69 2 2.9 2
Woznicki's 69 3 4.3 3
Woznicki’s-Heroin 68 3 4.4 3
 3
Brain Damage. The 5% of  participants (n=14) who characterize the impairment 
described specifically as “brain damage” all reduce their original sentence (see Table 
3.15). Of  the 19 participants who reduced their sentence in the Heroin Aetiology 
condition, six cited brain damage as a primary component in the thinking behind their 
decision.
Table 3.15 - Frequency with which impairment was characterized as brain 
damage.
Woznicki’s-
Heroin 34 14.5 (6.9) 34 15.5 (6.6) 533.5 -0.55 ns
n Frequency %
Heroin 70 1 1.4
Heroin-Woznicki's 69 7 10.1
Woznicki's 69 3 4.3
Woznicki’s-Heroin 68 9 13.2
n Frequency %
Heroin 70 11 15.7
Heroin-Woznicki's 69 24 34.8
Woznicki's 69 37 53.6
Woznicki’s-Heroin 68 28 41.2
n Frequency %
Heroin 70 22 31.4
Heroin-Woznicki's 69 10 14.5
Woznicki's 69 10 14.5
Woznicki’s-Heroin 68 9 13.2
n Frequency %
Heroin 70 14 20.0
Heroin-Woznicki's 69 3 4.3
Woznicki's 69 0 0.0
Woznicki’s-Heroin 68 14 20.6
n Frequency % Reducers
Heroin 70 6 8.6 6
Heroin-Woznicki's 69 2 2.9 2
Woznicki's 69 3 4.3 3
Woznicki’s-Heroin 68 3 4.4 3
 3
Discussion
In a replication of  the observed effect reported in Chapter 2, neurological 
impairment was a cue to leniency in sentencing when attributed to the fictional brain 
disease Woznicki's, whilst this leniency was blocked if  the same impairment was 
attributed to addiction. Moreover, we were able to examine the balancing of  these two 
factors when presented in tandem, observing partial leniency which fell mid-way 
between these two extremes. These findings demonstrate the crucial role of  choice in 
impairment aetiology when considering criminal responsibility. However, we saw no 
impact on judgments of  the age at which such choice was made, either in terms of  
sentencing behaviour or the rationales offered to underscore it.
It is clear to see that the distinction between brain impairment resulting from 
addiction to Heroin and that resulting from Woznicki’s disease is significant in the minds 
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of  sentencers. Significant to the extent that the Woznicki’s narrative demonstrated a 
sevenfold greater likelihood of  leading to reduction in sentence. This amounted to the 
difference between one week and six weeks off  an eighteen week sentence. By employing 
Woznicki’s as either a factor causal to drug-use or an impairment stemming from it, 
both the odds of  receiving leniency and the extent of  mean sentence reduction in 
respect of  it fell midway between the Heroin (minimal leniency) and Woznicki’s 
(maximum leniency) conditions.
Perhaps the most surprising distinction evident in these findings is that between the 
Heroin and Heroin-Woznicki’s conditions. Not only were the neurological deficits 
described identically across the two groups, but also the initiation narrative. In the 
Heroin group, participants were given to understand that initial use of  drugs had 
become habitual, culminating in neurological deficits associated with addiction. In the 
Heroin-Woznicki’s group this sequence included an extra step: habitual use led to the 
development of  a disease called ‘Woznicki’s’ and it was to the impact of  this syndrome 
which the damage to mental faculty was attributed. There is little to distinguish between 
these two narratives beyond terminology.
In one case, ‘brain disease’ has been replaced with the term ‘addiction’, whilst in the 
other the appended label is ‘Woznicki’s’. Drug-use remains a constant precipitating 
factor across both conditions. The difference which exists is, to all intents and purposes, 
a semantic one. Yet addiction by another name, it transpires, does indeed smell sweeter, 
increasing more than threefold the chances of  receiving a reduced sentence. 
In this example, it cannot be that addiction fails to inspire leniency by virtue of  its 
association with drug use alone. Both scenarios begin with drug use. The Heroin and 
Heroin-Woznicki’s conditions trace the impairment back to an identical origin and 
identical choice. Although in neither example is it offered that drug use has been 
curtailed, we may speculate that the Heroin condition contains the stronger implication 
of  continued use. Yet the study presented in the preceding chapter gave strong 
indication that the context of  initial choice was paramount in determining leniency, 
whilst the fact of  having maintained a drug habit since that time was of  lesser import. 
Interestingly, leniency in the Heroin-Woznicki’s condition occupied the same middle 
ground as that in the Woznicki’s-Heroin condition. Here, it might be understood as 
‘Woznicki’s’ taking the place, not of  addiction, but of  a predisposition to take drugs in 
the first place. By replacing the somewhat diffuse notion of  a heightened propensity for 
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drug use with a named (and hence legitimized) condition, the leniency extended falls 
mid-way between that seen in the Heroin and Woznicki’s conditions. However, our 
results suggest that whilst a predisposing condition called ‘Woznicki’s’ may provide 
sufficient explanatory power to merit some measure of  leniency in sentencing, a 
predisposing condition called ‘adolescence’ does not.
The study presented in Chapter 2 indicated that Woznicki’s could be rendered 
analogous to addiction solely with the addition of  a self-initiation factor. The suggestion 
of  Woznicki’s having been diagnosed but voluntarily left untreated resulted in the 
withdrawal of  leniency. Conversely, the suggestion that addiction initiation was outside 
the control of  the individual in question resulted in increased leniency even where 
responsibility for the maintenance of  that addiction could not be similarly attributed to a 
third party.
This accords with a common-sense interpretation. Compulsive drug-use is a defining 
characteristic of  drug addiction, and compulsion in respect of  criminal behaviour is an 
area covered extensively under the law. Whilst attempts to liken the compulsive nature 
of  drug use to circumstances which might merit a legal defence of  duress (Husak, 1999; 
Sullivan, 1973; Yaffe, 2013) have found little favour, the urge to take drugs is perhaps 
more readily understandable in the individual already addicted. Indeed, it is expected. 
In contrast, the choice to first use drugs appears uncompelled. The blame an addict 
bears for contributing to their own condition is necessarily titrated with the passage from 
habitual to compulsive drug-use, the loss of  control over drug intake being a pre-
eminent component of  addiction.
However, that the Heroin-Woznicki’s condition was equally likely to promote 
leniency in sentencing as the Woznicki’s-Heroin condition calls into question this earlier 
impression. It could be that blame attaches to the choice to take drugs in both scenarios. 
Although the order of  events is different in each, both conditions include the initiation 
component. Yet Woznicki’s is described as a degenerative disorder associated with 
progressively impaired behavioural control, suggesting volitional impairment in advance 
of  drug-use. To suggest that similar blame attaches to the choice in both conditions 
would be to suggest that the voluntary or involuntary nature of  that choice is of  little 
relevance to such considerations. It should be noted that the absence of  any substantive 
difference observable in respect of  the age at which drug-use was said to have been 
initiated would also lend itself  to such an interpretation. In both cases it would appear 
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that consideration extended to the context in which first drug-use occurred was eclipsed 
by other, more salient factors. Yet, were that the case, what would there be to distinguish 
the Woznicki’s-Heroin and Heroin conditions? The study presented in Chapter 2 
showed us that responsibility for the initiation of  drug-use was a significant determinant 
in the attribution of  blameworthiness. The present study has given clear indication that 
this picture is, at best, incomplete. We previously saw the nature of  initial choice 
markedly altering judgments, seemingly irrespective of  the continued drug-use which 
followed. In our original scenario, first drug-use was said to have occurred eight years 
previously. No suggestion was made that attempts had been made to curtail use or seek 
treatment. Yet these years of  drug-use did not appear to prevent the addict from 
receiving leniency in common with the Woznicki's sufferer when the initial choice to 
take drugs had not been theirs. From this it might appear that choice in initiation is all 
important, whilst the subsequent maintenance of  an acquired addiction is of  lesser 
relevance. However, the present study has given us reason to question this construction. 
We have seen in the case of  the Heroin and Heroin-Woznicki's conditions that identical 
choice can lead to very different outcomes, whilst at the same time observing that the 
fact of  such choice having occurred as a juvenile is apparently of  little import. We might 
reasonably question, then, the measure of  responsibility borne for the maintenance of  
addiction irrespective of  voluntariness in its initiation. This possibility will be examined 
in the following chapter. 
90
Chapter 4. Addiction and drug use: How the sentencing of  addicted offenders is 
affected by the pattern and consistency of  their drug use.
Abstract
In the previous Chapter we examined the impact of  impairment aetiology on 
Magistrates' determinations of  criminal responsibility. We found that leniency in 
sentencing was more frequently observed where Woznicki's was included in the 
aetiology, even where it was not directly causal to impairment, but did not observe 
any substantive difference in sentencing practice on the basis of  initial drug-use 
having occurred as a juvenile rather than as an adult. The present study was 
conducted with the intention of  replicating and extending the findings presented 
in Chapter 2, where we observed that the absence of  choice in initial drug-use 
promoted leniency even where that use was ongoing. We were interested to see 
what impact periods of  abstinence and instances of  relapse in individual drug-use 
histories would have on perceptions of  addicts' choice (or lack thereof) in their 
ongoing drug-use. 282 active and retired Magistrates in England and Wales were 
asked to consider a criminal sentencing scenario. Having selected an appropriate 
custodial sentence on the basis of  the facts of  the case, participants were presented 
with potentially mitigating or aggravating information about the defendant and 
given the opportunity to alter their sentence. All respondents were told that the 
defendant had been addicted to heroin and informed of  the association between 
heroin-use and prefrontal cortical damage likely to result in impulsivity and a lack 
of  self-control. Scenarios were varied along two dimensions: (i) the offender's 
initial addiction to drugs having been of  their own doing (autogenic) or the fault 
of  a physician (iatrogenic); and (ii) their history of  addiction maintenance having 
featured abstinence or relapse. Where addiction was iatrogenic, sentence 
reduction was more likely, but only where drug-use was ongoing. These reductions 
were offset by a comparatively greater frequency of  sentence increase in these 
same conditions, suggesting that iatrogenic addiction history was facilitating 
sentence alteration, but not directing it. We theorize that presentation of  narrative 
aspects conflicting with a standard archetype may have the effect of  derailing 
intuitive processes and promote review of  previously ignored cues to judgment. In 
concert with this, different histories of  addiction maintenance were associated 
with variation in the frequency with which criminal justice principles were cited 
and their rank order of  importance in consideration, providing insight into the 
complex network of  factors employed in judgment.
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…if a man be doing any thing unlawful, and a consequence ensues 
which he did not foresee or intend…his want of foresight shall be 
no excuse; for being guilty of one offence, in doing antecedently 
what is in itself unlawful, he is criminally guilty of whatever 
consequence may follow the first misbehaviour.
Sir William Blackstone
Commentaries on the Laws of England (1769)
The findings presented in Chapter 2 gave indication that choice was a crucial 
component in judging the degree to which mental impairment impacted considerations 
of  criminal responsibility. We observed that identical accounts of  brain impairment 
resulted in different approaches to leniency in sentencing, seemingly determined only by 
the degree to which a choice had been voluntarily made in the initial acquisition of  that 
impairment. The results presented in Chapter 3 appeared to confirm that it was this 
choice element which determined the will to leniency at the exclusion of  what might 
otherwise be understood as relevant factors, such as the offender's brain state or the age 
at which first drug-use occurred. Focus was drawn to the contrast between drug-use 
leading to addiction and drug-use leading to ‘Woznicki’s disease’, in which, crucially, 
both narratives involved the same choice element. In each of  the scenarios the 
defendant bore the same level of  responsibility for the choice made to begin using drugs 
and for continuing that use, yet there was a dramatic difference in the leniency extended 
on account of  the resulting disease. This difference cannot have arisen as a result of  
perceived choice in initiation as this was matched across conditions.
A possible explanation is that an assumption was made by participants in the 
Heroin-Woznicki’s condition that drug-use had been curtailed. Although this was not 
stated, it may have been concluded that the Woznicki’s sufferer had stopped using drugs 
in the wake of  his diagnosis. Yet, if  this were the cause of  the differences between the 
two conditions, it would run contrary to our initial impression of  little account being 
taken of  the subsequent maintenance of  addiction. In Chapter 2 we saw that an 
iatrogenic origin of  addiction prompted leniency almost in line with that seen in the case 
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of  the non-drug-using Woznicki’s sufferer. It appeared of  little relevance to those 
extending leniency that the initial involuntary drug-use was followed by almost a decade 
of  subsequent use. Absence of  choice in that first instance seemed sufficient to excuse, or 
at least explain, potentially thousands of  instances of  further use. Long-term 
maintenance of  addiction appeared minimally influential when set against the 
circumstances of  initial use. Yet now we are presented with the possibility that this is not 
the case, having demonstrated a set of  circumstances under which it seems the ongoing 
maintenance of  an addiction provides a more meaningful cue to sentencing decisions 
than the nature of  its initiation.
In their study of  sentencing in Germany, von Helversen and Rieskamp (2009) 
contrasted five models of  human judgment in terms of  their ability to predict sentencing 
for low-level crimes. They discovered that sentencing decision-making was most 
accurately described by a heuristic model which relied on "a limited number of  factors 
and neglected factors that were legally relevant and rated as highly important" (p. 375). 
In England and Wales, similarly 'frugal' heuristics have been shown to predict 
Magistrates' bail decisions with impressive accuracy (Dhami & Ayton, 2001).
Courts frequently operate under time pressure and without a truly complete picture, 
even under ideal conditions. Where information search is resource expensive, decision-
making which relies on accessible cues is likely to prevail (Sutherland, 2007). In such 
example, parsing the nature and degree of  responsibility borne for the maintenance of  a 
drug habit is a time-consuming detour into unnecessary complexity when the extant fact 
of  drug use provides a cue to judgment with high validity.
Yet we can ask legitimate questions concerning in which direction such a cue would 
direct thinking. Certainly, we saw some instances in the previous study of  addiction 
being conflated with intoxication (see Table 3.10 on page 83), with the implication that it 
was being taken to be similarly aggravating. However, at the same time we might allow 
for the compulsive nature of  addiction to bring into doubt the notion of  full 
voluntariness of  action. We saw in Chapter 2 that initial choice in drug-use was a 
driving factor in sentencing decisions, with seemingly little consideration paid to the 
years of  subsequent use. It appeared that responsibility for causing the addiction was 
attached to the individual, whilst responsibility for continued drug-use was more readily 
attributed to addiction. Disrupting impression of  the former by removing voluntariness 
from first drug use was therefore sufficient to promote leniency in sentencing with little 
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to no account being taken of  the years of  repeated drug-use which followed.
This would seem to imply a tacit acceptance of  the compulsive nature of  addiction, 
fully in keeping with its understanding as a neurobiological disorder rooted in disrupted 
self-control. However, the existence of  addicts who successfully stop taking drugs would 
appear to illustrate that some measure of  control over drug consumption is retained 
(Morse, 2011). If, once addicted, drug-use were truly irresistible, how is it that many 
addicts manage to stop taking drugs? Moreover, what of  relapse? The abstinent addict 
who resumes drug-taking has already demonstrated their capacity to resist the drive to 
take drugs, so it surely cannot be an insurmountable urge. These are complicated 
questions, to which the answers can only lie in our understanding of  compulsion as a 
facet of  addiction.
All known addictive drugs activate the mesocorticolimbic dopamine circuit, which 
projects from cell bodies in the midbrain into the prefrontal cortex (PFC) and the 
striatum. PFC disruption may throw some light on heightened impulsivity, a paucity of  
long-term planning and even a weakened expression of  moral responsibility in addiction 
(Baler & Volkow, 2006; Batts, 2009; Funk & Gazzaniga, 2009; Leeman, Grant, & 
Potenza, 2009), but does little to explain the preoccupying compulsion associated with 
drug-seeking behaviour. We might reasonably look instead to the striatum, a brain area 
associated with reward perception, motivation and reinforcement (Corbit & Balleine, 
2016; Taylor, Lewis, & Olive, 2013; Yager, Garcia, Wunsch, & Ferguson, 2015). Natural 
reinforcers such as food and sex cause increases in extracellular dopamine in the 
striatum, and together with other behaviours which lead to this kind of  activation, tend 
to be repeated (Kelley & Berridge, 2002). Activation of  this system by addictive drugs is 
much more powerful than that by natural reinforcers, such that drugs effectively hijack a 
circuit in the brain associated with goal-orientation and cue salience (Sulzer, 2011). 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the shift in striatal function from ventral to dorsal regions 
associated with repeated drug exposure occurs on a similar timeline to the transition 
from impulsive to compulsive drug-use in addiction (Everitt & Robbins, 2013). That 
drugs of  many different kinds share in common the activation of  this dopaminergic 
circuit projecting into a brain area associated with reward processing is telling of  its 
importance in understanding addiction. 
Repeated dopaminergic stimulation enhances long-term potentiation (Otani, Daniel, 
Roisin, & Crepel, 2003), leading to molecular and cellular changes which persist into 
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abstinence (Jones & Bonci, 2005; Lüscher & Malenka, 2011). In common with many of  
the neuroadaptations caused by repeated drug exposure, some of  these changes appear 
to reverse following the cessation of  drug-use, but neither the extent of  this recovery nor 
the timelines involved are entirely clear (Korpi et al., 2015).
The Neuropsychoimaging of  Addiction and Related Conditions Research Program 
undertook a longitudinal study to examine structural and functional brain changes in 
addicts over prolonged periods of  abstinence. They found that disrupted midbrain 
regions exhibited markers of  neural recovery after six months’ abstinence, with an 
associated reduction in drug-seeking behaviour (Moeller et al., 2012b). Likewise, a 
recovery in cortical grey matter volume has been observed in abstinent (or significantly 
reducing) cocaine addicts over a similar timeframe (Parvaz et al., 2016b), and this 
recovery correlated with improved decision-making and cognitive flexibility. However, a 
more complicated picture emerges when examining salience attribution associated with 
striatal alterations.
The Late Positive Potential (LLP) component of  electroencephalogram (EEG) can 
be employed as a marker of  motivated attention to stimuli (Hajcak, MacNamara, Foti, 
Ferri, & Keil, 2013) and, in an addiction context, can predict simulated drug-seeking 
behaviour (Moeller et al., 2012a). It makes sense, then, that LLP amplitude correlates 
with reports of  cue-induced craving (Franken et al., 2008). However, measuring 
response to drug cues using LPP amplitude reveals a disagreement between subjective 
and objective measures of  drug-craving. The subjective experience reported by 
abstinent addicts is one of  drug-craving decreasing in line with length of  abstinence, 
with self-reported cue-induced wanting and liking both reaching minimum values 
following six months abstinence. EEG markers associated with cue-induced drug-
craving, on the other hand, demonstrate an increase in motivated attention to drug cues. 
This increased sensitivity peaks between one and six months of  abstinence, before falling 
again at one year (Parvaz, Moeller, & Goldstein, 2016a). The apparent contradiction 
between the absence of  self-reported drug-cue salience and the presence of  its 
underpinning biological markers led the authors to speculate on the matter of  relapse 
that a “period of  vulnerability may occur without conscious awareness” (p. 1132). If  
craving can exist outside the scope of  awareness, there is potential for genuinely 
irresistible compulsion, if  for no other reason than the inherent difficulty in resisting 
something of  which one is not aware.
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There are those theorists who have likened the compulsive nature of  drug-seeking to 
a form of  duress, conceiving it as forced action and thereby bringing into question its 
voluntary nature (Husak, 1999, 2000; Yaffe, 2013). The law makes accommodation of  
this kind outside an addiction context, excusing behaviour which would ordinarily be 
criminal when it is forced. The difficulty introduced by addiction in this conception is 
arguably one of  foresight. As outlined in the introduction, it is long-established in law 
that a defendant “cannot rely on the duress to which he has voluntarily exposed himself  
as an excuse” (R v. Fitzpatrick, 1977, p. 33). As such, even a defendant subjected to 
genuine compulsion cannot invoke this as a defence to action where “he could fairly be 
said…to have voluntarily exposed himself  and submitted himself  to such 
compulsion." (R v. Shepherd, 1987, p. 51).
Is the addict the unwilling victim of  an overwhelming compulsion? If  so, we might 
consider it as a compulsion willingly entered into, and hence any analogy to duress 
dismissed. Yet, if  addicts are not powerless in the face of  their addiction, some measure 
of  accountability must attach to the fact of  continued use. The findings presented in the 
preceding chapters suggested that the nature of  the initial choice to use drugs was of  
paramount importance in determining criminal responsibility. Specifically, the absence 
of  choice promoted leniency, whilst perception of  a voluntary choice having been made 
was sufficient to block that same leniency. If  a single voluntary choice can anchor 
blameworthiness so effectively, we might readily speculate on the impact of  considering 
the maintenance of  an addiction as little more than a long sequence of  voluntary 
choices. This study was conceived to investigate the extent to which these questions 
influence perceptions of  culpability in a criminal justice context.
In Chapter 2, we saw that mitigation blocked in respect of  addiction-related 
impairment could be forthcoming where the origins of  that addiction were given as 
iatrogenic. By removing the initial choice to use drugs from the narrative, leniency was 
extended in common with that seen in the case of  disease. This equivalency suggested 
that little account was being taken of  the eight years' of  drug-use which was described as 
having followed. 
We hypothesized that perceptions of  choice in drug-use could be modulated through 
the presentation of  addiction maintenance histories which incorporated periods of  
abstinence or relapse. The addict whose drug-use has been uninterrupted presents the 
more compelling image of  one whose will is bound by factors beyond their control. By 
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contrast, the addict whose history includes a period of  abstinence has arguably 
demonstrated their ability to conquer the compulsion, lending a volitional quality to any 
subsequent relapse. Conversely, even a brief  period of  abstinence may indicate a will to 
betterment in the face of  adversity sufficient to engender rehabilitative instincts in 
sentencers. 
Method
Participants. A total of  283 active and retired Magistrates, invited via the 
Magistrates’ Association website and by direct invitation, took part in this survey (131 
Male, 137 Female, 14 withheld). One survey was incomplete, leaving 282 participants to 
be included in the primary analysis. Broadly in line with national figures, the majority 
(57%) of  Magistrates participating in this study were between 61 and 70 years of  age. 
Some participants were excluded from portions of  the analysis for reasons given below.
This study was conducted in accordance with the British Psychological Society’s 
Code of  Ethics and Conduct. Informed consent was collected in advance and all 
respondents were debriefed and given the opportunity to withdraw their responses 
following participation. The study protocol was approved by the Research Ethics 
Committee of  the University of  Sussex.
Design. This was a mixed 2 (Choice) by 4 (Maintenance) design. As in the earlier 
studies, the Choice condition varied the circumstances of  first drug use, offering that it 
had occurred either through the defendant’s own actions (Autogenic) or a physician’s 
mismanagement of  their pain medication following an accident (Iatrogenic). The 
Maintenance condition offered four variants of  the drug-use narrative (see Figure 4.1):
 
Continuous: drug use for 8 years; currently using, 
Quit: drug use for 5 years, abstinent 3 years; currently abstinent,
Two Quit: drug use for 5 years, abstinent 6 months, drug use for 3 years, abstinent 6 
months; currently abstinent,
Quit Fail: drug use for 5 years, abstinent 6 months, drug use for 3 years; currently 
using.
Across all conditions, the described structural and functional brain dysfunction was 
identical, and in all cases attributed to Heroin-use.
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~8 years ago Present3 years ago 6 months
Time prior to sentencing
Continuous
Quit
Two quit
Quit Fail
Time of
offence
Drug use
Abstinence
Figure 4.1 - Chronology of the four Maintenance conditions.
Procedure. The survey was hosted on the Qualtrics platform (Qualtrics, Provo, 
UT) and accessible via url. All participants were informed that they would  initially be 
presented with a fictional scenario and asked to decide on an appropriate sentence. The 
scenario was as follows:
Edward is 27 years old and has no previous convictions.
Edward was in a small, independent shop close to his home buying some 
milk. The shop assistant was distracted by another customer and left the 
cash register open. Noticing this, Edward leant over the counter and stole 
£545 in cash before fleeing on foot. The shop's owner tried to block his exit 
and Edward collided with her, knocking her over and leaving her with a badly 
twisted ankle. He was pursued by a customer and two police oﬃcers who 
were on patrol in the area. After briefly losing sight of him, the oﬃcers 
apprehended Edward several streets away. Edward pleaded ‘not guilty’ to a 
charge of Theft (Theft Act 1968, s. 1).
Edward has now been found guilty at trial, with the following factors 
contributing to the seriousness:
 
small, independent shop;
large sum of money;
use of force resulting in slight injury;
shop had to be closed for 2 days whilst the owner recuperated.
Respondents were guided in this task with the information that current sentencing 
guidelines would suggest a custodial sentence of  between 6 and 26 weeks. All 
participants were then asked to indicate, on a sliding scale of  1 to 26 weeks, how many 
weeks’ custody they would consider appropriate, given the facts of  the case as they had 
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been presented. Having decided on this initial ‘anchor’ sentence, they were subsequently 
presented with additional information on potentially mitigating or aggravating features. 
The first section of  this additional information was identical for all participants:
Edward has a history of using Heroin, a drug which reduces grey matter 
volume in the prefrontal cortex, an area of the brain associated with action 
inhibition. Damage to this area has been demonstrated to result in impulsive 
behaviour and a lack of self-control.
Those in each of  the eight conditions then received different histories concerning 
the origin of  this damage (see Tables 4.1 and 4.2).
Table 4.1 - Aggravating or mitigating circumstances presented across Choice 
conditions.
Maintenance Additional information
Cont Edward has been using Heroin on a daily basis for eight years.
Quit Edward took Heroin on a daily basis for five years. He then stopped taking Heroin three years ago and has not used the drug since.
2quit
Edward took Heroin on a daily basis for five years. He stopped taking 
Heroin three years ago and remained abstinent for six months. He 
then began using again for approximately three years before quitting 
again last October.
Quitfail
Edward took Heroin on a daily basis for five years. He stopped taking 
Heroin three years ago and remained abstinent for six months. He 
then began using again and has continued to for the three years since.
Choice Additional information
Autogenic
About ten years ago, when Edward was in his late teens, he became 
addicted to Heroin. Six months earlier, his doctor had diagnosed him 
as suﬀering from depression. Edward says that the depression he was 
suﬀering from at the time led to him becoming a Heroin user.
Iatrogenic
About ten years ago, when Edward was in his late teens, he became 
addicted to Heroin. Whilst abroad, he was hit by a car and spent 
several weeks in a local hospital, during which time he was regularly 
receiving morphine, an opioid painkiller. His regimen of painkillers 
was mismanaged and, although he recovered from his physical injuries, 
Edward had developed an addiction to morphine by the time he left 
the hospital and was able to return home. He says this led to him 
becoming a Heroin user.
 6
Table 4.2 - Aggravating or mitigating circumstances presented across 
Maintenance conditions.
Maintenance Additional information
Cont Edward has been using Heroin on a daily basis for eight years.
Quit Edward took Heroin on a daily basis for five years. He then stopped taking Heroin three years ago and has not used the drug since.
2quit
Edward took Heroin on a daily basis for five years. He stopped taking 
Heroin three years ago and remained abstinent for six months. He 
then began using again for approximately three years before quitting 
again last October.
Quitfail
Edward took Heroin on a daily basis for five years. He stopped taking 
Heroin three years ago and remained abstinent for six months. He 
then began using again and has continued to for the three years since.
Genesis Additional information
Autogenic
About ten years ago, when Edward was in his late teens, he became 
addicted to Heroin. Six months earlier, his doctor had diagnosed him 
as suﬀering from depression. Edward says that the depression he was 
suﬀering from at the time led to him becoming a Heroin user.
Iatrogenic
About ten years ago, when Edward was in his late teens, he became 
addicted to Heroin. Whilst abroad, he was hit by a car and spent 
several weeks in a local hospital, during which time he was regularly 
receiving morphine, an opioid painkiller. His regimen of painkillers 
was mismanaged and, although he recovered from his physical injuries, 
Edward had developed an addiction to morphine by the time he left 
the hospital and was able to return home. He says this led to him 
becoming a Heroin user.
 6
Following the delivery of  this additional information, participants were invited to 
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adjust their original sentence, within the same bounds of  1 to 26 weeks’ custody. Once 
participants had chosen to increase, decrease or leave unchanged their original sentence, 
several follow-up questions were presented in order to probe the underlying rationale for 
the decision. Firstly, respondents were explicitly requested to provide the reasoning 
behind their decision. Secondly, they were presented with the five principles of  justice as 
laid out in the Criminal Justice Act 2003 and asked to select those which were at the 
forefront of  their consideration in making their determination. If  more than one 
principle was selected, participants were then asked to rank them in order of  relevance 
to their deliberation. Thirdly, all respondents were asked to indicate on a sliding scale 
how likely they thought it was that David would go on to commit further crimes in 
future.
Finally, all respondents were given the option of  suspending David’s custodial 
sentence in favour of  a community order, with a view to facilitating his attending a 
residential treatment facility. Those who chose to suspend David’s sentence were asked 
to indicate for how long they felt his suspended sentence should last, on a sliding scale 
between 1 and 24 months.
Measures and analyses. One participant submitted an incomplete response and 
was omitted from the analysis. As in the previous chapter (see page 67), decision rules 
were applied with regard to percentage and odds ratio calculations. Ten participants 
offered the minimum possible sentence of  one week during the initial sentencing phase 
and were therefore excluded from analysis of  sentence reduction odds. Seven of  these 
respondents subsequently increased their initial sentence by more than 300% 
(M=1,329%, SD=390%) and by application of  the same exclusion criteria employed in 
Chapter 2 (see page 48) were excluded from analysis in percentage terms. Eighteen 
respondents selected the maximum sentence of  26 weeks at the initial sentencing phase, 
preventing them from increasing the sentence should they have wanted to. These 
participants were excluded from analyses performed in terms of  likelihood of  sentence 
increase. It should be noted that for these reasons the number of  participants in each 
condition varied slightly between tests.  
Bayes Factor calculations were conducted at several points in the analysis, employing 
updated prior probability distributions derived from the studies presented in Chapters 2 
and 3. Full Bayes Factor calculation parameters are detailed in Appendix I on page 185. 
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The relative frequency and importance of  principles under consideration in sentencing 
decisions were contrasted between conditions and with participants’ pre-experimental 
ratings. Participants were additionally given the opportunity to self-report the thinking 
behind their sentencing decisions in a text-based free response. These qualitative 
responses were coded for statistical and thematic analysis. Statistical measures were not 
calculated for qualitative responses where, due to small sample sizes, power analyses 
indicated only a marginal possibility of  detecting even a large effect.
Results
We were interested in examining how the choice in initial drug-use and maintenance 
of  addiction affected sentencing decisions. To this end, we asked Magistrates to consider 
a criminal sentencing scenario. Using a 2 (Choice) x 4 (Maintenance) design, 
Magistrates were provided with additional information which varied choice in the initial 
addiction and the nature of  its subsequent maintenance.
At the initial sentencing phase, Magistrates used the full range of  sentences available 
to them. Mean initial sentence was 14.3 weeks (SD=6.2; N=282). Following the 
introduction of  potentially mitigating or aggravating factors, we sought to determine the 
impact of  Choice and Maintenance on percentage change in length of  custodial 
sentence. The data in the Choice conditions were not normally distributed [Autogenic 
D(142)=0.43, p<.001; Iatrogenic D(133)=0.37, p<.001] and exhibited heterogeneity of  
variance [F(1,273)=6.9, p=.009]. Although the data in the Maintenance conditions did 
exhibit homogeneity of  variance [F(3,271)=0.67, p=.57], they were not normally 
distributed [Cont D(67)=0.40, p<.001; Quit D(70)=0.47, p<.001; 2quit D(69)=0.37, p<.
001; Quitfail D(69)=0.41, p<.001]. For these reasons, specific group contrasts 
subsequent to the initial interaction analysis adopted non-parametric methods.
A 2-way independent ANOVA indicated a non-significant main effect of  Choice on 
mean percentage sentence reduction outcome [F(1,267)=0.85, p=.34] and a non-
significant main effect of  Maintenance [F(3,267)=1.42, p=.24]. Additionally, there was a 
non-significant interaction effect between Choice and Maintenance [F(3,267)=0.23, p=.
88] (see Figure 4.2).
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Figure 4.2 - Mean percentage sentence change by Choice and Maintenance 
(N=275; error bars +/-1 SEM).
Choice. In order to determine the impact on leniency in sentencing of  iatrogenic or 
autogenic origin of  addiction, both the extent and frequency of  sentence alteration were 
compared across Choice conditions.
Sentence reduction. In the event that the defendant's drug-use was explained as 
continuous and ongoing, which most closely replicated the original scenario presented in 
Chapters 2 and 3, there was a significant effect of  choice in initiation on the likelihood 
of  receiving a reduction in sentence. There was a significantly greater chance of  
receiving a reduction in sentence in the event that addiction was iatrogenic [OR=5.3, 
X2=5.98, 95%CI=1.03-27.42, p=.03, BH(0, 2.49)=3.4]. In contrast, there was little 
evidence of  a similar effect in those conditions in which drug-use had been interrupted 
(see Table 4.3).
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Table 4.3 - Likelihood of receiving a reduction in sentence.
Autogenic Iatrogenic
n Estimate (%) SD n
Estimate 
(%) SD
Using
Abstinent
Age n Reoffending estimate (%) SD
Using
Abstinent
Cont. Quit 2quit QuitFail
Autogenic Iatrogenic Autogenic Iatrogenic Autogenic Iatrogenic Autogenic Iatrogenic
n 34 34 36 35 35 35 36 33
Community  
Order
30 29 30 28 30 33 30 24
Custody 4 5 6 7 5 2 6 9
Maintenance Choice n Months SD U z p Bayes  Factor
Cont.
Autogenic 30 18.2 (6.4)
306.5 -2.04 .02* -
Iatrogenic 29 15.5 (4.7)
Quit
Autogenic 30 14.7 (4.6)
396.0 -0.42 ns 0.45
Iatrogenic 28 13.9 (4.0)
2quit
Autogenic 30 14.9 (4.4)
493.0 -0.03 ns 0.25
Iatrogenic 33 14.3 (5.7)
QuitFail
Autogenic 30 17.1 (4.4)
274.5 -1.61 ns 316.9
Iatrogenic 24 15.0 (4.0)
Maintenance Choice n Increase % OR X2 p Bayes  Factor
Cont.
Autogenic 33 2 6.1
1.6 0.25 ns 1.0
Iatrogenic 33 4 12.1
Quit
Autogenic 33 0 0
5.2 1.33 ns 1.0
Iatrogenic 34 2 5.9
2quit
Autogenic 34 3 8.8
2.1 0.96 ns 1.0
Iatrogenic 36 6 16.7
QuitFail
Autogenic 31 2 6.5
2.2 0.91 ns 1.0
Iatrogenic 30 4 13.3
Maintenance Choice n Reduce % OR X2 p Bayes  Factor
Cont.
Autogenic 34 2 5.9
5.3 4.69 .03* 3.4
Iatrogenic 32 8 25.0
Quit
Autogenic 36 7 19.4
1.1 0.01 ns 0.2
Iatrogenic 34 7 20.6
2quit
Autogenic 35 3 8.6
3.6 3.29 ns 1.9
Iatrogenic 32 8 25.0
QuitFail
Autogenic 36 6 16.7
1.3 0.21 ns 0.2
Iatrogenic 33 6 18.2
 1
Sentence increase. 9% of  respondents (n=23) chose to increase the sentence they 
had given on learning of  Edward's impairment and its origin in drug-use. Odds ratio 
analysis of  the impact of  addiction genesis on the likelihood of  receiving an increase in 
sentence did not produce statistically significant results (see Table 4.4). Bayes Factor 
calculations indicated that the data were insensitive and therefore no conclusion can be 
drawn.
Table 4.4 - Likelihood of rece ving an increas  in sentence.
Autogenic Iatrogenic
n Estimate (%) SD n
Estimate 
(%) SD
Using
Abstinent
Age n Reoffending estimate (%) SD
Using
Abstinent
Cont. Quit 2quit QuitFail
Autogenic Iatrogenic Auto enic Iatrogenic Autogenic Iatrogenic Autogenic Iatrogenic
n 34 34 36 35 35 35 36 33
Community  
Order
30 29 30 28 30 33 30 24
Custody 4 5 6 7 5 2 6 9
Maintenance Choice n Months SD U z p Bayes  Factor
Cont.
Autogenic 30 18.2 (6.4)
306.5 -2.04 0.02 -
Maintenance Choice n Increase % OR X2 p Bayes  Factor
Cont.
Autogenic 33 2 6.1
1.6 0.25 ns 1.0
Iatrogenic 33 4 12.1
Quit
Autogenic 33 0 0
5.2 1.33 ns 1.0
Iatrogenic 34 2 5.9
2quit
Autogenic 34 3 8.8
2.1 0.96 ns 1.0
Iatrogenic 36 6 16.7
QuitFail
Autogenic 31 2 6.5
2.2 0.91 ns 1.0
Iatrogenic 30 4 13.3
 1
However, taken as a whole across the four Maintenance conditions, choice in 
addiction genesis did influence the likelihood of  receiving a change in sentence. Overall, 
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respondents in the iatrogenic conditions were more likely not only to reduce their 
sentence [OR=1.9, X2=4.2, 95%CI=1.0-3.7, p=.03, BH(0, 2.49)=1.9], but also to increase 
it [OR=2.4, X2=3.7, 95%CI=1.0-6.1, p=.04, BH(0, 0.35)=2.6]]. The effect of  this in most 
cases was that reductions and increases balanced one another out, giving the impression 
of  little change overall (see Figure 4.3).
30% 20% 10% 0 10% 20% 30%
Reduction Increase
Frequency
Quitfail
2quit
Quit
Cont
Autogenic
Iatrogenic
Mean frequency 
of reduction
Mean frequency 
of increase
Figure 4.3 - Frequency of sentence reduction and increase across Choice and 
Maintenance conditions.
Maintenance history. Collapsing across the Choice variable, a Kruskal-Wallis test 
indicated a nonsignificant effect of  Maintenance on mean percentage sentence 
reduction [H(3)=3.4, p=.33] (see Figure 4.4). The appearance of  greater mean 
percentage reduction in the Quit condition was a consequence of  fewer participants 
increasing sentences in that condition than the others (see Figure 4.4).
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Figure 4.4 - Mean percentage sentence reduction across the 4 Maintenance 
conditions (error bars +/-1 SEM).
Contrasting only those participants who chose to alter the sentence they had 
originally given showed a pronounced difference in mean percentage sentence change 
across conditions (see Figure 4.5). Whilst the mean percentage change in sentence was 
downward in all conditions, that in the Quit Maintenance condition was approximately 
three times the extent of  that in the other conditions. Whilst there was a marked 
difference between the Quit condition and all three other conditions, that between Quit 
and 2quit was nonsignificant following a Holm-Bonferroni correction.
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Figure 4.5 - Mean percentage sentence reduction (reducers only; n=66) across 
Maintenance conditions (*p<.05; error bars +/-1 SEM).
Reoffending estimate. In order to examine the relationship between current 
drug-use and estimated likelihood of  future reoffending, we contrasted participants' 
opinions on the probability of  future offences between scenarios in which the defendant 
was currently using or abstinent. Respondents estimated the likelihood of  future offences 
to be significantly higher [U=6428.5, z=-4.86, p<.001 (two-tailed test), r=0.48, 
power=0.99] in the event that Edward was currently using drugs than when he was 
currently abstinent (see Table 4.5).
Table 4.5 - Estimated probability of future reoffending.
Au ogenic Iatrog nic
n Estimate (%) SD n
Esti ate 
(%) SD
Using 70 70.2 (17.0) 67 70.9 (21.0)
Abstinent 71 62.8 (15.9) 70 61.5 (15.9)
Status n Reoffending estimate (%) SD
Using 137 70.5 (19.0)
Abstinent 141 62.2 (15.9)
Autogenic Iatrogenic
n Estimate (%) SD n
Estimate 
(%) SD U z p
Cont 34 71.9 (20.6) 34 70.6 (21.3) 564.5 -0.17 ns
Quit 36 62.3 (17.2) 35 58.8 (13.1) 511.5 -1.38 ns
2quit 35 63.3 (14.7) 35 64.3 (18.0) 593.0 -0.23 ns
QuitFail 36 68.6 (12.8) 33 71.1 (21.1) 477.0 -1.43 ns
Maintenance Choice n Reduce % OR X2 p Bayes  Factor
Cont.
Autogenic 34 2 5.9
5.3 4.69 .03* 3.4
Iatrogenic 32 8 25.0
Quit
Autogenic 36 7 19.4
1.1 0.01 ns 0.2
Iatrogenic 34 7 20.6
2quit
Autogenic 35 3 8.6
3.6 3.29 ns 1.9
Reparation
Rehabilitation
Reduction
Protection
Punishment
 1
There was no suggestion that the autogenic or iatrogenic choice component 
impacted respondents' perceptions of  the likelihood of  further offences in future (see 
Table 4.6).
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Table 4.6 - Estimated probability of future reoffending across Choice and 
Maintenance conditions.
Autogenic Iatrogenic
n Estimate (%) SD n
Estimate 
(%) SD U z p
Cont 34 71.9 (20.6) 34 70.6 (21.3) 564.5 -0.17 ns
Quit 36 62.3 (17.2) 35 58.8 (13.1) 511.5 -1.38 ns
2quit 35 63.3 (14.7) 35 64.3 (18.0) 593.0 -0.23 ns
QuitFail 36 68.6 (12.8) 33 71.1 (21.1) 477.0 -1.43 ns
Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients were computed to assess the 
relationship between estimated probability of  future re-offending and length of  either 
custodial sentence or community order. Length of  final sentence was positively 
correlated with estimated probability of  reoffending [N=278; r=0.312, p<.001]. 
Amongst those participants willing to see the custodial sentence suspended in favour of  
a community order (n=234), there was a positive correlation between the length of  that 
community order and estimated probability of  reoffending [r=0.248, p<.001]. Amongst 
those who chose not to suspend the custodial sentence [n=44], a nonsignificant positive 
correlation was observed between the length of  final sentence and estimated probability 
of  reoffending [r=0.211, p=.17].
In those conditions where drug-use was stated to be ongoing, fewer than one in ten 
Magistrates estimated Edward’s chances of  avoiding future criminal behaviour at 
greater than 50%.
Willingness to treat. 84% of  respondents (n=234) were willing to see Edward’s 
custodial sentence suspended in favour of  a community order so that he could attend a 
residential treatment program, whilst the remaining 16% (n=44) did not exercise this 
option, considering a custodial sentence more appropriate. The frequency with which 
respondents showed a willingness to opt for a non-custodial disposal was broadly 
equivalent across conditions, and there was no indication that the odds of  receiving a 
suspended custodial sentence in favour of  a community order varied by condition (see 
Table 4.7).
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Table 4.7 - Frequency of preference for community order or custodial disposal 
across Maintenance and Choice conditions.
Age
Using
Abstinent
Cont. Quit 2quit QuitFail
Auto Iat Auto Iat Auto Iat Auto Iat
n 34 34 36 35 35 35 36 33
Community  
Order
30 29 30 28 30 33 30 24
Custody 4 5 6 7 5 2 6 9
Maintenance Choice n Months SD U z p Bayes  Factor
Cont.
Autogenic 30 18.2 (6.4)
306.5 -2.04 .02* -
Maintenance Choice n Increase % OR X2 p Bayes  Factor
Cont.
Autogenic 33 2 6.1
1.6 0.25 ns 1.0
Iatrogenic 33 4 12.1
Quit
Autogenic 33 0 0
5.2 1.33 ns 1.0
Iatrogenic 34 2 5.9
2quit
Autogenic 34 3 8.8
2.1 0.96 ns 1.0
Iatrogenic 36 6 16.7
QuitFail
Autogenic 31 2 6.5
2.2 0.91 ns 1.0
Iatrogenic 30 4 13.3
Maintenance Choice n Reduce % OR X2 p Bayes  Factor
Cont.
Autogenic 34 2 5.9
5.3 4.69 .03* 3.4
Iatrogenic 32 8 25.0
Quit
Autogenic 36 7 19.4
1.1 0.01 ns 0.2
Iatrogenic 34 7 20.6
2quit
Autogenic 35 3 8.6
3.6 3.29 ns 1.9
Iatrogenic 32 8 25.0
QuitFail
Autogenic 36 6 16.7
1.3 0.21 ns 0.2
Iatrogenic 33 6 18.2
 1
However, whilst the proportion of  respondents willing to suspend the custodial 
sentence was broadly equivalent across conditions, there was a difference in the length 
of  community order given according to condition. A 2-way independent ANOVA 
indicated a significant main effect of  Choice on length of  community order 
[F(1,226)=5.76, p=.02] and a significant main effect of  Maintenance [F(3,226)=3.54, 
p=.02]. However, there was a non-significant interaction effect between Choice and 
Maintenance [F(3,226)=0.66, p=.58].
Specific contrasts indicated a significant effect of  Choice, but only in the Continuous 
Maintenance condition (see Table 4.8). Although the differences in the other three 
conditions were non-significant, the difference in the Quitfail condition approached 
significance (p=.06), and post hoc calculations indicated limited achieved power (Quit=.
11, 2quit=.12, Quitfail=.55). Bayes Factors gave strong evidence of  an effect of  Choice 
in the Quitfail condition and moderate evidence against the existence of  an equivalent 
effect in the two conditions in which drug-use had been curtailed, suggesting the 
possibility of  an impact of  autogenic or iatrogenic choice which is influenced by current 
drug-using status.
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Table 4.8- Length of community order given across Maintenance and Choice 
conditions. 
Autogenic Iatrogenic
n Estimate (%) SD n
Estimate 
(%) SD
Using
Abstinent
Age n Reoffending estimate (%) SD
Using
Abstinent
Cont. Quit 2quit QuitFail
Autogenic Iatrogenic Autogenic Iatrogenic Autogenic Iatrogenic Autogenic Iatrogenic
n 34 34 36 35 35 35 36 33
Community  
Order
30 29 30 28 30 33 30 24
Custody 4 5 6 7 5 2 6 9
Maintenance Choice n Months SD U z p Bayes  Factor
Cont.
Autogenic 30 18.2 (6.4)
306.5 -2.04 .02* -
Iatrogenic 29 15.5 (4.7)
Quit
Autogenic 30 14.7 (4.6)
396.0 -0.42 ns 0.45
Iatrogenic 28 13.9 (4.0)
2quit
Autogenic 30 14.9 (4.4)
493.0 -0.03 ns 0.25
Iatrogenic 33 14.3 (5.7)
QuitFail
Autogenic 30 17.1 (4.4)
274.5 -1.61 ns 316.9
Iatrogenic 24 15.0 (4.0)
Maintenance Choice n Increase % OR X2 p Bayes  Factor
Cont.
Autogenic 33 2 6.1
1.6 0.25 ns 1.0
Iatrogenic 33 4 12.1
Quit
Autogenic 33 0 0
5.2 1.33 ns 1.0
Iatrogenic 34 2 5.9
2quit
Autogenic 34 3 8.8
2.1 0.96 ns 1.0
Iatrogenic 36 6 16.7
QuitFail
Autogenic 31 2 6.5
2.2 0.91 ns 1.0
Iatrogenic 30 4 13.3
Maintenance Choice n Reduce % OR X2 p Bayes  Factor
Cont.
Autogenic 34 2 5.9
5.3 4.69 .03* 3.4
Iatrogenic 32 8 25.0
Quit
Autogenic 36 7 19.4
1.1 0.01 ns 0.2
Iatrogenic 34 7 20.6
2quit
Autogenic 35 3 8.6
3.6 3.29 ns 1.9
Iatrogenic 32 8 25.0
QuitFail
Autogenic 36 6 16.7
1.3 0.21 ns 0.2
Iatrogenic 33 6 18.2
 1
Principles. The principle of  justice cited most frequently as having been at the 
forefront of  consideration in sentencing determinations was Punishment (see Table 4.9). 
Almost nine out of  ten respondents indicated this to have been a significant factor in 
their thinking. This was followed by Protection, offered in four out of  five instances, 
whilst the Reduction of  crime was relevant to just over two-thirds of  sentencers. Slightly 
fewer than one half  of  participants offered Rehabilitation to have been important in 
reaching their decision, whilst Reparation featured least frequently amongst the 
principles cited, mentioned only 26% of  the time.
Table 4.9 - Frequency with which the five principles of criminal justice are cited 
in sentencing decisions.
Punishment Rehabilitation
3.9 2.6
4.3 2.2
Autogenic (n=141) Iatrogenic (n=137)
General 
principles
Present 
study Difference
Present 
study Difference
2.5 2.1 -0.4 1.9 -0.6
3.2 2.5 -0.7 2.7 -0.5
3.0 2.9 -0.1 2.9 -0.1
3.6 3.6 0 3.6 0
2.5 3.9 1.4 3.9 1.4
Principle n %
Punishment 248 89.2
Protection 226 81.3
Reduction 193 69.4
Rehabilitation 138 49.8
Reparation 73 26.2
 3
Only 5% of  respondents (n=13) stated that just one of  the five principles was at the 
forefront of  their consideration when making their decision (8 Punishment, 2 Protection, 
3 Rehabilitation). The remaining 95% of  respondents (n=265) offered two or more 
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principles and were subsequently asked to rank them in order of  relevance. If  fewer 
than four principles were selected, those omitted were imputed through equiprobability 
coding (see Appendix D on page 178 for full details of  this procedure). Rankings were 
then converted into weighted scores following the same procedure as outlined in 
Appendix A (see page 167) for direct comparison with the scores calculated there.
Punishment Reduction Reparation
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80%
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ue
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Autogenic
Iatrogenic
Figure 4.6 - Frequency with which the five principles of justice are cited as 
significant factors in sentencing decisions across Choice conditions.
The frequency with which the principles were cited as being a factor at the forefront 
of  consideration did not vary in line with Choice in initial addiction (see Figure 4.6), but 
there was some variability in the frequency with which the principles were cited across 
Maintenance conditions (see Figure 4.7).
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Figure 4.7 - Frequency with which the five principles of justice are cited as 
significant factors in sentencing decisions across Maintenance conditions.
Specifically, participants in the Quit condition offered Rehabilitation as having been 
a factor at the forefront of  their consideration significantly less frequently than 
participants in the other three conditions [X2=13.5, p=.003] (see Figure 4.8).
Continuous 2quit Quitfail Quit
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Rehabilitation
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Figure 4.8 - Relative frequency of Rehabilitation being cited as a factor in 
sentencing decisions across Maintenance conditions.
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In addition, the narrative of  current abstinence despite past relapse outlined in the 
2quit condition was associated with a slightly lower frequency of  Protection being cited 
as a factor [X2=11.3, p=.01] (see Figure 4.9).
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Figure 4.9 - Relative frequency of Protection being cited as a factor in 
sentencing decisions across Maintenance conditions.
Rank scores were calculated for the relative importance of  the five principles, 
allowing the relative weight attributed to each to be contrasted with the scores outlined 
in Appendix A (see page 167) in relation to general sentencing practice (see Table 4.10).
Table 4.10 - Change in relative importance of principles between general 
sentencing practice and present scenario.
7 8
1.1 1.4
-0.0 -0.1
-0.4 -0.0
-0.3 -0.4
-0.3 -0.9
Reduction Protection Punishment
2.9 3.6 3.9
3.0 3.6 2.6
3.0 3.6 2.7
-0.1 -0.0 1.3
-0.01 -0.15 1.22
-0.14 0.13 1.51
-0.04 -0.01 1.06
-0.22 -0.07 1.25
-0.17 -0.03 1.28
-0.04 -0.02 1.24
Reduction Protection Punishment
3.0 3.6 2.6
3.05 3.60 3.79
2.91 3.75 4.09
3.11 3.36 3.86
2.63 3.66 3.99
Principle General Sentencing
Present 
Study Difference
Protection 3.6 3.6 -
Rehabilitation 3.2 2.6 - 0.6
Reduction 3.0 2.9 - 0.1
Punishment 2.6 3.9 + 1.3
Reparation 2.5 2.0 - 0.5
 9
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Opinions. In order to examine the extent to which Magistrates’ drew on their 
personal understanding of  issues surrounding addiction and drugs of  abuse, we took the 
opportunity to compare Magistrates’ sentencing decisions with their responses to post-
experimental opinion questions (see Appendix B on page 171). As this was a post hoc 
analysis of  small, unbalanced and self-selecting groups, statistical tests were not 
conducted.
Magistrates who agree with the statement 'Addiction is a disease' exhibit a slightly 
greater tendency towards sentence reduction than those who disagree with it. However, 
they also demonstrate a tendency to increase their original sentence with slightly greater 
frequency on discovering the drug-using history presented (see Table 4.11).
Table 4.11 - Frequency of sentence reduction or increase by participants 
agreeing or disagreeing with Statement A: Addiction is a disease.
Autogenic Iatrogenic
n Estimate (%) SD n
Estimate 
(%) SD
Using
Abstinent
n Reoffending estim te (%) SD
Reduction Increase
Drug addiction is evidence 
of a lack of moral character
Agree 5.2% 5.5%
Disagree 18.4% 8.8%
Reduction Increase
All addicts must at one 
time have chosen to start 
taking drugs
Agree 14.8% 19
Disagree 24.0% 10.2%
Reduction Increase
Addiction is a disease
Agree 19.4% 9.6%
Disagree 10.0% 7.1%
 3
 In fact, amongst those who agreed with the statement 'Addiction is a disease', the 
proportion of  participants increasing their sentence was greater than amongst those who 
agreed with the statement 'Drug addiction is evidence of  a lack of  moral character (see 
Table 4.12). Curiously, there was more frequent sentence increase on the part of  those 
who disagreed with the statement 'Drug addiction is evidence of  a lack of  moral 
character' than amongst those who agreed with it.
Table 4.12 - Frequency of sentence reduction or increase by participants 
agreeing or disagreeing with Statement B: Drug addiction is evidence of a lack 
of moral character.
Autogenic Iatrogenic
n Estimate (%) SD n
Estimate 
(%) SD
Using
Abstinent
n Reoffending estimate (%) SD
Reduction Increase
Drug addiction is evidence 
of a lack of moral character
Agree 5.2% 5.5%
Disagree 18.4% 8.8%
Reduction Increase
All addicts must at one 
time have chosen to start 
taking drugs
Agree 14.8% 19
Disagree 24.0% 10.2%
Reduction Increase
Add ction is a disease
Agree 19.4% 9.6%
Disagree 10.0% 7.1%
 3
Sentence reduction was more prevalent amongst those who disagreed with the 
statement 'All addicts must at one time have chosen to start taking drugs', although those 
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who agreed with it were nevertheless more likely to reduce their sentence than to 
increase it (see Table 4.13). The tendency towards sentence increase was broadly 
equivalent between those who agreed and disagreed with the statement.
Table 4.13 - Frequency of sentence reduction or increase by participants 
agreeing or disagreeing with Statement C: All addicts must at one time have 
chosen to start taking drugs.
Autogenic Iatrogenic
n Estimate (%) SD n
Estimate 
(%) SD
Using
Abstinent
n Reoffending estimate (%) SD
Reduction Increase
Drug addiction is evidence 
of a lack of moral character
Agree 5.2% 5.5%
Disagree 18.4% 8.8%
Reduction Increase
All addicts must at one 
time have chosen to start 
taking drugs
Agree 14.8% 8.8%
Disagree 24.0% 10.2%
Reduction Increase
Addiction is a disease
Agree 19.4% 9.6%
Disagree 10.0% 7.1%
 3Participants who agreed with the statement 'People punished for taking drugs are less 
likely to take them in future' were nevertheless more inclined towards sentence reduction 
than increase on learning of  Edward's drug history (see Table 4.14). Indeed, there was a 
greater occurrence of  sentence reduction amongst those who agreed with the statement 
than those who disagreed with it.
Table 4.14 - Frequency of sentence reduction or increase by participants 
agreeing or disagreeing with Statement H: People punished for taking drugs 
are less likely to take them in future.
Reduction Increase
People punished for taking 
drugs are less likely to take 
them in future
Agree 21.9% 12.9%
Disagree 15.7% 8.2%
 4
Thematic analysis. All respondents were asked to provide a brief  rationale for 
the sentencing decision they had taken by means of  a text response. Selected examples 
of  the received responses are presented in Table 4.17 on page 117. These answers were 
coded to allow for statistical and thematic analysis, highlighting emerging themes among 
the factors which are most frequently cited as having underpinned sentencing decisions.
Mention of  addiction. Mention of  addiction amongst sentencing considerations 
was associated with a significantly greater incidence of  sentence increase [X2=8.0, p=.
114
04]. However, mention of  addiction is also associated with a higher likelihood of  
receiving a reduction in sentence [X2 =4.1, p=.04]. Almost half  of  all respondents (48%) 
who increased their sentence mentioned addiction as a component in their 
consideration when reaching the decision. At the same time, more than one in three 
respondents (36%) who reduced their sentence did likewise.
Approximately one in ten respondents (n=29) specifically offered that drug use was 
irrelevant to their consideration and, in keeping with this, did not alter the sentence they 
had previously given.
Irrelevant factors. Approximately one in five respondents (n=51) offered that 
none of  the additional information with which they had been provided served either to 
mitigate or aggravate the offending. None of  these participants either increased or 
decreased the sentence they had previously given.
Iatrogenic addiction. Although our results suggest a limited consideration of  the 
distinction between autogenic and iatrogenic addiction in reaching sentencing decisions, 
it would seem that this factor is influential on those occasions when it is considered. Of  
the 131 participants who received an iatrogenic variant of  the narrative, only 10 (8%) 
mentioned this as a factor in their consideration when deciding on their sentence. 
However, of  these ten, all but two reduced the sentence they had originally given. The 
likelihood of  receiving a sentence reduction was significantly greater in the event that 
the iatrogenic nature of  addiction was a salient factor in thinking [OR=19.0, X2=21.0, 
95%CI=3.8-96.2, p<.001]. No respondent who mentioned the iatrogenic nature of  the 
addiction increased their sentence.
Attempts to quit. 16 participants made mention of  past attempts to curtail drug-
use as a factor in their deliberations, representing 8% of  participants who were 
presented with that information. Where, as with these respondents, past attempts to quit 
were offered as salient in consideration, there was a greater likelihood of  sentence 
reduction [OR=7.5, X2=18.5, 95%CI=2.6-21.3, p<.001]. Past attempt to curtail drug-
use was mentioned with the greatest frequency in the Quit condition. However, in only 
one in three cases did this translate into a reduction in sentence. Nevertheless, it would 
appear that consideration of  previous attempts to quit tends towards invoking leniency. 
Whilst more than half  of  those who commented on this did so in the context of  
reducing their sentence, not one participant who mentioned this as a factor in their 
decision-making chose instead to increase.
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Prison. Four participants expressed a lack of  faith in prison to rehabilitate, all of  
whom reduced their sentence. In contrast, 15 respondents included the potential for 
custody to facilitate rehabilitation in their sentencing rationale. However, only one in five 
(n=3) of  those who expressed such a view translated this into an increased sentence.
Mitigation or aggravation. There was some variation in the frequency with 
which addiction was offered as a salient factor in sentencing decisions (see Table 4.15). 
Addiction is mentioned more frequently as a factor in sentencing decisions where drug-
use was ongoing, but with the greatest frequency where an unsuccessful attempt had 
been made to quit in the past. 
Table 4.15 - Frequency with which addiction is mentioned as a factor in 
sentencing decisions by Maintenance condition.
Cont.
Iatrogenic 29 15.5 (4.7)
306.5 -2.04 .02* -
Quit
Autogenic 30 14.7 (4.6)
396.0 -0.42 ns 0.45
Iatrogenic 28 13.9 (4.0)
2quit
Autogenic 30 14.9 (4.4)
493.0 -0.03 ns 0.25
Iatrogenic 33 14.3 (5.7)
QuitFail
Autogenic 30 17.1 (4.4)
274.5 -1.61 ns 316.9
Iatrogenic 24 15.0 (4.0)
L1
n
%
Mitigates Aggravates
Addiction
Yes 15% 15%
No 53% 17%
Condition Frequency
Quitfail 42%
Cont 26%
2quit 22%
Quit 8%
 2
Almost a quarter of  all respondents (n=69) mentioned addiction as a factor at the 
forefront of  their consideration when making their sentencing decision. Of  these, 53 
additionally commented on their view of  addiction’s mitigating or aggravating nature in 
reaching such decisions (see Table 4.16).
Table 4.16 - Perceptions of addiction's mitigating or aggravating power amongst 
respondents mentioning addiction as a factor in their decision-making (n=53).
Autogenic Iatrogenic
n Estimate (%) SD n
Estimate 
(%) SD
Using 70 70.2 (17.0) 67 70.9 (21.0)
Abstinent 71 62.8 (15.9) 70 61.5 (15.9)
Status n Reoffending estimate (%) SD
Using 137 70.5 (19.0)
Abstinent 141 62.2 (15.9)
Autogenic Iatrogenic
n Estimate (%) SD n
Estimate 
(%) SD U z p
Cont 34 71.9 (20.6) 34 70.6 (21.3) 564.5 -0.17 ns
Quit 36 62.3 (17.2) 35 58.8 (13.1) 511.5 -1.38 ns
2quit 35 63.3 (14.7) 35 64.3 (18.0) 593.0 -0.23 ns
QuitFail 36 68.6 (12.8) 33 71.1 (21.1) 477.0 -1.43 ns
Treatment n Punishment
Yes 234 3.9
No 44 4.3
Autogenic (n=141) Iatrogenic (n=137)
General 
principles
Present 
study Difference
Present 
study
Reparation 2.5 2.1 -0.4 1.9
Rehabilitation 3.2 2.5 -0.7 2.7
Reduction 3.0 2.9 -0.1 2.9
Protection 3.6 3.6 0 3.6
Punishment 2.5 3.9 1.4 3.9
Principle n %
Punishment 248 89.2
Mitigates Aggravates
Addiction
Yes 15% 15%
No 53% 17%
 1
Control. Across those conditions in which drug-use was described as having been 
curtailed (Quit and 2quit) there was variation in the frequency with which Edward was 
specifically referred to as having been in control of  his actions. Seven respondents (10%) 
in the Quit condition offered this as a consideration in their decision, whereas none of  
the respondents in the 2quit condition did likewise. Of  those seven, all but one had 
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received the Iatrogenic variant of  the narrative.
In each of  the conditions in which drug use was described as ongoing (Cont and 
Quitfail), a single respondent also took this impression that Edward was in control of  his 
actions at the time of  the offence. Both of  these participants had been presented with 
the autogenic variant of  their narrative. None of  the respondents who offered their 
considerations to have included Edward being in control of  his actions either increased 
or reduced their sentence, suggesting that this may have been a balancing factor set 
against other considerations in weighing their ultimate decision.
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Table 4.17 - Factors offered by Magistrates as considerations in sentencing 
decisions.
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Discussion
In line with our earlier findings, introducing suggestion that initial drug-use had not 
been voluntary had a significant impact on the likelihood of  receiving a reduction in the 
length of  custodial sentence. However, this impression was by no means consistent 
under all circumstances. Rather, the anticipated result was observed only where (as in 
our original paradigm) drug-use was described as ongoing and uninterrupted. Across the 
three conditions in which some period of  abstinence was included in the drug history, 
there was little indication of  a like effect. Even where sentence reductions were extended 
by some of  our respondents, these were offset by increases applied by others, such that 
the origin of  addiction having been iatrogenic was associated with a greater likelihood 
of  sentence alteration in either a downward or an upward direction. On its face, this 
would appear to contradict our earlier impression that the initial choice to use drugs, 
and in particular the voluntary nature of  that choice, was of  significant relevance in the 
ultimate determination of  criminal responsibility. 
Equally, the autogenic or iatrogenic origin of  addiction appeared to hold little 
distinction amongst those who were moved to alter their initial sentence. Considering 
only those who changed their sentence, the overall extent of  reduction was equivalent 
across conditions. Outside of  the ‘traditional’ narrative presented in the Continuous 
Maintenance condition, what effect the iatrogenic nature of  addiction appeared to exert 
on either the likelihood or the extent of  sentence reduction was offset by an equivalently 
increased likelihood of  sentence increase.
The autogenic or iatrogenic choice component in addiction initiation was a factor in 
determining the length of  community order, but in like fashion this was not observed 
under all conditions (see page 106). Instead, length of  community order was significantly 
lower when initial drug use was iatrogenic in origin, but only in the two conditions 
where drug use was understood to be ongoing. Where both offence and sentencing had 
taken place following the cessation of  drug use, there was no comparable indication that 
the origin of  impairment was at the forefront of  consideration in decisions of  this kind.
It is possible that, where the autogenic variant is presented, implicit assumptions go 
uncontradicted and judgments remain intuitive, whilst the more atypical iatrogenic 
narrative may have interrupted automatic processing, replacing it with a more thorough 
review of  the information provided. In this way, changes to initial sentence could have 
been more frequent in the iatrogenic conditions without being the direct result of  that 
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factor. Heuristics are most effective when cues fall into familiar categories, and the 
iatrogenic narrative introduces an unfamiliar cue in the shape of  the defendant’s initial 
drug-use having been outside of  his control. This may have given our respondents pause 
to reconsider and incorporate a wider range of  factors into their thinking than when 
making a similar decision on familiar ground.
Von Helversen and Rieskamp (2009) reviewed evidence of  task-based cognitive 
strategy across several spheres of  decision-making, including the judicial, and concluded 
that a rule-based mapping model was the most accurate predictor of  outcome. The 
model proposes that decisions derive not from a thorough review and weighing of  all 
potentially relevant factors, but rather from the step-wise consideration of  a limited 
number of  specific cues with high validity. Crucially, the validity of  these cues relies on 
prior understanding of  the direction in which they operate. Von Helversen and 
Rieskamp argue that, where such knowledge is absent, decision-making relies instead on 
matching relevant cues with previous exemplars. Simply put, judgment may be based on 
a limited number of  cues if  cue direction is known and, if  not, decisions rely instead on 
the similarity of  certain features with examples from past experience. It may be that the 
iatrogenic variant of  the narrative introduces an unfamiliar cue, thereby prompting an 
overall reassessment of  cue validity and hierarchy. By disrupting the heuristic being 
applied, the iatrogenic narrative may open the door to cues which previously fell outside 
the scope of  consideration or invoke processes which are customarily short-circuited 
when operating on more familiar ground. That some of  these could have pointed 
towards increased culpability would account for the somewhat counterintuitive finding 
that initial drug-use having been involuntary is associated with a greater likelihood of  
receiving an increase in sentence.
Of  the ten respondents who commented on the iatrogenic nature of  the addiction 
having been amongst the factors in their deliberation, eight reduced their sentence, 
suggesting that it tended towards invoking leniency when salient. However, that only ten 
respondents commented on it out of  a total of  133 who were presented with the 
information suggests even more strongly that its passage into salience as a cue with high 
feature validity was comparatively infrequent.
Along the dimension of  Maintenance, by contrast, none of  the variations presented 
in our narratives contradicted common experience. The narratives included generally 
understood features of  addiction such as long-term drug-use and periods of  abstinence 
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followed by relapse - there was little about them which could be regarded as 
unconventional. Across our four Maintenance conditions, Edward was in general more 
likely to receive a reduction in sentence than he was an increase. The greatest likelihood 
of  receiving an increase in sentence on disclosure of  drug involvement was seen when 
he was described as currently abstinent, but with an instance of  relapse in his drug-use 
history. Set against this, the appearance of  the most pronounced leniency in respect of  
maintenance history was in the Quit condition, where drug-use was said to have been 
curtailed three years ago without relapse during the time since. On presentation of  this 
information, Magistrates were slightly more inclined towards reducing their sentence 
than in any of  the other three conditions, and this tendency towards more frequent 
reduction was coupled with a comparatively minimal inclination towards sentence 
increase. In combination, these two developed a picture of  greater leniency in response 
to the Quit narrative. It is difficult to reconcile this with the fact that when participants 
in the Quit condition were asked to specify and rank which principles of  criminal justice 
underpinned their sentencing decisions, it was Punishment which was foremost in their 
consideration, being cited with greater frequency and rated of  greater importance. 
Although there is more to this principle than the merely punitive, it does seem counter-
intuitive that rating it as being of  greater importance was associated with greater 
leniency in sentencing. At the same time, Rehabilitation was cited far less frequently in 
this condition than any other and received its lowest rating of  importance. This was the 
singular instance in which it was rated as the least important of  the principles, falling 
into fifth place behind Reparation.
Of  our four maintenance narratives, three included either ongoing drug use or 
previous relapse. In each of  these conditions, sentencing decisions were more likely than 
not to be stated as having been predicated in part on rehabilitative principles. In the 
Quit condition, however, where drug use was historic and had been curtailed without 
relapse, fewer than one in three respondents considered rehabilitation to be a primary 
factor in deciding their sentence. This is, perhaps, merely the context in which the 
question was posed - where an offender is or has been a drug addict, there is a 
reasonable inclination to consider any rehabilitation to begin with addressing drug-use. 
We might expect to see rehabilitation feature more prominently in consideration when 
that use is ongoing, and less so when it is not. Yet this was not the case in the preceding 
chapter, where the lack of  drug involvement in the Woznicki’s narrative did not appear 
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to make rehabilitation any less relevant, and in fact it was in the straightforward 
addiction narrative that rehabilitation was cited significantly less frequently (see pages 
78-79).
Our fictional offender was more likely to receive a reduction in sentence from a 
Magistrate who expressed agreement with the disease model of  addiction than one who 
disagreed, but this same was also true when looking at the likelihood of  receiving an 
increase in sentence. It would appear that understanding addiction to be a disease is 
associated with an openness to sentence modification, but does not necessarily result in a 
downward adjustment. Contrastingly, Magistrates agreeing with the statement ‘drug 
addiction is evidence of  a lack of  moral character’ were less likely to alter their sentence 
in either direction than those who disagreed. 
We have already had reason to question the simple dichotomy of  addiction being 
perceived as either disease or moral failing. It is clear in this instance that agreement 
with the disease model of  addiction is associated with a greater exhibition of  leniency in 
sentencing. Yet there appears to be no countervailing tendency towards harsher 
sentencing on the part of  those expressing disagreement with the disease model or, for 
that matter, those understanding addiction as evidence of  a lack of  moral character: 
they are as comparatively unlikely to increase their sentence as they are to reduce it. 
Instead, what impression exists of  a dichotomy is one between those who are more or 
less easily swayed, in either direction, by the additional information provided. Across all 
conditions, the tendency towards sentence reduction was restricted to, at most, one in 
four participants. Almost three-quarters of  respondents did not deviate from the 
sentence they had given in the first instance, neither reducing nor increasing it. A 
portion of  this may be accounted for by the balancing of  factors, and indeed thematic 
analysis of  sentencing rationales gave some evidence of  this. There were certainly 
references made to mitigating and aggravating factors having the effect of  cancelling 
one another out, yet these were far from extensive. More common was suggestion that 
none of  the information provided was of  relevance. These were not instances of  
ascribing equivalent weight to countervailing factors, but rather of  discerning that these 
factors bore no weight.
Guidance issued by the Sentencing Council of  England and Wales (Sentencing 
Council, 2017) states that a crime having been committed whilst under the influence of  
drugs or alcohol is an aggravating factor indicating greater culpability. However, at no 
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point in our vignettes was it suggested that the defendant was intoxicated at the time of  
the offence. Rather, the ‘influence’ of  drugs which was suggested was long-term: the 
changes to brain structure and function associated with repeated exposure. It is difficult 
to argue that this is the influence which the guidelines speak of, as the counterpart list of  
factors indicating significantly reduced culpability features ‘mental illness or 
disability’ (p. 20). The interpretation of  addiction as a disease, though predominant 
across our sampled respondents, is not a prerequisite for understanding of  the brain 
impairment outlined in our scenarios as presenting exactly such a factor.
The dismissal of  iatrogenic or autogenic origin effects when drug-use had been 
curtailed perhaps gives a clue as to the logic underpinning these decisions. No 
suggestion was made in our scenarios that the described impairments were extant only 
during periods of  continued drug-use, yet personal accountability for initial drug-use 
appeared to be rendered irrelevant by abstinence. In much the same way that the 
distinction between voluntary and involuntary intoxication only informs judgment when 
the individual in question was intoxicated at the time of  the offence, it seems a similar 
logic may render the ‘voluntary’ or ‘involuntary’ nature of  first drug-use of  relevance 
only when drug-use is ongoing. Taken together with some of  the rationales offered for 
sentencing decisions (see page 117), this suggests a perceived interrelationship between, 
and perhaps even a confounding of, intoxicated and addicted brain states on the part of  
sentencers. It also poses a question: how, and to what extent, do these two interrelate 
when they are both salient factors in judgment? This is the question we will address in 
the following chapter.
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Chapter 5. Addiction and intoxication: How the sentencing of  addicted offenders 
is affected by their intoxication at the time of  the offence.
Abstract
Across the preceding chapters we have seen instances in which chronic addicted 
state is seemingly confounded with acute intoxication. We saw the clear evidence 
in Chapter 4 of  perceived choice in drug-use initiation resulting in retroactive 
responsibility for current addiction-related impairment, seemingly by application 
of  a version of  the prior fault logic which operates in cases of  intoxication. 
However, this is a distinct variant of  prior fault logic which can be distinguished 
from its operation in the case of  intoxication in several important ways. Addiction 
and intoxication operate on different time scales, can be extant in isolation from 
one another and, when co-existing, there is scope for addiction to undermine the 
perception of  intoxication being wholly voluntary. This study was conceived to 
examine these questions surrounding the interrelationship of  addiction and 
intoxication in a criminal justice context and the operation of  prior fault logic in 
determinations of  culpability for offending. We asked 290 UK Magistrates to 
consider a criminal sentencing scenario in which evidence of  the defendant’s state 
of  intoxication at the time of  the offence was presented in tandem with 
information that they were either teetotal, a casual drinker or an alcoholic. We 
found that intoxication reduced blameworthiness for criminal acts if  the offender 
had no previous experience with alcohol whilst, in direct contrast, intoxication 
served to aggravate offending if  the defendant was an alcoholic. Our defendant 
was more than ten times as likely to receive a reduced sentence in the event that, 
though intoxicated, they were not also an alcoholic. The state of  being an 
alcoholic was moreover aggravating in its own right, being associated with harsher 
sentencing even where the offence in question was committed whilst sober. 
Leniency was blocked by alcoholism despite Magistrates’ qualitative responses 
suggesting its understanding as a generally mitigating factor, revealing a 
disconnect between expressed opinion and sentencing behaviour in practice. Our 
results indicate that, far from excusing drunkenness, alcoholism is more often 
taken to be an aggravating factor in sentencing decisions, even where the offender 
was sober at the time of  the offence.
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Obviously the scope of the defence of drunkenness in common law is 
very much limited. A modification of the law would bring into 
closer harmony moral and legal responsibility. But in view of the 
serious consequences to society of such a step, it is not likely that 
the future will witness any broadening of the scope of this 
defence except in so far as drunkenness comes to be treated as a 
disease. There are inebriates who cannot help being such for 
reasons of a diseased condition of the brain induced by alcohol 
either voluntarily or on account of the heritage of a neurotic and 
unstable brain; and it is but fair that law should take as much 
account as it can, in such cases, of the factors that may modify or 
make impossible full responsibility by fettering or preventing 
normal volition.
Dr R. U. Singh 
History of the Defence of Drunkenness in English Criminal Law (1933)
Where a person is judged to have been insensate at the time of  an alleged offence, 
there can be no criminal liability. As outlined in the Introduction (see page 19), the actus 
reus must be accompanied by mens rea in order for it to be considered criminal. These 
terms are derived from the writings of  Sir Edmund Coke, a 17th-century English legal 
scholar who addressed infirmity of  mind and its regard under the law. In his 1628 
volume The First Part of  the Institutes of  the Laws of  England he outlines the potential for 
excusing the actions of  those considered non compos mentis (unsound of  mind), in 
accordance with the notion that bodily action in the absence of  mental control cannot 
be criminal.
As has been developed in the preceding chapters, the voluntariness of  action is the 
touchstone of  criminal liability. Where voluntariness is understood to have been entirely 
absent, no criminal liability can attach to acts. That action was compelled or induced 
can suggest the partial absence of  voluntary control over behaviour sufficient to merit 
leniency in sentencing. As a result, offences committed whilst under the influence of  
psychoactive substances pose a problem.
The spectrum of  intoxicated mental states ranges from the mild lowering of  
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inhibitions through to the complete loss of  awareness and memory (White, 2003). In 
cases of  acute alcohol intoxication, for example, it may be entirely plausible for a 
criminal defendant to argue that they were not in control of  their actions at the time of  
the offence and have no memory of  the events which occurred. Such a state having been 
brought about by other means would cast doubt on the mens rea requirement for criminal 
liability and exculpate, but plainly the law cannot permit the advance of  such an 
argument in the case of  intoxication. Instead, the bar for intoxication's relevance at the 
liability stage is set very high, with the result that it is in almost all cases a matter dealt 
with at sentencing (Dingwall, 2006). 
The expansive body of  literature dealing with intoxicated offending contains 
relatively little empirical research, and that more commonly conducted with mock jurors 
or participants without legal background. Studies of  the decision-making processes 
behind judgments of  intoxicated offenders examining the thinking of  those occupying 
active roles within the criminal justice system are comparatively rare. This can be 
attributed in part to their general inaccessibility as research subjects, but, perhaps more 
importantly, the vast majority of  sentencing decisions are made without written record 
of  the reasoning behind them (Ashworth & Roberts, 2013), such that it is impossible to 
discover after the fact whether intoxication was a relevant factor in consideration and, 
should it have been, whether it was determined to aggravate or mitigate offending.
Whilst allowance is made for the fact that intoxication it may guide judgment in 
respect of  available treatment disposals (Padfield, 2011), sentencing guidelines issued by 
the Magistrates' Association include intoxication as an aggravating factor (Sentencing 
Council, 2017). However, the impact of  this is not always discernible in observed 
sentencing practice. In the example of  burglary offences, Irwin-Rodgers and Perry 
(2015) determined a slight but discernible tendency for intoxication to mitigate. The 
2014 Crown Court Sentencing Survey (Sentencing Council, 2015) indicated that, in the 
case of  Domestic Burglary, the offender having been intoxicated is commonly 
considered to be an aggravating factor, but, although associated with a greater likelihood 
of  receiving a custodial sentence, those sentences tended to be shorter than average.
It would be fair to say that alcohol intoxication facilitates offending (Felson & Staff, 
2010; Hore, 1988). People are more likely to act irresponsibly when drunk (Field, Wiers, 
Christiansen, Fillmore, & Verster, 2010). This is both common knowledge and, in many 
cultures, common experience. Yet the law is concerned with the punishment of  
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responsible actors for their choices. If  a defendant argues that they would not have 
committed the act in question had they not been intoxicated, they raise the possibility 
that they were not wholly responsible and that any punishment should be moderated on 
that account.
The law circumvents this question by applying the logic of  prior fault: if  irrationality 
at the time of  the offence is the consequence of  an earlier, rational choice, that earlier 
choice can be used in place of  the mens rea requirement. In the case of  intoxication, this 
choice is the voluntary act of  first becoming intoxicated - the sober man attracts blame 
by virtue of  having opened the door to drunkenness. It is of  no account whether the 
state of  inebriation ultimately reached was originally intended, it is the first choice to 
drink which inculpates.
Crucially, this choice must be voluntary, as the law determines it, and this 
determination is governed almost entirely by considerations of  compulsion and 
recklessness. Compulsion because compelled action is ipso facto involuntary. Recklessness 
because intoxication is held to be voluntary when the substance which was taken is, as 
per R v. Hardie (1984), one generally understood to have the potential "to cause 
unpredictability of  aggressiveness" (p. 70). To consume a substance in the reasonable 
awareness of  such potential imbues the act with an inculpatory recklessness with regard 
to the possible consequences.
Yet viewing intoxication law through the lens of  volition presents a significant 
difficulty when dependency is added into consideration. 22% of  arrestees test positive 
for alcohol (Deehan, Marshall, & Saville, 2002), but, given the swift metabolism of  
alcohol, a positive test is likely only in the case of  very recent or heavy drinking (Bennett 
& Holloway, 2001), and it is probable that this underestimates the proportion of  
arrestees with alcohol abuse issues. Figures compiled by Her Majesty's Inspectorate of  
Prisoners for England and Wales (HMIP, 2015b) indicate that almost one in three 
offenders arriving in prisons self-report having some form of  alcohol problem.
By virtue of  their frequent consumption of  alcohol, the alcoholic cannot claim to be 
in ignorance of  its potential effects, and has demonstrated a repeated recklessness with 
regard to such consequence. However, alcohol dependency may serve to undermine the 
idea of  intoxication being voluntary, inasmuch as an act is only truly voluntary if  it is 
within the power of  the actor to withhold it. Compelled action, as in the case of  crimes 
committed under duress, is not held to the same account under the law as action freely 
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taken (Arnold, 2001). Not only is addiction characterized by compulsion to seek and 
consume drugs, but the alcoholic is moreover genuinely under threat of  harm from 
sobriety, as alcoholic withdrawal is potentially fatal (Hall & Zador, 1997).
In contrast, a teetotaller with no personal experience of  alcohol’s effects might on 
that basis argue against any recklessness on their part in choosing to become intoxicated, 
having no reasonable anticipation of  reacting negatively. In both cases, there are 
substantive factors which could arguably influence the synthesis of  judgments. A casual 
drinker who consumes alcohol recreationally, by contrast, has neither claim to hand - 
their intoxication is both voluntary and knowingly reckless.
The notion of  intoxicated defence is not particularly popular with jurors. In his 1998 
study, Stephen Garvey outlined some of  the features emerging from South Carolina's 
Capital Juror Project, in which interviews were conducted with 153 jurors who had been 
involved in a total of  41 US capital murder trials. Fewer than one in five jurors reported 
considering intoxication at the time of  the offence to be a mitigating factor. Moreover, 
far from addiction lending explanation to intoxication, being either alcoholic or 
otherwise drug dependent was taken to be, in and of  itself, an aggravating factor.
In their 2006 study, Tombs and Jagger explored the sentencing behaviour of  Scottish 
justices when considering borderline decisions, noting that the tendency towards an 
"overarching retributivism" (p. 803) in the thinking behind such decisions often stood in 
contrast to the sentencers' own perceptions of  the inefficacy of  harsher sentencing. They 
concluded that "this retributivism was without proportionality in so far as it was directed 
at the offender rather than proportionate to the offence" (p. 803).
Sentencing decisions are ideally conceived to result from the balancing of  all 
relevant factors, each given its due weight and accounted for in a linear additive fashion, 
and sentencing guidelines are developed with a view to directing this process. However, 
there is a great deal of  evidence to suggest that the majority of  sentencing decisions are 
drawn together through an 'instinctive synthesis' (Hutton, 2013) of  the pertinent factors 
and rely extensively on specific cues to judgment (Dhami & Ayton, 2001). Such a 
heuristics-based approach to decision-making has been observed across many different 
high-information, low-resource contexts (Newell, Weston, & Shanks, 2003; Rieskamp & 
Hoffrage, 2008), and this is no less true in the case of  weighing criminal sentencing 
decisions (von Helversen & Rieskamp, 2009).
Konečni and Ebbesen (1984) draw from their study of  US judge's bail decisions that 
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"the judges’ actual strategy - as opposed to the espoused one - is exceedingly simple and 
takes very few factors into account", adding that these few factors "are different from 
those that the judges claim they take into account and that they should take into 
account" (p. 11). Similarly, Dhami (2003) observed bail decisions made by judges over a 
four-month period in two London Courts and established that over 95% of  those 
decisions could be predicted on the basis of  three or fewer pieces of  information 
unrelated to the nature and seriousness of  the offence. 
Yet the risk attached to such strategies comes in part from the possibility which exists 
for relevant factors to be either left out of  consideration entirely, or eclipsed by other 
cues to judgment with greater perceived validity. This tendency to overlook 
unanticipated features may help to explain why certain mitigating factors can be 
discounted in the event that a defendant fits a stereotypical profile and are only drawn 
into consideration if  that stereotype is confounded (Barnett, Brodsky, & Davis, 2004).
Link and Phelan (2014) argue that stigma surrounding mental abnormality is driven 
by fear rather than reason, motivated in particular by perceptions of  uncontrollability 
and dangerousness. This perhaps goes some way towards explaining the finding that 
stigma surrounding conditions such as schizophrenia, depression or dependance can 
increase when neurobiological models are introduced in explanation (Pescosolido et al., 
2010). In a criminal justice context, however, the picture becomes less straightforward. 
Whilst biogenetic explanations for mental disorders are positively associated with 
perceived dangerousness, they are also negatively associated with perceived 
blameworthiness (Kvaale, Gottdiener, & Haslam, 2013). Clearly, these two influences 
point in different directions when considering appropriate criminal sanction.
We were interested in examining the extent to which perceptions of  voluntariness in 
intoxication might be modified by the motivating factor of  alcoholism, and moreover 
whether reasonable naivety over intoxication may help it to function as a mitigating 
factor in sentencing. We anticipated that, in keeping with sentencing guidelines, 
intoxication would be taken as an aggravating factor in the case of  the casual drinker. 
However, we theorized that the credible ignorance of  potentially negative consequences 
might undermine perceptions of  recklessness in intoxication on the part of  the 
inexperienced drinker, whilst the consumption of  alcohol on the part of  the alcoholic 
may be considered less than wholly voluntary. In both examples, there is a reason to 
question the factors contributing to the aggravating nature of  intoxication, opening the 
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door to the possibility that it may actually serve to mitigate the seriousness of  offending.
Method
Participants. A total of  290 active and retired Magistrates, invited via the 
Magistrates’ Association website and by direct invitation, took part in this survey (131 
Male, 137 Female, 22 withheld). Broadly in line with national figures, the majority 
(55.2%) of  Magistrates participating in this study were between 61 and 70 years of  age. 
Some participants were excluded from portions of  the analysis for reasons given below.
This study was conducted in accordance with the British Psychological Society’s 
Code of  Ethics and Conduct. Informed consent was collected in advance and all 
respondents were debriefed and given the opportunity to withdraw their responses 
following participation. The study protocol was approved by the Research Ethics 
Committee of  the University of  Sussex.
Design. This was a mixed 2 (Intoxication) by 3 (Relationship) design. The 
Intoxication condition varied the sobriety of  the offender at the time of  the offence, 
offering that he was either Drunk or Sober. The Relationship condition varied the 
defendant’s past relationship with alcohol, stating that he was either an Alcoholic, a 
Casual drinker or a Teetotaller (the offence in question having taken place on the 
occasion of  his first alcohol consumption).
This study therefore consisted of  six conditions:
Drunk Alcoholic
Sober Alcoholic
Drunk Casual
Sober Casual
Drunk Teetotal
Sober Teetotal
Procedure. The survey was hosted on the Qualtrics platform (Qualtrics, Provo, 
UT) and accessible via url. All participants were informed that they would initially be 
presented with a fictional criminal sentencing scenario and asked to decide on an 
appropriate sentence. The scenario was as follows:
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Peter is 22 years old and has no previous convictions.
Peter was invited to join some friends at a pub on a Friday evening. At 
closing time, a fight broke out on the crowded street outside the pub. 
Although it is unclear who started it, several bystanders were injured by 
flying projectiles and witnesses have confirmed that Peter was one of those 
seen to throw a glass bottle during the fight. He was one of several people 
arrested at the scene. Peter pleaded ‘not guilty’ to a charge of Aﬀray [Public 
Order Act, s. 3].
Peter has now been found guilty at trial, with the following factors 
contributing to the seriousness:
 
oﬀence occurred outside a pub at closing time;
fight involved thrown objects;
conduct caused serious risk of injury;
bystanders were injured.
Respondents were additionally guided in this task with the information that current 
sentencing guidelines would suggest a custodial sentence of  between 6 and 26 weeks. All 
participants were then asked to indicate, on a sliding scale of  1 to 26 weeks, how many 
weeks’ custody they would consider appropriate, given the facts of  the case as they had 
been presented. Having decided on this initial ‘anchor’ sentence, they were subsequently 
presented with additional information on potentially mitigating or aggravating features. 
Each respondent was informed that, on the basis of  the evidence they had heard at trial, 
they had been satisfied that the information presented was true. The additional factors 
presented for consideration in sentencing are shown in Table 5.1.
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Table 5.1 - Additional factors presented for consideration in sentencing.
Condition
Relationship Intoxication Additional information
Teetotaller
Drunk
Peter is a teetotaller (he abstains from drinking alcohol).
Peter was drunk at the time of the oﬀence (this was the 
first occasion on which he had consumed alcohol).
Sober Peter is a teetotaller (he abstains from drinking alcohol).Peter was sober at the time of the oﬀence.
Casual
Drunk Peter drinks alcohol occasionally.Peter was drunk at the time of the oﬀence.
Sober Peter drinks alcohol occasionally.Peter was sober at the time of the oﬀence.
Alcoholic
Drunk Peter is an alcoholic.Peter was drunk at the time of the oﬀence.
Sober Peter is an alcoholic.Peter was sober at the time of the oﬀence.
 5
Participants were then invited to adjust their original sentence, within the same 
bounds of  1 to 26 weeks’ custody, in light of  this additional information. Once 
participants had chosen to increase, decrease or leave unchanged their original sentence, 
several follow-up questions were presented in order to probe the underlying rationale for 
the decision. Firstly, respondents were explicitly requested to provide the reasoning 
behind their decision. Secondly, they were presented with the five principles of  justice as 
laid out in the Criminal Justice Act 2003 and asked to select those which were at the 
forefront of  their consideration in making their determination. If  more than one 
principle was selected, participants were then asked to rank them in order of  relevance 
to their deliberation. Thirdly, all respondents were asked to indicate on a sliding scale 
how likely they thought it was that Peter would go on to commit further crimes in future.
Finally, all respondents were given the option of  suspending Peter's custodial 
sentence in favour of  a community order, with a view to facilitating his attending a 
residential treatment facility. Those who chose to suspend Peter's sentence were asked to 
indicate for how long they felt his suspended sentence should last, on a sliding scale 
between 1 and 24 months.
Measures and analyses. Decision rules for participant exclusion were applied in 
common with the studies presented in the preceding chapters with regard to percentage 
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and odds ratio calculations (see page 48). Ten participants offered the minimum possible 
sentence of  one week during the initial sentencing phase and were therefore excluded 
from analysis of  sentence reduction odds. Eight of  these respondents subsequently 
increased their initial sentence by more than 300% (M=1113%, SD=409%) and by 
application of  the same decision rule employed in Chapter 3 (see page 67) were 
excluded from analysis in percentage terms. Similarly, any respondents who opted for 
the maximum possible sentence of  26 weeks at the initial sentencing stage were 
prevented from increasing the sentence at the following stage. 12 respondents met this 
criterion and were excluded from analysis of  odds of  sentence increase. For these 
reasons, the number of  participants in each condition varied between tests.
Primary analyses were conducted in terms of  likelihood of  sentence change.  
Complimentary analyses were additionally conducted in terms of  percentage change in 
sentence.
Bayes Factors were calculated employing prior probability distributions as outlined 
in Appendix J on page 187. The relative frequency and importance of  principles under 
consideration in sentencing decisions were contrasted between conditions and with 
participants’ pre-experimental ratings. Participants were additionally given the 
opportunity to self-report the thinking behind their sentencing decisions in a text-based 
free answer, responses to which were coded for statistical and thematic analysis. 
Statistical measures were not calculated where, due to small or poorly balanced sample 
sizes, power analyses indicated only a marginal possibility of  detecting even a large 
effect.
Results
We were interested in determining how the defendant's relationship with alcohol and 
state of  intoxication at the time of  the offence informed decisions over their degree of  
criminal responsibility, and moreover the extent to which these two interacted in guiding 
sentencing decisions. To this end, we asked Magistrates to consider a criminal 
sentencing scenario. Using a 2 (Intoxication) x 3 (Relationship) design, Magistrates were 
provided with additional information which varied the nature of  the defendant's 
relationship with alcohol and their state of  intoxication at the time of  the offence.
At the initial sentencing phase, Magistrates used the full range of  sentences available 
to them. Mean initial sentence was 14.5 weeks (SD=5.3; N=290). Following the 
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introduction of  potentially mitigating or aggravating factors, we sought to determine the 
impact of  Relationship and Intoxication on percentage change in length of  custodial 
sentence. The data in the Relationship conditions exhibited homogeneity of  variance 
[F(2,279)=0.8, p=.46], but were not normally distributed [Teetotal D(94)=0.47, p<.001; 
Casual D(95)=0.41, p<.001; Alcoholic D(93)=0.46, p<.001]. The data in the 
Intoxication conditions exhibited heterogeneity of  variance [F(1,280)=7.6, p=.006] and 
were not normally distributed [Drunk D(145)=0.37, p<.001; Sober D(137)=0.44, p<.
001]. For these reasons, specific group contrasts subsequent to the initial interaction 
analysis adopted non-parametric methods.
A 2-way independent ANOVA indicated a non-significant main effect of  
Relationship on percentage sentence reduction outcome [F(2,284)=0.13, p=.88] and a 
non-significant main effect of  Intoxication [F(2,284)=0.54, p=.47]. However, there was a 
significant interaction effect between Relationship and Intoxication [F(2,284)=3.4, p=.
03] (see Figure 5.1).
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Figure 5.1 - Mean percentage sentence alteration across Relationship and 
Intoxication conditions.
Intoxication. 
Sentence reduction. A reduction in sentence on discovery that Peter was drunk at 
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the time of  the offence was significantly less likely if  that information was accompanied 
by the fact that Peter was an alcoholic (see Table 5.2). Mitigation of  criminal 
responsibility by virtue of  drunkenness was significantly more likely in the event that 
Peter was a casual drinker [OR=8.6, X2=5.4, 95%CI=1.03-71.48, p=.02, BH(0, 1.1)=3.5] 
or a teetotaller [OR=11.5, X2=7.7, 95%CI=1.41-94.22, p=.006, BH(0, 1.1)=5.1].
Table 5.2 - Odds ratio matrix of sentence reduction across Relationship and 
Intoxication conditions (*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001).
Alcoholic Casual Teetotal
Drunk Sober Drunk Sober Drunk Sober
- 0.2 0.1* 0.1* 0.1** 0.2
4.2 - 0.5 0.5 0.4 1.0
8.6* 2.0 - 1.0 0.7 2.0
8.8* 2.1 1.0 - 0.8 2.0
11.5** 2.8 1.3 1.3 - 2.6
4.4 1.0 0.5 0.5 0.4 -
Alcoholic Casual Teetotal
Drunk Sober Drunk Sober Drunk Sober
Alcoholic
Drunk - 8.5** 1.1 4.4* 18.3*** 6.0**
Sober 0.1** - 0.1** 0.5 2.1 0.7
Casual
Drunk 0.9 7.6** - 3.9* 16.3*** 5.3**
Sober 0.2* 2.0 0.3* - 4.2 1.4
Teetotal
Drunk 0.1*** 0.5 0.1*** 0.2 - 0.3
Sober 0.2** 1.4 0.2** 0.7 3.1 -
Alcoholic Casual Teetotal
Drunk Sober Drunk Sober Drunk Sober
Alcoholic
Drunk - 0.2 0.1* 0.1* 0.1** 0.2
Sober 4.2 - 0.5 0.5 0.4 1.0
Casual
Drunk 8.6* 2.0 - 1.0 0.7 2.0
Sober 8.8* 2.1 1.0 - 0.8 2.0
Teetotal
Drunk 11.5** 2.8 1.3 1.3 - 2.6
Sober 4.4 1.0 0.5 0.5 0.4 -
 2
A Cochran-Mantel-Haenszel estimate of  pooled odds ratio indicated that Peter was 
ten times more likely to receive a reduction in the length of  his custodial sentence in the 
event that, though intoxicated, he was not additionally an alcoholic [ORpooled=10.0, 
X2=11.3, 95%CI=2.25-44.51, p<.001, BH(0, 1.1)=25.2]. In fact, it transpires that 
alcoholism is more commonly associated with an increase in sentence on discovery that 
Peter was intoxicated at the time of  the offence (see Table 5.3).
Table 5.3 - Percentage of respondents altering their initial sentence on discovery 
that Peter was drunk at the time of the offence.
Alcoholic Casual Teetotal
Reduce 2% 16% 20%
Increase 29% 27% 2%
Addiction is a disease
Agree Disagree
All addicts must at one 
time have chosen to start 
taking drugs
Agree 149 19
Disagree 42 7
Addiction is a disease
Agree Disagree
People punished for taking 
drugs are less likely to take 
them in future
Agree 27 3
Disagree 159 25
 1
Sentence increase. Although overall there was an association between being 
drunk at the time of  the offence and receiving an increase in the length of  custodial 
sentence given, this was not true in all cases. Having been drunk rather than sober at the 
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time of  the offence was associated with a greater likelihood of  receiving an increased 
sentence in the event that the defendant was an alcoholic [OR=8.5, X2=9.4, 
95%CI=1.8-40.5, p=.002] or a casual drinker [OR=3.9, X2=5.3, 95%CI=1.2-13.0, p=.
02]. However, there did not appear to be an equivalent effect in the case of  the 
teetotaller, where being drunk meant being slightly less likely to receive an increased 
sentence than being sober [Teetotal: OR=0.3, X2=1.0, 95%CI=0.03-3.25, p=.32].
The drunk alcoholic was equivalently likely to receive an increase in the length of  
custodial sentence as the drunk casual drinker [OR=1.1, X2=0.07, p=.80], but was 
significantly more likely to receive an increase in the length of  their sentence than the 
drunk teetotaller [OR=18.3, X2=12.5, 95%CI=2.3-146.9, p<.001] (see Table 5.4).
Table 5.4 - Odds ratio matrix of sentence increase across Relationship and 
Intoxication conditions (*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001).
Alcoholic Casual Teetotal
Drunk Sober Drunk Sober Drunk Sober
- 0.2 0.1* 0.1* 0.1** 0.2
4.2 - 0.5 0.5 0.4 1.0
8.6* 2.0 - 1.0 0.7 2.0
8.8* 2.1 1.0 - 0.8 2.0
11.5** 2.8 1.3 1.3 - 2.6
4.4 1.0 0.5 0.5 0.4 -
Alcoholic Casual Teetotal
Drunk Sober Drunk Sober Drunk Sober
Alcoholic
Drunk - 8.5** 1.1 4.4* 18.3*** 6.0**
Sober 0.1** - 0.1** 0.5 2.1 0.7
Casual
Drunk 0.9 7.6** - 3.9* 16.3*** 5.3**
Sober 0.2* 2.0 0.3* - 4.2 1.4
Teetotal
Drunk 0.1*** 0.5 0.1*** 0.2 - 0.3
Sober 0.2** 1.4 0.2** 0.7 3.1 -
Alcoholic Casual Teetotal
Drunk Sober Drunk Sober Drunk Sober
Alcoholic
Drunk - 0.2 0.1* 0.1* 0.1** 0.2
Sober 4.2 - 0.5 0.5 0.4 1.0
Casual
Drunk 8.6* 2.0 - 1.0 0.7 2.0
Sober 8.8* 2.1 1.0 - 0.8 2.0
Teetotal
Drunk 11.5** 2.8 1.3 1.3 - 2.6
Sober 4.4 1.0 0.5 0.5 0.4 -
 2
Drunk. Where equivalently intoxicated, the defendant's relationship with alcohol 
had a dramatic effect on sentencing decisions. Whilst on average the teetotaller and the 
casual drinker received a reduction in the length of  their custodial sentence, the 
alcoholic was not met with equivalent leniency and more generally received an increase 
in sentence length (see Figure 5.2). A Joonckheere-Terpstra test revealed a significant 
trend in the data: leniency in sentencing decreased and reversed in line with prevalence 
of  alcohol history [J=2667.0, z=-3.76, r=0.31, p<.001]. Whilst intoxication served to 
mitigate for the teetotaller, and marginally so for the casual drinker, the intoxicated 
alcoholic was in receipt of  harsher sentencing.
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Figure 
5.2 (a) Mean percentage change in sentence across Drunk conditions by all 
respondents (n=145; error bars +/-1 SEM); (b) Mean percentage change in sentence 
across Drunk conditions by just changers (n=43; error bars +/-1 SEM).
In terms of  raw weeks, this difference between the Drunk conditions was similarly 
discernible. There was a significant difference in the mean sentence change in weeks 
between conditions [X2=16.2, p<.001] and a Joonckheere-Terpstra test revealed a 
significant trend in the data: the extent of  history with alcohol was associated with 
reduced leniency and a greater tendency towards an increase in the length of  custodial 
sentence given [J=4588.0, z=4.03, r=0.33, p<.001] (see Figure 5.3).
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Figure 5.3 - Mean sentence change in weeks across three Drunk conditions 
(n=148; error bars +/-1 SEM).
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Sober. Contrasting the Sober groups revealed no equivalent relationships or trends. 
There was no significant difference in the likelihood of  reduction in sentence across the 
Sober conditions [X2=0.43, ns], and the same was true of  the likelihood of  sentence 
increase [X2=0.59, ns].
It is however noteworthy that, while non-significant, the echo of  a similar pattern 
which existed in the Drunk conditions is discernible across the Sober groups in respect 
of  distinguishing the alcoholic. Though minimal, there is an observable tendency for 
sentences to be reduced in the event of  sobriety being paired with either a casual 
drinking or teetotal narrative, whilst the overall tendency in the case of  the sober 
alcoholic is a slight increase in sentence (see Figure 5.4).
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Figure 5.4 (a) Mean percentage change in sentence by all respondents across 
Sober conditions (n=137); (b) Mean percentage change in sentence by just 
changers across Sober conditions (n=19; error bars +/-1 SEM).
The likelihood of  receiving either an increase or a reduction in the length of  
custodial sentence varied as a function of  both Intoxication and Relationship. Sentence 
change was more frequent where the offender had been intoxicated at the time of  the 
offence, but it was their relationship with alcohol which appeared to guide the direction 
in which such change was made (see Figure 5.5).
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Figure 5.5 - Frequency of sentence reduction and increase across Intoxication 
and Relationship conditions.
Reoffending estimate. Alcohol dependency was associated with higher estimated 
likelihood that Peter would reoffend in future. These estimates were only partly 
moderated by the absence of  intoxication at the time of  the offence (see Figure 5.6). 
Intoxication. In the Casual and Teetotal conditions, there was no indication of  
variation in reoffending estimate on the basis of  intoxication (or lack thereof) at the time 
of  the offence [Casual: t(97)=-0.66, p=.51; Teetotal: t(94)=1.74, p=.09]. In the Alcoholic 
condition, by contrast, estimated likelihood of  reoffending was significantly higher 
[t(93)=-3.43, p=.001] in the event that the defendant was drunk at the time of  the 
offence [M=58.9%, SD=20.8] than if  he was sober [M=44.5%, SD=19.9].
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Figure 5.6 - Mean estimated likelihood of future offences by condition (N=290; 
error bars +/-1 SEM; **p<.01).
Relationship. A one-way ANOVA indicated that the defendant’s Relationship with 
alcohol (Alcoholic, Casual or Teetotal) was associated with significant variation in 
estimates of  likely future offending whether the offender was drunk [F(2,145)=32.0, p<.
001] or sober [F(2,139)=6.6, p=.002] at the time of  the offence.
Where the defendant was described as having been drunk at the time of  the offence, 
the estimated likelihood of  future offending was higher in the Alcoholic condition 
[M=58.9%, SD=20.8] than in either the Casual [M=32.6%, SD=18.6] or the Teetotal 
[M=31.1%, SD=18.3] conditions. Additionally, even where the defendant is described as 
having been sober at the time of  the offence, the fact of  being an alcoholic is associated 
with a higher estimate of  future reoffending [M=44.5%, SD=19.9] than either the 
casual drinker [M=30.2%, SD=18.4] or the teetotaller [M=37.9%, SD=19.8].
Willingness to treat. Participants were presented with the opportunity to suspend 
the custodial sentence they had given in favour of  a Community Order and a treatment 
programme and over 90% opted to do so. However, the rate at which the opportunity to 
suspend the sentence was rejected varied across conditions. Whether drunk or sober, the 
alcoholic was more likely to be retained in custody (see Figure 5.7). The sober alcoholic 
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was three times as likely to be retained in custody than either the sober teetotaller or the 
sober casual drinker [ORpooled=3.0, 95%CI=1.1-8.2, X2=4.2, p=.04].
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Figure 5.7 - Percentage of respondents refusing Community Order across 
Intoxication and Relationship conditions.
So whilst the sober alcoholic sees little change to the length of  their custodial 
sentence in respect of  their condition, they are also less likely to see that sentence 
suspended in favour of  a community order and treatment.
Principles. The principle of  justice cited most frequently as having been at the 
forefront of  consideration in sentencing determinations was Punishment (see Table 5.5). 
Almost nine out of  ten respondents indicated this to have been a significant factor in 
their thinking. This was followed by Protection, offered in three-quarters of  instances, 
whilst the Reduction of  crime was relevant to just over two-thirds of  sentencers. Fewer 
than a quarter of  participants offered Rehabilitation to have been important in reaching 
their decision, whilst Reparation featured least frequently amongst the principles cited, 
mentioned only 7% of  the time.
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Table 5.5 - Frequency with which the five principles of criminal justice are cited 
in sentencing decisions.
Alcoholic Casual Teetotal
Drunk Sober Drunk Sober Drunk Sober
Alcoholic
Drunk - 8.5** 1.1 4.4* 18.3*** 6**
Sober 0.1** - 0.1** 0.5 2.1 0.7
Casual
Drunk 0.9 7.6** - 3.9* 16.3*** 5.3**
Sober 0.2* 2 0.3* - 4.2 1.4
Teetotal
Drunk 0.1*** 0.5 0.1*** 0.2 - 0.3
Sober 0.2** 1.4 0.2** 0.7 3.1 -
Alcoholic
Drunk
Sober
Casual
Drunk
Sober
Teetotal
Drunk
Sober
Principle n %
Punishment 253 87.2
Protection 219 75.5
Reduction 200 69.0
Rehabilitation 62 21.4
Reparation 20 6.9
 1
Just 9% of  participants (n=27) offered that only one of  the five principles was at the 
forefront of  their consideration when making their decision. The remaining 91% of  
respondents (n=263) selected two or more principles and were subsequently asked to 
rank them in order of  relevance.
The frequency with which the principles were cited as being a factor at the forefront 
of  consideration did not vary in line with the defendant's relationship with alcohol (see 
Figure 5.8).
Reparation  
Rehabilitation
Reduction  
Protection
Punishment
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Re
lat
iv
e 
fre
qu
en
cy
ns
Principle
Teetotal
Casual
Alcoholic
ns
ns
ns
ns
Figure 5.8 - Frequency with which the principles of justice were cited as factors 
in sentencing decisions across Relationship conditions.
In contrast, there was some variability in the frequency with which the principles 
were cited in line with the defendant’s state of  intoxication at the time of  the offence (see 
Figure 5.9). Rehabilitation was offered as a factor in sentencing significantly more 
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frequently when the defendant was drunk [X2=4.4, p=.02].
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Figure 5.9 - Frequency with which the principles of justice were cited as factors 
in sentencing decisions across Intoxication conditions (*p<.05).
Specifically, participants offered Rehabilitation as having been a factor at the 
forefront of  their consideration more frequently in the event that Peter was both 
alcoholic and drunk at the time of  the offence. Whilst there was no indication that 
intoxication at the time of  the offence impacted the frequency with which Rehabilitation 
was cited in the case of  either the teetotaller [X2=0.2, ns] or the casual drinker [X2=0.4, 
ns], it was cited significantly more frequently as a factor in consideration in the case of  
the alcoholic [X2=6.3, p=.01] (see Figure 5.10).
Addiction and intoxication in combination were also associated with a reduction in 
the frequency with which Punishment was cited as a principle component in 
deliberations (see Figure 5.11). Whilst this variation was not statistically significant 
[X2=4.2, ns], it is noteworthy that Punishment is cited with greater frequency when the 
offender was intoxicated at the time of  the offence in both the Teetotal and Casual 
conditions, whilst this relationship is reversed in the event that they are an alcoholic.
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Figure 5.10 - Relative frequency of Rehabilitation being cited as a significant 
consideration in sentencing decisions.
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Figure 5.11 - Relative frequency of Punishment being cited as a significant 
consideration in sentencing decisions.
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Thematic analysis. In order to probe the thinking behind Magistrates' sentencing 
choices, all participants were asked to share the reasoning behind their decisions using a 
free-text response. These responses were coded for statistical and thematic analysis, 
revealing the factors which emerged most frequently as having underpinned sentencing 
decisions. Selected examples of  the responses offered are presented in Table 5.7 on page 
146. 
Previous convictions. There was a significant variation in the degree to which 
mention of  Peter having no previous convictions was associated with a reduction in 
sentence. In the Casual and Teetotal Relationship conditions, roughly half  of  all those 
offering a lack of  previous convictions as a component at the forefront of  their 
consideration in sentencing reduced their sentence. In contrast, not a single respondent 
in the Alcoholic condition who offered this as a factor in their thinking did likewise (see 
Table 5.6). Despite being explicitly stated in sentencing guidelines as a basis for 
mitigation, Peter's lack of  previous convictions was associated with a much greater 
likelihood of  receiving a reduction in sentence in the event that he was not an alcoholic 
[ORpooled=35.4, X2=17.2, 95%CI=4.3-291.8, p<.001].
Table 5.6 - Frequency with which a lack of previous convictions is cited as a 
consideration in sentencing (n=48) and associated frequency of sentence 
reduction.
Alcoholic Casual Teetotal
Drunk Sober Drunk Sober Drunk Sober
Alcoholic
Drunk - 8.5** 1.1 4.4* 18.3*** 6**
Sober 0.1** - 0.1** 0.5 2.1 0.7
Casual
Drunk 0.9 7.6** - 3.9* 16.3*** 5.3**
Sober 0.2* 2 0.3* - 4.2 1.4
Teetotal
Drunk 0.1*** 0.5 0.1*** 0.2 - 0.3
Sober 0.2** 1.4 0.2** 0.7 3.1 -
Alcoholic
Drunk
Sober
Casual
Drunk
Sober
Teetotal
Drunk
Sober
Principle n %
Punishment 253 87.2
Protection 219 75.5
Reduction 200 69.0
Rehabilitation 62 21.4
Reparation 20 6.9
Reduction Increase
Drug addiction is evidence
of a lack of moral character
Agree 10.3% 2.6%
Disa ree 11.5% 12.0%
Reduction Increase
All addicts must at one 
time have chosen to start 
taking drugs
Agree 11.3% 13.9%
Disagree 15.1% 5.7%
Reduction Increase
People punished for taking 
drugs are less likely to take 
them in future
Agree 12.1% 3.0%
Disagree 12.3% 11.4%
Reduction Increase
Addiction is a disease
Agree 12.1% 12.6%
Disagree 9.1% 6.1%
Age Teetotal Casual Alcoholic
n 11 22 15
Reducing 5 13 0
% 45% 59% 0%
 1
Intoxication. Of  those respondents info med that Peter was drunk at the time of  
the offence (n=148), 68% mentioned this fact as a component at the forefront of  their 
consideration in reaching their sentencing decision. Mention of  intoxication as a factor 
in sentencing decisions was associated with a reduced likelihood of  receiving a reduction 
in sentence [OR=0.3, X2 =6.0, 95%CI=0.1-0.8, p=.01] and an increased likelihood of  
receiving an increase in sentence [OR=3.1, X2=5.6, 95%CI=1.2-8.3, p=.02]. Of  those 
informed that Peter was sober at the time of  the offence (n=142), 42% mentioned this as 
a factor in their deliberation. However, mention of  this as a component in thinking was 
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not associated with a greater propensity to either increase or reduce sentences 
[Reduction: OR=0.7, p=.49; Increase: OR=1.8, p=.38].
Alcoholism. The fact of  Peter being an alcoholic appeared to have greater salience 
in the event that he was drunk at the time of  the offence. In the Sober Alcoholic 
condition (n=47), 21% of  respondents offered the fact of  alcoholism to have featured in 
their sentencing considerations, as against 44% who offered the same in the Drunk 
Alcoholic condition (n=48). Of  those participants who mentioned alcoholism, only six 
altered their original sentence, one reducing in each of  the two Alcoholic conditions, 
and four increasing, all of  whom were in the Drunk Alcoholic condition.
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Table 5.7 - Selected factors offered by Magistrates as considerations in 
sentencing decisions.
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Discussion
In keeping with expectation, there is clear indication in our results that Magistrates 
commonly take intoxication as an aggravating factor in offending, although it would be 
unreasonable to suggest consistency in this regard. More unexpectedly, there is the 
implication that alcoholism, unrelated to any intoxication at the time of  the offence, also 
serves to aggravate. Where one might have anticipated dependency giving explanation 
to intoxication, rather, our results indicate that the drunk alcoholic attracts greater ire 
than either the casual drinker or the teetotaller, be they drunk or sober. Far from 
excusing drunkenness, it appears dependency renders it all the more inculpatory.
When examining dependency in the absence of  intoxication, as in the case of  the 
sober alcoholic, our results echo those observed in Tombs and Jagger (2006): an 
overarching retributivism, driven by offender characteristics and enacted in spite of  self-
reported belief  that harsher sentencing would do little to prevent future offending. Many 
of  our respondents offered that they considered alcoholism to mitigate to the extent that 
it balanced out the aggravating feature of  intoxication, but this did not translate into 
sentencing practice. Intoxication in the absence of  dependency was treated more 
leniently in terms of  both the likelihood and extent of  sentence reduction. Whilst our 
participants’ explanations of  their decisions are presented as considering alcoholism as a 
substantively mitigating factor, this is not borne out in sentencing practice. Greater 
leniency is forthcoming when intoxication is not accompanied by dependency, whilst 
dependency, even in the absence of  intoxication, serves to block mitigation and even 
aggravate.
Our focus here was the voluntariness of  intoxication, considered in terms of  both 
foresight and compulsion. We found that while sobriety seldom mitigates (and is offered 
in some instances as an aggravating feature), the impact of  intoxication on the extent of  
leniency varies in line with the nature of  an offender’s relationship with alcohol.
In keeping with expectation, intoxication is more readily accommodated as a 
mitigating factor in the event that the offender in question lacked previous experience 
with alcohol. This accords with the notion that the voluntary nature of  intoxication 
inculpates by virtue of  an individual’s reasonable anticipation of  potential deleterious 
results. It is the reasonable absence of  such anticipation by which the law delineates 
'dangerous' and 'non-dangerous' substances with respect to the recklessness of  their 
consumption (cf. R v. Hardie, 1985). It is taken that certain substances (alcohol being 
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among them) are commonly understood in this regard, such that claims of  individual 
ignorance have little bearing. However, the House of  Lords decision in R v. G & R 
(2003) suggests that credible naivety on the part of  the offender as to potential 
consequences may undermine the suggestion of  recklessness in their actions. Indeed, 
our own results demonstrate that, where a particular offender is understood to lack 
personal experience with alcohol, credible naivety prevents drunkenness from 
aggravating and in many cases proves mitigating. The casual drinker, by comparison, 
received a mixed reaction from sentencers; though 16% reduced their sentence on 
learning of  the defendant's intoxication, a somewhat greater proportion increased their 
sentence on the basis of  that same information. This may be contrasted with the fact 
that only a single respondent in 46 felt that the teetotaller’s drunkenness aggravated 
sufficiently to merit an increased sentence.
Analysis of  the qualitative responses collected gives clear indication of  the 
contradictory logic being brought to bear here. There is suggestion that, whilst at the 
same time acknowledging intoxication as an aggravating factor, many appear to 
consider a crime committed whilst clear-headed and free from the befuddling effects of  
alcohol to be entirely more serious. In simple terms, there is an acknowledgement that 
whilst intoxication cannot excuse criminal behaviour, it does permit the understanding 
of  such behaviour having been ‘out of  character’. Where intoxication itself  is 
determined to be out of  character, there is a tendency towards more lenient sentencing. 
This is very much in keeping with the impression developed in Lightowlers and Pina-
Sanchez's 2017 study of  Crown Court sentencing practice, which offered that the more 
severe sentencing attracted by intoxication "is moderated if  the offence is deemed an 
isolated incident" (p. 132).
Yet, whilst this reasoning is repeatedly expressed in the discussion of  sentencing 
rationales, the drunk alcoholic is in general more likely to be in receipt of  harsher 
sentencing than the drunk casual drinker. Both are equivalently likely to receive an 
increase in the length of  custodial sentence, commonly cited as being determined on the 
basis of  intoxication, but the casual drinker is much more likely to receive a reduction in 
sentence on that same account. In contrast, only a single Magistrate in our sample felt 
that drunkenness on the part of  the alcoholic merited leniency expressed as a reduction 
in the length of  custodial sentence, and then only to the extent of  removing a single 
week from a 16 week sentence.
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As we saw in Chapter 2, leniency in respect of  addiction can be blocked by virtue of  
its being seen as a disease of  choice, drawing from the perception that all drug 
dependent individuals must at one time have first begun taking drugs. That this could be 
seen as a voluntary act and an unforced choice is, if  anything, thrown into sharper relief  
by its contrast with the latter stages of  dependency. The compulsive drug-seeking and 
lack of  self-control associated with addiction give at least some licence to the idea that 
the addict’s will is bound by external factors, serving only to make pre-addiction choices 
surrounding drug-use seem all the more unconstrained by comparison. In this there are 
echoes of  the prior fault logic employed in the case of  intoxication, though stretched 
over a longer timespan. It would seem that, if  the drunk behaviour can inculpate by 
virtue of  the sober choice to begin drinking, so responsibility for addicted behaviour can 
be projected back in time to be placed on the once-sober individual who first began on 
this path. We might speculate as to whether the application of  this logic is scaffolded by 
the conflation of  intoxication and addiction in lay understanding.
In the preceding chapters we developed an impression of  addiction as blocking 
mitigation - preventing the extension of  leniency in respect of  circumstances which 
would, if  arising from alternate cause, tend to engender it. The present study was 
designed with the intent of  examining short- and long-term prior fault thinking in 
parallel, with the perhaps misguided expectation that applying both simultaneously was 
logically impracticable. Against that expectation, it would appear that 'doubling-up' on 
prior fault can have a cumulative impact on perceptions of  culpability. The fact of  being 
addicted, rather than rendering intoxication more understandable, appears instead to 
aggravate offending in its own right, and all the more so when the offence was 
committed whilst intoxicated. Many theorists agree that there is a lack of  clarity at the 
heart of  intoxication law (Child, 2014; Law Commission, 2009; Mackay, 1990). It would 
appear that once the additional confounding factor of  dependency is also included, 
some measure of  confusion is inescapable.
To be clear, that the Magistrates in our sample exhibited a measure of  inconsistency 
in the logic underpinning their sentencing decisions in the case of  intoxicated or 
addicted offenders serves only to place them in the company of  legal scholars into 
antiquity. The culpability of  those rendered insensate through drink is a question which 
has long vexed theorists and practitioners alike, and our more recent scientific insight 
into the mechanisms at play has added degrees of  complexity to the debate. However, 
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one intended goal of  issuing sentencing guidelines is consistency in sentencing. That the 
guidelines in their present form are subject to such varied interpretation in the case of  
addicted and intoxicated offenders gives an indication of  how challenging a goal that is. 
Given that the majority of  arrestees test positive for drugs (Holloway & Bennett, 2004), 
it is arguable that these issues are being addressed in the greater number of  cases 
coming before English and Welsh courts. On the basis of  these findings, it is clear that 
there is scope for greater clarity in the guidance Magistrates receive with respect to 
intoxication and addiction. At the very least, addressing addiction in sentencing 
guidelines would have the benefit of  distinguishing it in consideration from acute 
intoxication.
On the basis of  our findings, it is clear that perceptions surrounding addiction are 
influenced by the same logic which informs understanding of  intoxication. In a sense 
this is unsurprising as the two are connected and there is guidance on intoxication where 
there is none for addiction. More importantly, we have demonstrated that where 
addiction is specifically differentiated from intoxication, it is nevertheless associated with 
harsher sentencing overall. There is no sentencing guidance which directs this, leaving 
only our respondents’ developed intuitions as the source of  this tendency, yet these 
intuitions are not revealed in direct questioning. Elsewhere, we have seen Magistrates 
largely agree that addiction is a disease, reject it as evidence of  a lack of  moral 
character, and doubt that punishment can be successful in preventing people from 
further drug-use (see Appendix B on page 171). In the present study, the rationales 
Magistrates provided for sentencing decisions were frequently in keeping with these 
opinions, but the sentencing decisions themselves were less obviously so. Attempting to 
account for this apparent discrepancy leads to the somewhat surprising possibility that 
Magistrates’ intuitions at sentencing are at odds with their acceptance of  the disease 
model of  addiction, rather than in line with it.
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GENERAL DISCUSSION
Over the course of  four empirical studies, we examined factors influencing 
Magistrates' perceptions of  addiction as a disease and the extent to which it is treated as 
such when deciding punishment, highlighting the roles of  choice and volition. Questions 
surrounding an individual's control over their behaviour would ordinarily be a 
significant factor in determinations of  criminal responsibility. This is clearly reflected in 
sentencing guidelines, which include mental illness or disease amongst factors indicating 
significantly lower culpability for offences (Sentencing Council, 2017). Indeed, in our 
initial investigation we determined that identical neurological deficits attributed to a 
cause other than addiction served to mitigate. However, the impression we have 
developed of  addiction's role in guiding judgment is one of  complexity and 
contradiction.
We will begin here by summarizing the results of  each chapter, highlighting the 
major findings, before turning our attention to the themes which emerged across these 
studies. In the final section we discuss potential future directions for research in this area.
Overview
Study 1 examined leniency extended in sentencing in respect of  neurological deficits 
stemming from either addiction or a (fictional) disease, together with the extent to which 
the autogenic or iatrogenic origin of  either impacted perceptions of  criminal 
responsibility. We determined that addiction was treated in common with brain disease, 
but only where perceptions of  choice in initial drug-use were confounded. Leniency in 
respect of  neurobiological impairment was blocked when participants were presented 
with a conventional addiction narrative, but was extended where the initial choice to use 
drugs was absent from that narrative.
Study 2 built on these findings, varying the aetiology of  addiction and disease by 
presenting additional narratives in which they were presented in tandem. We included 
variants in which our fictional neurobiological disorder 'Woznicki's' developed in 
advance of  first drug-use and in which it was the consequence of  drug-use. We 
additionally probed the relevance of  the timing of  initial choice by presenting variants 
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in which first use took place at either 15 or 20 years of  age. That we saw little difference 
here suggested that perceptions of  choice are not necessarily sensitive to the full range 
of  circumstances surrounding that choice. Whilst there was no discernible impact of  
age, we replicated our initial finding that disease mitigated where addiction did not, with 
leniency extended in the case of  Woznicki’s disease and not where identical impairment 
was attributed to addiction. In our mixed aetiologies, we saw that a combination of  
addiction and Woznicki’s resulted in leniency which fell part-way between the extremes 
seen when the two were presented in isolation. This was true even where Woznicki's was 
effectively addiction in all but name, having been described as the consequence of  
exactly the same history of  habitual drug-use as that described in the matched addiction 
narrative.
In Study 3, we sought to confirm the overarching relevance of  initial choice in 
addiction by replicating the distinction between autogenic and iatrogenic origin which 
directed judgment in our initial paradigm. We were also interested in further 
investigating the finding in our original study that the subsequent maintenance of  
addiction was minimally relevant in determinations of  criminal responsibility. To this 
end, we developed contrasting drug-use histories which involved periods of  abstinence 
and instances of  relapse. We found that the autogenic/iatrogenic distinction was only a 
factor in Magistrates' decision-making where drug-use had been consistent. Periods of  
abstinence in drug-use history, even where followed by relapse, appeared to overshadow 
the relevance of  the voluntary nature of  initial choice. We postulated that the act of  
curtailing drug-use carries with it the implication of  some measure of  control having 
been retained over that use, restoring to the addict a degree of  the agency which the 
iatrogenic origin of  their addiction would conventionally deny. When contrasted with 
the more conventional autogenic narrative, iatrogenic addiction was associated with a 
greater likelihood of  receiving a reduction in sentence, but also with a greater likelihood 
of  receiving an increase in sentence. We speculated that the unconventional nature of  
iatrogenic addiction prompted reconsideration of  relevant cues to judgment where the 
straightforward autogenic addiction scenario did not. That this process would draw into 
focus previously ignored factors speaking to either mitigation or aggravation may 
account for the observation that the same array of  information resulted in both sentence 
reductions and increases.
Study 4 investigated the extent to which addiction could contradict perceptions of  
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voluntariness in intoxication, whilst also examining the degree to which a lack of  
previous experience with alcohol might mitigate responsibility for offending whilst 
intoxicated. We discovered that intoxication could serve to mitigate responsibility for 
offending in the event that the individual concerned was personally naive to its effects. A 
similar degree of  mitigation was observable in the example of  the casual drinker, though 
this was largely offset by a like proportion of  respondents taking intoxication to 
aggravate. In the case of  the alcoholic, by contrast, intoxication served only to 
aggravate, with addiction seemingly providing little in the way of  excuse for alcohol 
consumption. Moreover, even when sober at the time of  the offence, the alcoholic was in 
receipt of  harsher sentencing than either the teetotaller or the casual drinker, regardless 
of  their state of  intoxication.
Limitations
Before turning to discussion of  the themes which emerged across our studies, there 
are some limitations which should be noted. Our results were collected online, rather 
than face to face, so we did not have the opportunity to observe our participants in the 
act of  sentencing. Nor were we able to probe responses with additional qualitative 
questions beyond those predetermined for inclusion. What additional understanding 
might have been gained by the presence of  a researcher and a measure of  discursive 
questioning had to be weighed against the logistics of  sampling. Conducting separate 
interviews with each respondent would have necessitated limiting the scope of  our 
studies in order to compensate for the additional time taken, and it would have been 
significantly more challenging to achieve a geographical cross-section of  Magistrates. 
For these reasons, it was determined at an early stage that our specific research questions 
would be best addressed through the online approach subsequently adopted. One 
additional factor in our consideration was a desire for genuine answers on sometimes 
sensitive topics, which we deemed less likely from subjects under direct observation. 
Allowing our respondents privacy and anonymity in providing their answers was 
advantageous in this respect.
For similar reasons, we collected limited information with potential to permit 
identification of  individual participants. This had the effect of  limiting our ability to 
probe whether and to what extent our results were driven in part by specific differences. 
By way of  example, amongst the information we opted not to request was the 
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geographic locality in which they sat as Magistrates. We therefore cannot exclude the 
possibility that diverging assessments of  identical cases were in part influenced by 
regional variations in judicial perspective. Given the rule of  law concerns which the 
suggestion of  inconsistency across regional boundaries necessarily generate, this merits 
consideration as a potential confounding factor. Whilst these studies were not intended 
to probe questions surrounding these kinds of  inconsistency, it is clear from the wide 
range of  responses we received to each of  our initial sentencing scenarios that some 
measure of  inconsistency was in operation at this initial stage, even in advance of  
confounding factors being introduced. We cannot ascribe this to geography any more 
than to individual differences in personal experience between Magistrates, but both 
remain candidates for the attention of  future research.
Finally, each of  the studies presented here employed a single crime and a single 
drug. We therefore cannot offer that our results would be reflected in general sentencing 
practice across all offence types or in relation to all manner of  intoxicants. As noted 
below (see page 161), there is scope for variation of  our scenarios in terms of  both the 
nature of  the crime committed and that of  the drug involved. In particular, we did not 
investigate what effect switching between legally available and proscribed drugs might 
have had in our scenarios. Nor can we offer insight into the extent to which our 
participants’ reactions to personal mitigation factors might be subject to attenuation 
through variation in the features of  the crime or the nature of  the victim. Such 
distinctions as may exist here would be particularly beneficial to highlight as, in reality, 
sentencing is all too frequently concerned with multiple offences committed by poly-
drug users.
Emerging themes
Do Magistrates regard addiction as a disease?
Across these studies a complex picture emerges of  the regard in which addicted and 
intoxicated offenders are held. Whilst it is perhaps to be expected that Magistrates may 
disagree with one another, many appear to act in contradiction of  their own expressed 
opinion. When asked directly whether they consider addiction to be a disease, 
Magistrates overwhelmingly agree, whilst only a small proportion support the notion 
that addiction is evidence of  a lack of  moral character (see Appendix B on page 171). 
However, our initial empirical finding was of  addiction seemingly being considered a 
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case apart from disease, as leniency which was extended in light of  Woznicki's disease 
was not forthcoming when the same impairment developed through drug-use. We were 
able to render addiction analogous to disease by removing choice from its development. 
Offering that initial drug-use had not been voluntary prompted leniency in line with 
that shown to the offender whose impairment stemmed from Woznicki’s. Yet it quickly 
became clear that this was not as clear-cut as it may at first have seemed.
We saw the apparent difference with respect to addiction and disease again in 
Chapter 3, where addiction blocked leniency in line with that extended to the Woznicki's 
suffer. However, where drug-use had led to Woznicki's disease, greater leniency was 
extended than where drug-use had led to addiction. This added a complication to our 
initial assessment, in that it was evidently not solely the fact of  choice in initial drug-use 
which spoke against mitigation. The initial choice to use drugs was the same across the 
two narratives. Our tentative speculation as to the reason for this difference was that the 
acquisition of  Woznicki's disease implied, or at least was taken by Magistrates to imply, a 
cessation of  drug-use. We considered that perhaps the Woznicki's sufferer might have 
been accorded some mitigation for having stopped taking drugs. However, the study 
presented in Chapter 4 did not show a similar effect, as in that scenario the former drug-
user was sentenced in similar fashion to the current user. Whether our Magistrate 
participants felt the defendant was better or worse for the fact of  having stopped taking 
drugs was not evident in their sentencing behaviour. There was a slightly lowered 
tendency to increase sentences on that account, but abstinence did not appear to be the 
driving factor behind this.
Yet, in one sense at least, Magistrates do treat addiction as the disease that, when 
asked directly, they overwhelmingly agree it is. Whilst we saw, across our studies, 
leniency withheld in the case of  addiction, we saw a similar response to Woznicki’s 
disease in Chapter 2 when choice was introduced to the initiation narrative. Whilst the 
effect was not as pronounced as we saw in the case of  addiction, it was nevertheless 
present. We could not logically draw from this observation that Magistrates do not see 
‘Woznicki’s disease’ as a disease, nor would it be reasonable to argue that it represents 
Magistrates’ rejection of  the ‘disease model of  Woznicki’s’. In this sense, denying 
addiction the mitigating power of  its associated neurobiological deficits by virtue of  
choice in its initiation is entirely compatible with it being understood as a disease. What 
sets addiction apart is not its characterization as something other than disease, but 
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rather the implicit assumption that it proceeds from a choice. As such, beliefs 
surrounding the nature and circumstances of  that choice have a great deal more to do 
with defining addiction’s status in law than its recognition a legitimate medical 
condition.
The role of  prior fault in sentencing
Prior fault is a mechanism in law by which the offender who claims they lacked the 
necessary mens rea for an offence can nevertheless be held to account by virtue of  
complicity in having brought about that state. As such, in theory it has no role to play 
outside the liability stage of  criminal proceedings. Nevertheless, it is apparent that its 
underlying logic guides impressions of  culpability in sentencing, as we saw leniency 
extended when it was made explicit that initial drug-use was involuntary. Where 
addiction was understood as a voluntarily-contrived circumstance, this was sufficient to 
prevent sentence reduction of  a kind seen when its initiation was involuntary. This 
seemed straightforward enough, but for the fact that it left open the question of  what 
regard was paid to the years of  drug-use which followed. We were then confronted with 
the fact that the age at which that initial choice was made appeared to have minimal 
impact on perceptions of  individual culpability. Ordinarily, juvenile offending is 
considered more leniently than equivalent crimes committed by adults. In Chapter 4, we 
presented scenarios in which the crime was committed in adulthood, but drug-use had 
begun as a juvenile. Fault was seemingly imported from this initial choice to use drugs 
without consideration for the age at which it had occurred.
Additionally, whilst we observed in Chapter 2 and then confirmed in Chapter 4 the 
ability of  iatrogenic origin to forestall the application of  prior fault logic, this picture was 
complicated by the introduction of  what might be considered standard features of  
addiction. We saw in Chapter 4 that whilst the continuous drug-user was treated more 
leniently in the event that their addiction had first developed through circumstances 
beyond their control, this did not appear to be the case where a subsequent attempt had 
been made at abstinence. Iatrogenic origin of  addiction appeared all but irrelevant in 
the case of  the former addict, despite their neurological deficits being described in 
identical terms, whilst a period of  abstinence followed by relapse appeared to similarly 
contradict impressions of  addiction overwhelming the capacity for restraint. 
It is difficult to reconcile these observations. Our initial speculation was that 
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iatrogenic origin removed responsibility for initial drug-use, and that subsequent use was 
considered to some degree involuntary by virtue of  addiction. The addict would 
therefore be seen, in this instance, as without blame for their condition. Yet it would 
seem that evidencing some measure of  control over their continued drug consumption 
by virtue of  a period of  abstinence serves to contradict impressions of  an irresistible 
compulsion to use drugs. Moreover, as we observed in Chapter 5, there is no suggestion 
that alcoholism allows associated intoxication to be considered involuntary, implying 
that whatever power addiction has to excuse drug-taking is, at best, a theoretical 
consideration not evident in practice.
Nevertheless, our Magistrate participants clearly recognize a variety of  compulsion 
in the addict. Over three-quarters disagree with the notion that people punished for 
taking drugs are less likely to take them in future (see Appendix B on page 171), 
suggesting an acceptance of  inevitable repeated use despite adverse consequences. This 
would accord well with their general acceptance of  the disease model of  addiction and 
their rejection of  the notion that it evidences bad moral character. Yet we saw in 
Chapter 5 that such compulsion as they recognize in addiction is insufficient to excuse 
intoxication.
That we see the operation of  prior fault logic at sentencing is in one sense 
unsurprising. It is a logic derived from common intuitions about what is and is not 
blameworthy. In this sense, it is reasonable to expect its operation wherever blame is 
being judged. Yet the way we have seen it applied here, across our studies, is not a 
precise reflection of  its function at the liability stage. In this, there is perhaps a clue as to 
where the balance of  interpretation lies. If  addiction were understood as an adjunct to 
intoxication, we might expect to see the operation of  prior fault logic in sentencing. By 
contrast, likening addiction to an acquired disease of  the mind would arguably forestall 
the operation of  prior fault logic, as it has little relevance in such cases. A finding of  
insane automatism or cognitive insanity will not be undermined by the aetiology of  the 
brain state in question. The observation of  prior fault logic being applied in the 
sentencing of  addicted offenders could therefore reflect the fact that the conflation of  
addiction with intoxication has greater import in these judgments than its disease-like 
neurobiology.
From a neuroscientific perspective, we can say with relative certainty that in some 
people repeated use of  addictive drugs alters brain structure and function, commonly 
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resulting in a failure of  inhibitory control (Baler & Volkow, 2006). From a legal 
perspective, brain damage leading to impulsive behaviour would ordinarily mitigate 
criminal responsibility. Linking these two facts together does not rely on an acceptance 
of  the disease model of  addiction. Considered in this way, the question of  whether or 
not the Magistrates we sampled consider addiction a disease is all but irrelevant in a 
criminal justice context. Except, that is, for the small matter of  the sentencing 
guidelines. As they are presently constructed, it is disease or mental illness which 
mitigates, and the addicted brain state would need to be considered in common with 
these to do likewise.
The relationship between intoxication and addiction at sentencing
Across these studies, we saw examples of  the conflation of  addiction and 
intoxication. In this, perhaps, we see reflected the ambiguity which appears in 
sentencing guidelines with respect to alcohol and drugs. It is clearly expressed that 
culpability for an offence is greater if  the offender was (voluntarily) under the influence 
of  either, but there is nothing to indicate what 'under the influence' encompasses. If  one 
has 'influenced' one's brain into an addicted state through repeated drug administration, 
is it correct to say the state is one of  continuing to be influenced by the drug?
It is unlikely that this is the intended interpretation of  the guidelines, but, that 
having been said, we saw evidence in Chapter 5 that amongst the Magistrates we 
sampled there were those who seemingly took this interpretation. Being an alcoholic was 
sufficient to block leniency which was forthcoming for the casual drinker who committed 
the same crime in the same state of  intoxication, and qualitative responses indicated a 
blurring of  the lines between addicted and intoxicated states (see page 146). In Chapter 
4 we saw that some Magistrates felt that past drug-use aggravated offending, even where 
the addiction it fed had been iatrogenic in origin.
Conversely, in Chapter 5, only 2% of  respondents felt that intoxication aggravated 
offending in the case of  the teetotal defendant, despite the fact that the sentencing 
guidelines include the “commission of  an offence while under the influence of  alcohol 
or drugs” (Sentencing Council, 2017, p. 20) as indicating higher culpability. Even the 
narrowest interpretation of  'under the influence' would have to include the direct, acute 
effects of  consuming alcohol. Yet the vast majority found something in the example of  
the teetotaller to balance against the aggravating factor of  intoxication. Indeed, fully one 
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in five Magistrates reduced the teetotaller's sentence on learning that he was drunk at 
the time of  the offence, and approaching one in six did likewise in the case of  the casual 
drinker. For the alcoholic, it was 1 in 50.
It does appear counterintuitive that intoxication should sometimes mitigate when 
voluntary, but fails to do so when some degree of  involuntariness is suggested. Yet we 
saw something similar in Chapter 4, where addiction of  iatrogenic origin was more 
frequently seen as aggravating than that of  autogenic origin. It would seem that, where 
information is limited and available guidance absent or at best ambiguous, judgments 
can be inconsistent even across identical circumstances.
Should addiction be included in sentencing guidelines?
Intoxication is already included in the guidelines and is clearly stated as a factor 
indicating increased seriousness, yet we saw in Chapter 5 that there were circumstances 
under which it inspired greater leniency in sentencing. This serves to illustrate a 
potential problem with including addiction in the guidelines, even were it possible to 
specify its generally mitigating or aggravating nature. Even though intoxication is 
specifically mentioned and directly stated to aggravate offending, there are clearly other 
factors being taken into account which balance against or supersede this direction. 
Whilst it is not immediately obvious how this is in keeping with the guidelines as written, 
in the absence of  further insight into how they are interpreted in practice we cannot 
exclude the possibility that our respondents were acting in a manner consistent with 
their understanding of  them. Without a clear picture of  how the guidelines inform 
judgment in general sentencing practice, it is difficult to predict what effect, if  any, even 
explicit direction on the matter of  addiction would have.
Sentencing guidelines have the goal of  consistency in sentencing across different 
courts, but they also have a role to play in individual Magistrates' internal consistency. 
All of  our participants made their decisions in line with their personal intuitions, with 
reference to the guidelines. Prompting reconsideration of  the details by disrupting 
automatic processing led some to change their minds, but neither their own knowledge 
nor the guidelines had changed. The only thing which can have changed was their 
assessment of  which facts were more or less pertinent to judgment. The inclusion of  
addiction in sentencing guidelines would likely prove beneficial in that regard, as it 
would highlight it as a factor meriting consideration.
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We saw across our studies examples of  sentencing behaviour which ran counter to 
intuition. We saw in Chapter 4, for example, that iatrogenic addiction could attract 
harsher sentencing than autogenic. We observed in Chapter 5 that the alcoholic was 
more frequently denied treatment than the teetotaller. We found, across our studies, that 
mitigation in respect of  neurological impairment was in part dependent on the historic 
cause of  that impairment.
Clearly, there is scope for opinions to diverge on how to approach these admittedly 
thorny issues, and it seems reasonable to suggest that this is in part the consequence of  
common decision-making processes. We can use a limited number of  cues to judgment 
in the event that they conform to a common archetype. If  it walks like a duck, and is 
addicted to heroin, it is likely also a criminal. Where we disrupted archetypical 
impressions by, for example, introducing an iatrogenic origin of  addiction, a greater 
proportion of  respondents increased the length of  the sentence they had given than 
when addiction was, stereotypically, autogenic (see Chapter 4). This suggests a tendency 
towards reconsideration, perhaps taking in a wider array of  factors, when presented 
with reason to do so. Challenging presumptions has the effect of  prompting 
reassessment. In this way, the mention of  addiction in sentencing guidelines would draw 
it into consideration as a factor. It would also have the distinct advantage of  clearly 
delineating it from intoxication, whilst clarifying its position as separate and 
distinguishable for 'mental illness or disease'.
Should addiction mitigate or aggravate?
The question of  whether addiction should be taken to mitigate or aggravate 
responsibility may appear to be directly tied to its contentious status as a disease, but our 
findings would tend to throw that assumption into doubt. It seems clear that the wider 
circumstances of  addiction can promote either leniency or severity in sentencing, and in 
many cases both simultaneously, despite broad agreement that addiction is a disease. 
Indeed, whilst those who agreed that addiction is a disease were in general more likely to 
reduce their sentences in light of  novel factors than those who did not, they were also 
generally more likely to increase them (see page 112). The resulting impression is one of  
greater subtlety in these judgments than can be captured by the presumptive dichotomy 
of  disease or moral failing.
As outlined in the Introduction, there are two potential routes to mitigation of  
161
criminal responsibility by virtue of  addiction. Firstly, compulsive craving may be offered 
to explain intoxication as having been involuntary, in keeping with Husak’s (1999; 2000) 
likening of  addiction to duress. In addition to some of  the difficulties Husak outlines 
with this conception, there is the somewhat limiting factor that this would apply only 
where offences were committed whilst intoxicated. Denying the voluntary nature of  
intoxication may permit it to excuse, but only in the tiny fraction of  cases in which 
intoxication was severe enough to conceivably mitigate offending in the first place. 
Secondly, addiction might promote leniency by virtue of  being an acquired brain state 
with neurologically-driven behavioural consequences. Altered motivation and impaired 
self-control are common characteristics of  the addict which might be advanced to 
reduce blameworthiness for their actions (Morse, 2017).
One barrier here is that for addiction to inform sentencing, it would first need to be 
accurately identified. If  the guidelines directed addiction be treated in some special way, 
it would be all but useless in the absence of  some further direction as to what should be 
recognized as addiction. Though we are arguably approaching a reasonable expertise in 
identifying the relevant neural markers, we are still a long way from any kind of  rapid, 
straightforward test of  the kind necessary for in situ courtroom categorization. Next to 
this, perhaps the most relevant tool would be the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of  
Mental Disorders (APA, 2013), which specifically excludes ‘addiction’ as a diagnostic 
term in part “because of  its uncertain definition” (p. 485). We cannot rely on the self-
report of  addiction, because if  it was taken to be aggravating then defendants would 
take steps to conceal it and if  it served to mitigate then the genuine claims would likely 
be outnumbered by the false.
Given this, it would be advisable to incorporate mention of  addiction into the 
sentencing guidelines without specific reference to its aggravating or mitigating nature. 
This would highlight it as a factor worthy of  consideration in the synthesis of  judgment, 
whilst allowing that judgment to proceed intuitively in line with expertise.
Future directions
There are a number of  dimensions along which the studies presented here could be 
profitably extended. In the first instance, we explored only two drugs: heroin and 
alcohol. There are any number of  others. A drug of  the psychostimulant class, such as 
cocaine, would provide for an interesting comparison. Like heroin, it is illegal, but in its 
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relationship to criminal behaviour it has more in common with alcohol (Boles & Miotto, 
2003). Whereas the narcotic effect of  heroin provides little scope for criminal endeavour 
whilst experiencing its acute effects, cocaine is more akin to alcohol, in that there is some 
evidence of  an increased propensity for criminal behaviour whilst under its acute 
influence (Miller, Gold, & Mahler, 1991; Chermack & Blow, 2002). Replicating the study 
presented in Chapter 5 with cocaine as the intoxicant would be one approach to follow 
in this vein, where it would be interesting to see if  the casual cocaine-user's intoxication 
moved some Magistrates to show similar leniency to that extended in the example of  the 
casual drinker.
Equally, the legal drug we explored was alcohol, but this is not the only legal route to 
addiction. As outlined in the Introduction (see page 3), the number of  illegal drug users 
who first began using legal, prescription drugs is growing (McCabe et al., 2017). In a 
disturbingly-high proportion of  instances, these drugs will have been legitimately 
prescribed to them, often while still a juvenile (Lankenau et al., 2012). This has much in 
common with the form of  iatrogenic addiction that we used in our studies, and poses 
questions surrounding juvenile choice which we were not able to adequately answer 
here. Amongst these is what measure of  excuse is extended to a child who became 
addicted to opiates by following the instructions of  their doctor to take opiates. Given 
the complex role of  choice in the context of  addiction, this presents an interesting route 
of  inquiry and merits future study.
Where we attempted, in Chapter 3, to introduce juvenile choice, we found that age 
of  first drug-use appeared all but irrelevant in the terms that we described. Our age 
manipulation seemed to make a minimal difference to judgments of  responsibility, as the 
offender whose addiction began at 15 was considered in much the same regard as the 
offender whose addiction began at 20. Whilst our impression of  the impact of  choice in 
initial addiction has evolved over the course of  these studies and no longer plays an 
exclusive role in understanding sentencing judgments, it remains clears that it is a 
powerful determinant. In our first study, the Woznicki's sufferer was blameless for their 
neurological deficits, yet virtually equivalent leniency was forthcoming in the case of  the 
addict when it was explained that they had no choice in the initiation of  their addiction. 
Clearly, initial choice is important, so the observation that the juvenile status of  the 
individual making that choice seemed of  little relevance is somewhat surprising. It would 
be interesting to probe the point at which the relevance of  youth was observable in its 
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operation. Our age manipulation might be repeated contrasting a 20-year-old's choice 
with that of  a 10-year-old. Whilst a 10-year-old using drugs might seem unlikely, it is by 
no means unheard of  (Gilvarry & McArdle, 2004; McKegany et al., 2005), and an 
extreme case may elicit a response where an all-too-common one failed to.
We might also legitimately ask what effect variations in the nature of  the crime 
committed might have on judgments. We saw in Chapter 3 that the vulnerability of  the 
victim, though described identically across conditions, was mentioned as a factor in 
sentencing deliberations with much greater frequency in the Heroin condition. 
Certainly, a particularly vulnerable victim should be taken into account in determining 
the seriousness of  the offence, but we can only speculate as to which factors mediated its 
relevance here. Attention was given to a particular offence characteristic more 
frequently in one instance than another, despite the offence in question being identically 
described. It can only be offender characteristics which mediate this effect, as it was only 
this which varied between conditions.
In a sense this is unsurprising, as it is understandable enough to allow an individual's 
past behaviour to colour perceptions of  their present actions. A person's actions may be 
understood very differently in light of  multiple previous convictions, or being of  long-
standing good character. Yet these are conscious associations in the minds of  sentencers, 
whereas what we observed in our studies does not lend itself  well to this interpretation. 
Rather, there is the suggestion that the entrance of  salient factors into conscious 
consideration is gated by superficially unrelated factors operating outside awareness. 
Developing future studies with a limited number of  potentially salient cues to judgment 
would allow us to focus in on which offender characteristics make it more or less likely that 
certain offence characteristics are considered.
In a broader vein, we have seen multiple examples across these studies sentencing 
decisions which ran counter to both intuition and prediction. In some cases, it has been 
difficult to reconcile these decisions with the sentencing guidelines from which they 
would ideally be being drawn. Exactly how Magistrates interpret and apply the 
guidance with which they are provided is an under-explored question. Although there 
are examples of  empirical work examining the sentencing guidelines in their application 
(Raine & Dunstan, 2009; Roberts, Hough, & Ashworth, 2011), a lack of  access to the 
necessary data limits their number (Ashworth & Roberts, 2013). It was only as recently 
as 2010 that a statutory requirement was placed on the newly formed Sentencing 
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Council to monitor the use of  its guidelines. Prior to this, the two statutory bodies which 
preceded it had neither the mandate nor the resources. The Sentencing Council 
discharged this monitoring duty by means of  a survey of  Judges’ sentencing decisions in 
Crown Court cases. To date, no equivalent study has been attempted in Magistrates’ 
Court. As a result, we know comparatively little of  how the guidelines influence the 
synthesis of  sentencing decisions for the kind of  low-level crimes which make up the vast 
majority of  cases.
This gap in our understanding is a reason for hesitancy in recommending the 
inclusion of  addiction into the sentencing guidelines, but the format of  the studies 
presented here, appropriately modified, may provide some answers. Rather than varying 
the offender characteristics, we could develop conditions in which respondents received 
different versions of  draft guidelines on addiction. This would allow us to examine both 
how addiction would be interpreted in the absence of  direction regarding its 
aggravating or mitigating nature, and whether guidance as to its mitigating or 
aggravating nature would in fact direct sentencing decisions.
Lastly, whilst the studies related here offer a window onto sentencing, there is much 
that remains obscured about this vital process. Whether we seek to correct behaviour, 
protect society, deter others from a similar path, or simply desire revenge for harms 
done, these are matters which are addressed at sentencing. Yet, there are impediments to 
discovering how these influences resolve in practice, amongst the greatest being that, in 
the majority of  cases, the reasoning behind sentencing decisions goes unrecorded. 
Studying sentencing requires either, as in the studies presented here, deriving artificial 
models of  sentencing practice, or gathering information from genuine cases. There is no 
requirement placed on Magistrates to record their reasoning in deciding one sentence 
over another. As a result, very few sentencing judgments are recorded in any significant 
detail, and understanding all of  the factors which went into them would require being 
present in person ion the day to note the details. Short of  this, what nuance Magistrates 
expressed in their sentencing practice would be known only to them.
Yet we are rapidly approaching a point in time at which this need not necessarily be 
the case. At present, there is an active move towards digitizing many aspects of  the 
criminal justice system. Much of  what would previously have been printed evidence is 
now shared electronically, and it is not uncommon to see Magistrates consulting the 
sentencing guidelines on their tablets. All new recruits to the Magistracy are now 
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required to be proficient in information technology. As these changes come into effect, a 
fascinating opportunity presents itself. With relatively little effort, it would be possible to 
implement an interactive version of  the sentencing guidelines. They already prompt a 
sequence of  steps, beginning with an initial determination of  the sentencing threshold 
which has been crossed, before accounting for indicators of  greater or lesser seriousness. 
There is even a non-exhaustive list of  potential factors which might serve to aggravate 
or mitigate offending. Magistrates are directed to follow this process, summing these 
factors as they go. It would be relatively straightforward to develop a digital version of  
the guidelines which recorded these steps. This would be a useful method for 
Magistrates to keep track of  multiple factors at once in their deliberations, but would 
also provide insight into how the guidelines are used in practice. 
Magistrates could select what they considered to be the relevant factors as they 
progressed, or enter others which were not suggested, before recording these along with 
their final sentencing decision. This would mean that a record would be kept not just of  
the sentence an offender received, but why they received it. The effect of  this would be 
to reveal a great deal of  what is presently obscured in sentencing decisions and permit 
light-touch monitoring of  guideline efficacy. In turn, this would provide an invaluable 
resource for evolving sentencing policy approaches. Perhaps most importantly, it would 
be relatively straightforward to implement and would almost certainly drive long-term 
efficiency savings more than sufficient to offset the cost of  its adoption.
The studies presented here have provided new insights into Magistrates’ perceptions 
surrounding addiction, intoxication and prior fault by analyzing and interpreting 
approximately 1000 sentencing decisions. Across England and Wales, somewhere in the 
region of  1.6 million such decisions are made each year (National Audit Office, 2016). 
To capture a sense of  the reasoning behind even a small fraction of  these would have 
profound implications both for our understanding of  criminal justice and for our 
approach to its practical application.
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Conclusion
Addiction is seen as a disease by the majority of  Magistrates, yet this does not 
appear to operate as a driving factor behind sentencing decisions. There is evidence of  a 
much more complicated picture here, in which addiction makes salient certain ancillary 
characteristics of  crimes and obscures others from consideration. Much of  what we have 
seen suggests that this is not a consciously-adopted process, as it frequently contradicts 
stated aims and beliefs. The neurobehavioural hallmarks of  addiction are taken to 
mitigate offending, even when explicitly stemming from drug-use, yet addiction itself  is 
associated with harsher punishment. This apparent contradiction can be attributed in 
part to the type of  intuitive decision-making processes which proliferate in the absence 
of  clear guidance, informed by implicit moral biases operating largely outside conscious 
awareness.
 Given the high number of  cases involving addicted offenders, there is a clear and 
pressing need to address addiction in the sentencing guidelines. That it should be 
included as a mitigating factor derives not only from our current neuroscientific insight 
into addiction’s impact on the brain and the resulting behavioural impairment, but also 
from Magistrates’ demonstrated propensity towards leniency in respect of  those same 
factors when salient in other guises. Even where they are attributed to habitual drug-use, 
and even when there is no clear excuse for beginning that use, the neurocognitive 
sequelae of  addiction serve to mitigate responsibility for offending. It is only when 
named as addiction that they do not.
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Appendix A
Principles
Addressing matters to be taken into account in sentencing, Section 142 (1) of  the 
Criminal Justice Act 2003 lays out that:
Any court dealing with an offender in respect of his offence must have regard 
to the following purposes of sentencing—
(a)the punishment of offenders,
(b)the reduction of crime (including its reduction by deterrence),
(c)the reform and rehabilitation of offenders,
(d)the protection of the public, and
(e)the making of reparation by offenders to persons affected by their 
offences.
There is no suggestion that any one principle is to be held above the others, nor that 
each should be given equal weight. As such, Magistrates are equipped with some 
latitude in determining the correct balance of  these principles as they should be applied 
in sentencing a given defendant.
In order to gain a sense of  the relative importance Magistrates place on the five 
principles in their general sentencing practice, we asked one cohort of  participants 
(N=290) to complete a set of  pre-experimental ratings. Respondents were shown the five 
principles, presented sequentially in random order, and asked to rate the importance of  
each in relation to their general sentencing practice dealing with adult offenders.
Table A1 - Importance ratings and corresponding percentage values.
Mean ratings are represented in Figure A1 and response patterns are represented in 
Figure A2.
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Figure A1 - Mean rating of importance of five principles of justice (error bars 
+/- 1 SEM).
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Figure A2 - Response distribution of rating of importance of five principles of 
justice.
By comparing individual respondents’ ratings of  the five principles we determined 
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the ranked order of  importance for each respondent, giving us an idea of  how each 
respondent balances the five principles in relation to one another in their general 
sentencing practice. This has the benefit of  controlling for variation in linguistic 
expression of  value (i.e. one respondent’s definition of  ‘very important’ may be 
equivalent to another respondent’s definition of  ‘extremely important’), but also allowed 
the calculation of  weighted rank scores. For each response set, the rank position of  each 
principle was given a score (1st position=5, 2nd position=4, 3rd position=3, etc.). Where 
two or more principles were indicated as being of  equal importance, the rank scores for 
those positions were summed and divided equally between them (e.g. where two 
principles were ranked in equal first place, the 5 and 4 points available for 1st and 2nd 
place were summed and divided equally, giving each 4.5 points). The higher the value, 
the higher the relative importance the principle has in relation to the other principles. 
The sum of  these rank scores (α), divided by the total number of  participants (n), gave a 
standardized relative importance score across groups (ω):
ω = αn∑
This step permitted the scores calculated here to be directly compared to those 
calculated from ranking data across individual chapters by accounting for variation in 
group size.
In general sentencing practice, the principle most likely to be placed first in order of  
importance, ahead of  the other four principles, was Protection of  the Public. Almost 
half  of  all respondents (49%; n=141) considered Protection of  the Public to be of  
greatest importance when making sentencing decisions9. The principle second most 
frequently placed in a position of  prominence was Rehabilitation, with 38% of  
respondents citing it as the most important principle (see Table A2).
9 Please note that stating of  principles as equally important resulted in joint placement. For example, 
indicating that Protection and Punishment were both ‘Extremely’ important would assign a score of  
100% to each and both principles would be ranked as occupying joint 1st place. For this reason, the sum 
total of  ratings expressed as percentages may be higher than 100%.   
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Table A2 - Frequency and relative ranking of importance in sentencing 
decisions of the five principles of justice (modal rank for each principle in bold).
Label %
Not at all 0
Not very 20
Somewhat 40
Quite 60
Very 80
Extremely 100
Rank Principle 1st place %
1 Protection 141 49
2 Rehabilitation 111 38
3 Reduction 84 29
4 Punishment 55 19
5 Reparation 54 19
Rank
Principle 1st  % 2nd  % 3rd  % 4th  % 5th  %
Protection 141 (49) 63 (22) 43 (15) 25 (9) 18 (6)
Rehabilitation 111 (38) 47 (16) 57 (20) 45 (16) 30 (10)
Reduction 84 (29) 66 (23) 55 (19) 50 (17) 35 (12)
Punishment 55 (19) 43 (15) 78 (27) 70 (24) 44 (15)
Reparation 54 (19) 47 (16) 44 (15) 58 (20) 87 (30)
 1
At the other end of  the scale, both Punishment and Reparation were judged the 
most important principle in the least number of  instances. The majority of  respondents 
ranked Punishment third or below, whilst Reparation was most commonly judged to be 
the least important principle. This picture is reflected in the standardized scores (see 
Table A3).
Table A3 - Standardized scores of relative importance of the five principles of 
justice.
In placing Protection of  the Public ahead of  all other principles, Magistrates reflect 
the attitude of  the public themselves. When asked about the importance of  the five 
principles, 96% of  the general public consider Protection to be of  high importance 
(Hough, Roberts, Jacobson, Moon, & Steel, 2009, p. 13). However, 85% of  the public 
consider that Punishment is of  equivalent importance, whereas our sample of  
Magistrates indicated that they considered it among the least important principles in 
their general sentencing practice, of  lower relevance than either Rehabilitation or the 
Reduction of  offending.
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Appendix B
Opinions
One cohort of  participants (N=274) was additionally presented with a series of  attitude 
questions designed to probe the personal opinions of  Magistrates on aspects of  drug-use 
and criminality. Each participant was presented with nine statements, randomly 
ordered, and asked to express the measure of  their agreement or disagreement with 
each statement on a 7-point Likert scale:
These responses were scored with agreement as positive values (e.g. slightly 
agree=+1, moderately agree=+2, etc.), disagreement as negative values (e.g. slightly 
disagree=-1, moderately disagree=-2, etc.) and neutral answers scored as zero.
The nine opinion statements which were presented are shown in Table B1 and 
response patterns are presented in Figure B1 on page 172.
Table B1 - Opinion statements.
Rank Principle Score
1 Protection 3.6
2 Rehabilitation 3.2
3 Reduction 3.0
4 Punishment 2.6
5 Reparation 2.5
15.0
Label %
Not at all 0
Not very 20
Somewhat 40
Quite 60
Very 80
Extremely 100
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
Rank
Principle 1st  % 2nd  % 3rd  % 4th  % 5th  %
Protection 141 (49) 63 (22) 43 (15) 25 (9) 18 (6)
Rehabilitation 111 (38) 47 (16) 57 (20) 45 (16) 30 (10)
Reduction 84 (29) 66 (23) 55 (19) 50 (17) 35 (12)
Punishment 55 (19) 43 (15) 78 (27) 70 (24) 44 (15)
Reparation 54 (19) 47 (16) 44 (15) 58 (20) 87 (30)
Code                                                     Statement
A Addiction is a disease
B Drug addiction is evidence of a lack of moral character
C All addicts must at one time have chosen to start taking drugs
D All addictive drugs should be illegal
E A drug addict is more likely than not to be a criminal
F All harmful drugs should be illegal
G A criminal is more likely than not to be a drug addict
H People punished for taking drugs are less likely to take them in the future 
I Most people are oﬀered illegal drugs at some point
Drug addiction is evidence 
of a lack of moral character
All addicts must at one 
time have chosen to start 
taking drugs
People punished for taking 
drugs are less likely to take 
them in future
 1
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Addiction is a disease
Drug addiction is evidence of 
a lack of moral character
All addicts must at one time have 
chosen to start taking drugs
All addictive drugs should be illegal
A drug addict is more likely than 
not to be a criminal
All harmful drugs should be illegal
A criminal is more likely than 
not to be a drug addict
People punished for taking drugs 
are less likely to take them in future
Most people are offered illegal 
drugs at some point
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I
M=1.4
Mdn=2
M=-1.3
Mdn=-2
M=1.1
Mdn=2
M=0.2
Mdn=0
M=0.6
Mdn=1
M=0.6
Mdn=1
M=-0.3
Mdn=0
M=-1.6
Mdn=-2
M=0.3
Mdn=1
Disagree Agree
Disagree Agree
Disagree Agree
Disagree Agree
Disagree Agree
Disagree Agree
Disagree Agree
Disagree Agree
Disagree Agree
Figure B1 - Statement evaluation.
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Overall, Magistrates expressed strongest agreement with statement A (‘Addiction is a 
disease’) and statement C (‘All addicts must at one time have chosen to start taking 
drugs’). The strongest disagreement in evidence was with statement B (‘Drug addiction 
is evidence of  a lack of  moral character’) and statement H (‘People punished for taking 
drugs are less likely to take them in future’).
Disease and Moral character. A sizeable majority of  Magistrates (76%) 
expressed agreement with statement A (‘Addiction is a disease’). Of  those, 73% (n=151) 
expressed disagreement with statement B (‘Drug addiction is evidence of  a lack of  moral 
character’), whilst 11% (n=23) agree (see Table B2)
Table B2 - Comparison of agreement with statements A and B.
Addiction is a disease
Agree Disagree
Drug addiction is evidence 
of a lack of moral character
Agree 23 12
Disagree 151 13
Age n Reoffending estimate (%) SD
Using 137 70.5 (19.0)
Abstinent 141 62.2 (15.9)
Autogenic Iatrogenic
n Estimate (%) SD n
Estimate 
(%) SD U z p
Cont 34 71.9 (20.6) 34 70.6 (21.3) 564.5 -0.17 ns
Quit 36 62.3 (17.2) 35 58.8 (13.1) 511.5 -1.38 ns
2quit 35 63.3 (14.7) 35 64.3 (18.0) 593.0 -0.23 ns
QuitFail 36 68.6 (12.8) 33 71.1 (21.1) 477.0 -1.43 ns
 1
It appears as if  disagre me t with the disease model of  addiction does not go hand 
in hand with an assumption that addiction is thereby a moral failure. Certainly, those 
who agreed with the statement ‘addiction is a disease’ were significantly more likely to 
disagree with the statement ‘drug addiction is evidence of  a lack of  moral 
character’ [OR=4.1, X2=14.8, 95%CI=1.93-8.89, p<.001], but the presumptive 
corollary does not appear to be true. That is, whilst 12% (n=33) of  respondents 
disagreed with the statement ‘addiction is a disease’, this did not in itself  equate with a 
tendency towards viewing addiction in moral terms. Of  those 33 respondents, 13 (39%) 
additionally disagreed with addiction being evidence of  moral failing, whilst 8 (24%) 
remained neutral on the issue.
 Ultimately, then, only 4% (n=12) of  all respondents in the sample (N=274) both 
disagreed with the conceptualization of  addiction as a disease and at the same time 
agreed with the suggestion that it was evidence of  moral failure. Almost twice as many 
respondents (8%; n=23) disagreed with both statements.
There is the suggestion here, then, that the notion of  moral outrage expressed 
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towards addiction as a failure of  will or conscience does not necessarily sit in opposition 
to its conception as a disease. Rather, there would appear to be scope for strong opinion 
in one regard in the absence of  any strong opinion in the other, and moreover the 
potential for them to overlap.
Indeed, those that expressed neutrality in respect of  addiction’s disease status (n=34) 
were significantly more likely to disagree with its being evidence of  moral failing than 
they were to agree [X2=9.78, p=.003], and whilst the majority of  respondents (76%; 
n=207) agreed with the characterization of  addiction as a disease, more than one in ten 
of  those who did so (11%; n=23) also expressed agreement with addiction being 
evidence of  moral failing. Only a very small proportion of  respondents (4%) were 
neutral in respect of  both statements.
Whilst a Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient indicated a significant 
negative correlation between agreement with the disease model and the moral failing 
perspective [N=274, r=-0.29, p<.001], the weakness of  this correlation in combination 
with the preceding findings suggests that any presumptive dichotomy of  moral failing 
versus brain disease is unlikely to bear up under scrutiny.
People punished (H). The most pronounced opinion was that offered to the 
statement ‘people punished for taking drugs are less likely to take them in future’. Fully 
77% of  respondents disagreed with this statement and nearly half  did so in the strongest 
possible terms. In contrast, only 12% of  respondents agreed with the statement, not one 
of  whom did so in strong terms. Although debate continues over the value of  deterrence 
as a factor in sentencing practice, it would appear that its utility in respect of  drug-
fuelled crime is a calculation which a preponderance of  Magistrates have already made.
The proportion of  respondents disagreeing with the efficacy of  punishment in 
reducing future drug use did not exhibit significant variation in line with acceptance or 
rejection of  the disease model of  addiction [OR=1.4, X2=0.3, 95%CI=0.4-5.0, p=.59] 
(see Table B3).
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Table B3 - Comparison of agreement with statements A and H.
Addiction is a disease
Agree Disagree
Drug addiction is evidence 
of a lack of moral character
Agree 23 12
Disagree 151 13
Addiction is a disease
Agree Disagree
All addicts must at one 
time have chosen to start 
taking drugs
Agree 149 19
Disagree 42 7
Addiction is a disease
Agree Disagree
People punished for taking 
drugs are less likely to take 
them in future
Agree 27 3
Disagree 159 25
 1
Choice (C). The majority of  Magistrates (71%) agree with the statement ‘All 
addicts must at one time have chosen to start taking drugs’, contrasted against only 19% 
who disagree.
Separation along the lines of  agreement with the disease model of  addiction 
demonstrates that 69% of  respondents express agreement with both statements (see 
Table B4). Which is to say that over two-thirds of  Magistrates conceive of  addiction as, 
in one sense at least, a disease of  choice.
Table B4 - Comparison of agreement with statements A and C.
Addiction is a disease
Agree Disagre
Drug addiction is evidence 
of a lack of moral character
Agree 23 12
Disagree 151 13
Addiction is a disease
Agree Disagree
All addicts must at one 
time have chosen to start 
taking drugs
Agree 149 19
Disagree 42 7
Addiction is a disease
Agree Disagree
People punished for taking 
drugs are less likely to take 
them in future
Agree 27 3
Disagree 159 25
 1
However, acceptance or rejection of  the disease model of  addiction did not appear 
to be related to whether initial drug use was understood to be a choice [OR=1.3, 
X2=0.32, 95%CI=0.5-3.3, p=.57].
Overall. There is broad agre ment amongst Magistrates that addiction is a disease. 
In the wider sense, then, this model is demonstrably influencing understanding amongst 
Magistrates. The proportion of  Magistrates agreeing with the statement ‘addiction is a 
disease’ was 76%.
However, what is revealed in these results is the clear absence of  a simple dichotomy 
in the understanding of  addiction. Amongst those who agreed in the strongest possible 
terms that addiction is a disease (n=86), 75% also agree with the notion of  choice being 
a relevant component in first drug-use, whilst 11% additionally characterize addiction as 
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evidence of  moral failure.
There is an evolving presumption in much of  the recent literature touching on the 
issue of  addiction that the disease model sits in antithesis to the conception of  drug 
dependency as a voluntarily self-induced condition indicative of  weak or absent morality 
(Heyman, 2009, 2013; Lewis, 2015). These findings on the opinions held by acting 
Magistrates provide strong evidence against the existence of  such a relationship, 
suggesting at the very least a multi-dimensionality to these opinions sufficient to 
accommodate factors which, superficially, appear to be mutually countervailing.
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Appendix C
Odds ratios
The relative odds of  receiving an altered sentence in one condition over that of  
receiving an altered sentence in a second condition can be calculated using the formula:
where, (a) and (b) are the number of  sentence changers and non-changers, 
respectively, in condition 1 and (c) and (d) the number of  sentence changers and non-
changers, respectively, in condition 2.
Resulting Odds Ratios that are either greater than or less than 1 are indicative of  an 
association between the information provided at a particular stage and the likelihood of  
sentence change (an Odds Ratio of  1 is indicative of  no association).
To determine the statistical significance of  calculated Odds Ratios, we additionally 
determined 95% confidence intervals using the formula:
Odds ratios were pooled and weighted averages obtained using the Cochran-
Mantel-Haenszel method:
where ai, bi, ci and di are the number of  participants in a two-by-two table in the ith 
iteration of  a stratified analysis and ni is the total number of  participants in that 
iteration.
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Appendix D
Equiprobability rank calculations
Two variants of  equiprobability coding were employed to allow the ranked 
importance of  the five principles of  justice to be compared across conditions, between 
studies, and with the ranking of  principles in general sentencing practice (see Appendix 
A). Rank scores were calculated as the reverse of  ranked importance (e. g. 1st place=5 
points, 2nd place=4 points, 3rd place=3 points, etc.).
As outlined in Appendix A (see page 167), when rating the importance of  the 
individual principles in general sentencing practice, it was possible for our participants 
to submit two or more principles as being of  equal importance. In this event, rank scores 
were averaged. For instance, where two principles were ranked in equal first place, the 5 
points for 1st place and the 4 points for 2nd place would be summed and shared across 
the two principles, giving each 4.5 points. The next highest ranked principle would then 
be assigned 3rd place, receiving an associated 3 points. In this way, the total rank scores 
for any one response set totalled 15.
In chapters 3, 4 and 5, participants were asked to specify which of  the five principles 
were at the forefront of  their consideration in reaching their sentencing decision. In the 
event that they selected more than one principle (as they most frequently did), they were 
asked to rank them. Where three or fewer principles were selected, those omitted shared 
the points available for the remaining positions. For example, if  three principles were 
selected and ranked in 1st, 2nd and 3rd position, those principles which had not been 
selected would occupy the 4th and 5th ranks, sharing the 2 and 1 points available for 
those positions and receiving 1.5 points each.
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Appendix E
Ethics and sampling
All studies presented in this thesis were conducted in accordance with the British 
Psychological Society’s Code of  Ethics and Conduct. Informed consent was collected in 
advance and all respondents were debriefed and given the opportunity to withdraw their 
responses following participation. The study protocols were approved by the Research 
Ethics Committee of  the University of  Sussex. Ethical approval for the study presented 
in Chapter 2 was extended by the University of  Sussex School of  Psychology Research 
Ethics Officer under project code 11109. Data collection for this study took place 
between January and March 2012. The online survey was hosted on the Qualtrics 
platform (Provost, Utah). Cards inviting participants to take part in the study were 
distributed at London’s Westminster, Hammersmith and Richmond Courts, and a link 
to the study was also hosted in the secure Members Area of  the Magistrates’ Association 
(MA) website. The studies presented in Chapters 3, 4 and 5 were approved by the 
Sciences and Technologies Cross-Schools Research Ethics Committee of  the University 
of  Sussex under project codes ER/NS249/1 and ER/NS249/2. Sampling took place 
between May and September 2016. The studies were hosted on the same Qualtrics 
platform. Links to the studies were distributed via e-mail in the MA’s monthly member 
bulletin and, in common with the first study conducted, also accessible via the Members 
Area of  the MA website.
The demographic information collected from our participants was limited to their 
sex and age, but we can offer that in these two respects our samples closely reflected the 
population of  Magistrates as a whole. Our participants included both sexes in 
approximately equal proportions and were, in the majority, between 60 and 70 years of  
age.
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Appendix F
Bayes Factor calculations
All Bayes Factor calculations performed in the studies presented were conducted 
using the Dienes Bayes calculator (Dienes, 2012). Where possible, prior probability 
distributions were derived from observed effects in previous experiments. In the absence 
of  previous empirical research, priors were derived through examination of  findings in 
related areas. Full details of  the probability distributions employed for each chapter are 
outlined in the associated appendix. Bayes factor interpretation and presentation adopt 
the approach outlined in Dienes (2015; 2016). Bayes Factors are presented in the format 
Bx(y, z), where x is the distribution employed, y is the modal value of  the distribution and z 
is the standard deviation. For instance, BH(0, 5) describes a half-normal distribution with a 
mode of  0 and and standard deviation of  5 (see Figure F1).
0 5 10 15
1 SD
Figure F1 - Example prior probability distribution for Bayes Factor calculation.
Table F1 is provided as a guide to Bayes Factor interpretation. For a more detailed 
account of  Bayes Factor calculation and interpretation, see Dienes (2014). Where 
appropriate, Bayes Factors are presented in standard form.
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Table F1 - Classification Scheme for the Bayes Factor (as proposed by Jeffreys 
(1961) and adapted by Wagenmakers et al. (2011)).
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Appendix G
Bayes calculations for Chapter 2
For Bayes Factor calculations at Stages 3 and 4, the sample mean was taken as the 
natural log of  the calculated odds ratio, whilst the predicted population value and 
associated standard deviation were derived from the observed effect at Stage 2. The 
prior probability distribution was modelled as a half-normal (p=0) with a standard 
deviation of  1.16, the natural log of  the calculated odds ratio at Stage 2 (see Figure G1). 
Bayes Factor calculations for estimates of  pooled odds ratios derived standard error 
assuming a fixed-effects model.
0 1 2 3 4
1.16
1 SD
Figure G1 - Prior probability distribution employed for Bayes Factor 
calculations at Stages 3 and 4.
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Appendix H
Bayes calculations for Chapter 3
Percentage change.
The study presented in Chapter 2 gave a difference of  10.28% in mean sentence 
reduction between the Heroin and Woznicki’s conditions (see page 49). Bayes factor 
calculations for the difference in mean percentage sentence reduction between the 
Heroin and Woznicki’s Aetiology conditions in Chapter 3 were based on this value. The 
prior probability distribution was defined as a normal with a mean of  10.28 and a 
standard deviation of  5.14 (see Figure H1).
-10 0 10 20 30
5.14 10.28
1 SD
Figure H1 - Prior probability distribution of difference in mean percentage 
reduction between Heroin and Woznicki’s Aetiologies.
Both the Heroin-Woznicki’s and the Woznicki’s-Heroin conditions replaced one of  
the two components distinguishing the Heroin condition from the Woznicki’s condition. 
Anticipating that any effect of  such replacement would fall mid-way between the 
observed results in the Heroin and Woznicki’s conditions, the prior probability for 
subsequent comparisons was determined as a normal distribution with a mean of  11.6 
(half  the observed difference between the Heroin and Woznicki’s conditions), with an 
associated standard deviation of  5.8 (see Figure H2).
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-10 0 10 20 30 40
5.8 11.6 23.2
1 SD
Figure H2 - Prior probability distribution of difference in mean percentage 
reduction between Heroin/Woznicki’s Aetiologies and mixed Aetiologies.
Odds.
Bayes Factor calculations with respect to odds of  sentence change employed priors 
derived from the observed effect in Chapter 2. The prior probability distribution was 
modelled as a half-normal with a mode of  0 and a standard deviation of  1.16 (see 
Figure H3). Bayes Factor calculations for estimates of  pooled odds ratios derived 
standard error assuming a fixed-effects model.
0 1 2 3 4
1.16
1 SD
Figure H3 - Prior probability distribution employed for Bayes Factor 
calculations relating to odds of sentence alteration.
185
Appendix I
Bayes calculations for Chapter 4
Odds of  sentence reduction
Bayes Factor calculations on the odds of  sentence reduction employed a prior 
probability distribution derived from the observed odds of  sentence reduction by virtue 
of  autogenic or iatrogenic origin in Chapter 2 (see page 49). The distribution was 
modelled as a half-normal with a mode of  0 and a standard deviation of  2.49 (see 
Figure I1).
0 2 4 6 8
2.49
1 SD
Figure I1 - Prior probability distribution employed for Bayes calculations of 
likelihood of sentence reduction..
Odds of  sentence increase
With no previous findings on the impact of  autogenic or iatrogenic origin of  
addiction on the likelihood of  sentence increase, probative Bayes Factor calculations 
employed a prior probability distribution derived from our observation across preceding 
studies that a 2:1 odds ratio was a rule-of-thumb requirement for anything more than 
anecdotal evidence of  an effect given sample sizes and response rates. The distribution 
was modelled on a logarithmic scale with a mode of  0 and a standard deviation of  0.35, 
such that two standard deviations from the mean fell at 0.7, the natural log of  2 (see 
Figure I2). 
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1 SD
0             0.7      
0.35
Figure I2 - Prior probability distribution employed for Bayes Factor 
calculations of likelihood of sentence increase.
Willingness to treat
The prior probability distribution employed in Bayes Factor calculations with regard 
to willingness to treat in the Quit, 2quit and Quitfail Maintenance conditions was 
derived from the observed effect in the Cont condition. It was modelled as a normal 
distribution with a mean of  2.7 and a standard deviation of  1.35 (see Figure I3). Bayes 
Factor calculations for estimates of  pooled odds ratios derived standard error assuming a 
fixed-effects model.
-2 0 2 4 6
1.35 2.7
1 SD
Figure I3 - Prior probability distribution employed for Bayes calculations of 
willingness to treat.
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Appendix J
Bayes calculations for Chapter 5
Odds of  sentence reduction
Bayes Factor calculations on the odds of  sentence reduction employed a prior 
probability distribution modelled as a half-normal with a mode of  0 and a standard 
deviation of  1.1, the natural log of  3 (see Figure J1). This distribution was derived from 
similar observed effects in the preceding chapters, accounting for the sensitivity of  the 
data given sample and effect sizes.
0 1 2 3
1.1
1 SD
Figure J1 - Prior probability distribution employed for Bayes calculations of 
likelihood of sentence reduction.
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